Shoaib Ahmed Malik

We present perspectives from six panellists on “Life as a cosmic phenomenon facing human culture”, contrasting our experience and knowledge of life as found on Earth with the vastness of the Universe and the fact that Earth-centric and/or anthropocentric views have repeatedly proven untenable. How does an outwards view of projecting Earth-based experience into the cosmos combine with the inwards view of the potential detection of life beyond Earth telling us who we are?

This article reconstructs Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210) systematic treatment of the jinn in his Great Exegesis (al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr) and his summa The Sublime Objectives in Metaphysics (al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya min al-ʿIlm al-Ilāhī). In these works, al-Rāzī treats the jinn not as a marginal curiosity but as a test case for probing core metaphysical categories such as substance, embodiment, and divine action. His analysis unfolds through a sequence of guiding questions. Do the jinn exist at all? If not, we arrive at (1) the Denialist View. If they do exist, they must be either immaterial or material. The first yields (2) the Immaterialist View. The second raises the further question of whether bodies differ in essence or share a single essence. If they differ, we arrive at (3) the Non-Essentialist Corporealist View. Notably, these first three views are associated, in different ways, with various figures in the falsafa tradition. If they share a single essence, this produces the Essentialist Corporealist position, which then divides according to whether bodily structure is metaphysically necessary for life and agency. If not necessary, this produces (4) the Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Independence View, associated with the Ashʿarīs. If necessary, it leads to (5) the Essentialist Corporealist—Structural Dependence View, associated with the Muʿtazilīs. Al-Rāzī rejects (1) and (5), but he leaves (2), (3), and (4) as live possibilities. While he shows greater sympathy for (4), his broader purpose is not to settle the matter but to map the full range of theological and philosophical options. Al-Rāzī’s comprehensive exposition reflects the wider dialectic between falsafa, Ashʿarī theology, and Muʿtazilī theology, showcasing a sophisticated willingness to engage and entertain multiple metaphysical possibilities side by side. The result is an exercise in systematic metaphysics, where the question of the jinn, as liminal beings, becomes a means for interrogating broader ontological commitments in Islamic theology and philosophy.

This paper recommends a theological turn for the engagement of Islam and Science. There were two identifiable prior phases. Two broad movements typified the first: an attempt to “Islamise” science, and an attempt to show the Qurʾān miraculously contains modern scientific knowledge. The second phase included non-systematic investigations into methodology, divine action, and some localised issues at the Islam and science interface. Nidhal Guessoum proposes the next step should be developing a theistic interpretation of Islam that conforms with modern science as it stands and harmonises Islamic beliefs with science. This presupposes conflicts or serious tensions between traditional Islamic understandings and modern science. This paper argues that a more rigorous exploration into classical and traditional theological approaches could benefit, as it might reveal possibilities in Islam’s theological traditions that do not result in an inherent tension between Islam and science. For instance, in Sunnī theology, we suggest a default “no-conflict” position can be achieved. Such an approach is recommended, since modern Muslim resistance to science, or to certain scientific theories, is often due to perceptions that science challenges Islamic teachings.

This article explores Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210) theological insights on the metaphysical hierarchy of creation to address the question: Can there be extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) superior to human intelligence? By revisiting a long-standing debate in the Islamic tradition concerning the superiority (afḍaliyyah) of angels versus humans, this article positions al-Rāzī as a pivotal case who diverges from the majority Ashʿarī stance by advocating for angelic superiority. Through a detailed analysis of al-Rāzī’s deconstruction of pro-human superiority arguments and his construction of arguments favoring angels, the article demonstrates how his framework challenges anthropocentric assumptions and broadens theological possibilities. If al-Rāzī’s arguments are deemed successful, his scripturally and rationally grounded framework provides a foundation for envisioning ETI that may surpass humanity in spiritual or intellectual rank. This article contributes uniquely by unveiling al-Rāzī’s underexplored ideas on angelic superiority and integrating them into the context of Islam and ETI, thereby advancing modern discourse on Islamic theological anthropology.

This article examines the Ashʿarī theological framework of Imam Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 1490) and its potential for shaping contemporary Muslim engagement with science. At the heart of al-Sanūsī’s thought is a tripartite typology of judgements—legal (ḥukm sharʿī), nomic (ḥukm ʿādī), and rational (ḥukm ʿaqlī)—as articulated in The Preliminaries of Theology (al-Muqaddimāt). This classification distinguishes between rulings grounded in revelation, patterns observed in nature, and conclusions drawn from reason. Unlike other theological approaches, al-Sanūsī’s model integrates core Ashʿarī doctrines such as radical contingency, occasionalism, and divine command theory, offering a coherent synthesis of metaphysics, empirical inquiry, and ethics. Building on recent scholarship that re-engages with Ashʿarī theology in the context of Islam and science, this article argues that al-Sanūsī’s schema offers a meta-framework—one that positions science not merely as an object of analysis but as a locus for theology.

This article critically evaluates Jeffrey Koperski’s decretalism, which presents the laws of nature as divine decrees functioning as constraints rather than dynamic forces. Building on his work, we explore whether his model successfully avoids the implications of occasionalism, as he claims. By analysing his latest publications, we first reconstruct Koperski’s argument and then present three key objections. These include (1) issues related to scientific realism, (2) the principle of simplicity, and (3) the reduction of Koperski’s model to occasionalism. We argue that despite his attempts to distinguish his framework, Koperski’s model ultimately collapses into occasionalism due to the continuous divine sustenance required for natural processes. By engaging with recent developments in metaphysical and scientific debates, this article highlights the limitations of Koperski’s decretalism.

In the nascent discourse of Islam and science, the discussion of how to reconcile evolution with Islam is one of the most, if not the most, pressing concerns. This article reviews the various studies that have looked at the reception of evolution in multiple contexts to highlight the pedagogical challenges that materialise for Muslim students and teachers. It argues that, while recognising the obstacles and challenges mentioned in other studies, the crucial subject matter of Islamic theology (ʿaqīda) is not fully appreciated in those analyses. How and why theology is a vital discussion matter is examined, along with the benefits that it can offer. These insights could provide fodder for teachers and students when discussing the thorny topic of Islam and evolution in classroom settings. This paper’s deliberations could also be of interest to researchers examining the pedagogy and reception of evolution in Muslim contexts.