Anna Wright
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Anna Wright has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zoltan Matolcsy
University of Technology, Sydney
5 shared publications - Anne Wyatt
University of Queensland
2 shared publications Donald Stokes
1 shared publicationJonathan A. Christy
Oxford University
1 shared publicationSiewan Ren
KPMG CFO Advisory Group Sydney, Australia
1 shared publicationSuzanna Riddell
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
Do Board Characteristics Influence the Shareholders' Assessment of Risk for Small and Large Firms?
This paper investigates the association between board characteristics and shareholders' assessment of their exposure to economic and agency risks as reflected in the volatility of stock returns. Our hypotheses incorporate prior evidence that small and large firms have ‘dramatically’ different board structures, reflecting the firms' different monitoring and advising needs. We hypothesize and find evidence that only the shareholders of well‐established large firms are able to generate positive net benefits, in the form of lower equity risk, from independent boards and well‐connected independent directors with multiple directorships. We also find professional and formal industry degree qualifications on the board are associated with shareholders' risk assessment for some small firms consistent with the focus of small firms on building growth and scale. While we find evidence that formal industry professional affiliations (weak evidence) and MBAs provide benefits for the shareholders of large firms, there is limited evidence that financial expertise on the board systematically influences shareholders' risk assessments for small or large companies. The key conclusion from the evidence in this paper is that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to governance in relation to the board of directors may not meet the diverse needs of companies at different stages of economic development.
Do Board Characteristics Influence the Shareholders' Assessment of Risk for Small and Large Firms?
This paper investigates the association between board characteristics and shareholders' assessment of their exposure to economic and agency risks as reflected in the volatility of stock returns. Our hypotheses incorporate prior evidence that small and large firms have ‘dramatically’ different board structures, reflecting the firms' different monitoring and advising needs. We hypothesize and find evidence that only the shareholders of well‐established large firms are able to generate positive net benefits, in the form of lower equity risk, from independent boards and well‐connected independent directors with multiple directorships. We also find professional and formal industry degree qualifications on the board are associated with shareholders' risk assessment for some small firms consistent with the focus of small firms on building growth and scale. While we find evidence that formal industry professional affiliations (weak evidence) and MBAs provide benefits for the shareholders of large firms, there is limited evidence that financial expertise on the board systematically influences shareholders' risk assessments for small or large companies. The key conclusion from the evidence in this paper is that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to governance in relation to the board of directors may not meet the diverse needs of companies at different stages of economic development.
- 30 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-22
Stock option use by Australian IPOs
- 30 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-22
Stock option use by Australian IPOs
- 16 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 51 (3) , 745-763
CEO compensation structure and firm performance
The objectives of our study are to estimate a model of ‘efficient’ compensation structure based on firm characteristics and test the performance consequences of deviation from the efficient compensation structure. Our results are based on 3503 firm years for the period from 1999 to 2005. The results suggest that firms whose CEOs receive compensation inconsistent with their firm characteristics have a lower performance compared to those firms whose CEOs’ compensation is consistent with their firms’ characteristics. Our measure of performance is based on both accounting and market‐based performance measures. Overall, our study provides some important new insights into the links between CEO compensation structure and firm performance.
- 16 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 51 (3) , 745-763
CEO compensation structure and firm performance
The objectives of our study are to estimate a model of ‘efficient’ compensation structure based on firm characteristics and test the performance consequences of deviation from the efficient compensation structure. Our results are based on 3503 firm years for the period from 1999 to 2005. The results suggest that firms whose CEOs receive compensation inconsistent with their firm characteristics have a lower performance compared to those firms whose CEOs’ compensation is consistent with their firms’ characteristics. Our measure of performance is based on both accounting and market‐based performance measures. Overall, our study provides some important new insights into the links between CEO compensation structure and firm performance.
- 31 December 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 5 (2) , 95-107
Alternative explanations for the association between market values and stock-based compensation expenditure
- 31 December 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 5 (2) , 95-107
Alternative explanations for the association between market values and stock-based compensation expenditure
- 1 November 2007
- Published by Wiley in Australian Accounting Review
- Vol. 17 (43) , 47-59
Australian CEO Compensation: The Descriptive Evidence
CEO compensation has been well documented in the US in the academic and professional literature. However, despite widespread attention by the Australian business community and the federal government to this issue, descriptive evidence on Australian CEOs' compensation contracts is very sparse. Using a sample of large Australian firms for three years, this study provides the first detailed descriptive evidence on both the levels and structures of Australian CEO compensation. The study compares these findings with those from the US and reveals significant variations in CEO compensation contracts between the Australian and US markets.
- 1 November 2007
- Published by Wiley in Australian Accounting Review
- Vol. 17 (43) , 47-59
Australian CEO Compensation: The Descriptive Evidence
CEO compensation has been well documented in the US in the academic and professional literature. However, despite widespread attention by the Australian business community and the federal government to this issue, descriptive evidence on Australian CEOs' compensation contracts is very sparse. Using a sample of large Australian firms for three years, this study provides the first detailed descriptive evidence on both the levels and structures of Australian CEO compensation. The study compares these findings with those from the US and reveals significant variations in CEO compensation contracts between the Australian and US markets.
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Wiley in Australian Accounting Review
- Vol. 14 (32) , 33-40
Do Independent Directors Add Value?
The Australian Stock Exchange's Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations require all listed companies that do not have a majority of independent directors to explain their reasons. We show that independent (outside) directors seem to add value only where their firms have substantial amounts invested in growth options. In these circumstances, outside directors add significant value in their first year on the board and where they have at least three other board positions.
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Wiley in Australian Accounting Review
- Vol. 14 (32) , 33-40
Do Independent Directors Add Value?
The Australian Stock Exchange's Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations require all listed companies that do not have a majority of independent directors to explain their reasons. We show that independent (outside) directors seem to add value only where their firms have substantial amounts invested in growth options. In these circumstances, outside directors add significant value in their first year on the board and where they have at least three other board positions.