Mohamed Tkiouat
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mohamed Tkiouat has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adil EL Fakir
Sheffield Hallam University Sheffield Business School Sheffield UK
2 shared publications - Ghita Bennouna1 shared publication
- Youssef Lamrani Alaoui
Ifelab-LERMA, Mohammadia School of Engineering, Mohammed V University, Rabat B.P:8007.N.U, Morocco
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2018
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Board: role, duties and composition
- Vol. 14 (3) , 7-14
PLS ratios negotiability: A repeated game incentive mechanism approach
PLS contracts in Islamic finance are fair economic practices as they focus on sharing profits and loss between the project’s participants. Despite its ethical dimension, moral hazards and adverse selection are the paramount risks in this type of contracts. In this paper we seek reducing moral hazards in the form of the entrepreneur’s effort shirking and if a project optimum lifetime can be identified. To answer these questions, we use a game theory approach in one stage and in a repeated framework. Under each scenario, the participants either fix the capital contributions or negotiate over the sharing ratio or vice-versa. We found theoretical evidence that cooperation can be sustained over a one period game. Cooperation can be sustained in a repeated game only if an appropriate monetary incentive is introduced. However, this incentive can only be given for a specific period before the project’s NPV starts to drop. Indeed, we managed to find that period, called duration, for which the financier NPV is maximized. This duration can be proposed to be used as the optimum lifetime of the contract.
- 12 October 2018
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Board: role, duties and composition
- Vol. 14 (3) , 7-14
Open AccessPLS ratios negotiability: A repeated game incentive mechanism approach
PLS contracts in Islamic finance are fair economic practices as they focus on sharing profits and loss between the project’s participants. Despite its ethical dimension, moral hazards and adverse selection are the paramount risks in this type of contracts. In this paper we seek reducing moral hazards in the form of the entrepreneur’s effort shirking and if a project optimum lifetime can be identified. To answer these questions, we use a game theory approach in one stage and in a repeated framework. Under each scenario, the participants either fix the capital contributions or negotiate over the sharing ratio or vice-versa. We found theoretical evidence that cooperation can be sustained over a one period game. Cooperation can be sustained in a repeated game only if an appropriate monetary incentive is introduced. However, this incentive can only be given for a specific period before the project’s NPV starts to drop. Indeed, we managed to find that period, called duration, for which the financier NPV is maximized. This duration can be proposed to be used as the optimum lifetime of the contract.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Journal of Engineering Business Management
- Vol. 10
Risks assessment in Moroccan microfinance sector
Managing risks is very significant for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to guarantee their financial soundness, to achieve their social objectives and then to encourage donors and investors to participate in microfinance industry financing. Risks impacts on MFIs differ considerably which make their prioritizing a highly important task to figure out the candidate risks to be mitigated or tolerated. This article provides a clear picture of the most serious risks affecting the microfinance sector in Morocco. We used an approach that combines the interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IVIFSs) and the technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) method to deal with the lack of sufficient statistical data and the subjectivity of the experts’ judgement in risk rating. A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to show the impact of criteria weights on the decision process and to examine the robustness of the model results.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Journal of Engineering Business Management
- Vol. 10
Open AccessRisks assessment in Moroccan microfinance sector
Managing risks is very significant for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to guarantee their financial soundness, to achieve their social objectives and then to encourage donors and investors to participate in microfinance industry financing. Risks impacts on MFIs differ considerably which make their prioritizing a highly important task to figure out the candidate risks to be mitigated or tolerated. This article provides a clear picture of the most serious risks affecting the microfinance sector in Morocco. We used an approach that combines the interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IVIFSs) and the technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) method to deal with the lack of sufficient statistical data and the subjectivity of the experts’ judgement in risk rating. A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to show the impact of criteria weights on the decision process and to examine the robustness of the model results.
- Open Access
- 6 December 2016
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions
- Vol. 6 (4) , 268-273
Stochastic model of microcredit interest rate in Morocco
Access to microcredit can have a beneficial effect on the well-being of low-income households excluded from the traditional banking system. It allows this population to receive affordable financial services to help them to meet their needs and to improve their living conditions. However to provide access to credit, microfinance institutions should ensure not only their social mission but also commercial and financial mission to enable the institution to perpetuate and become self-sufficient. To this end, MFIs (microfinance institutions) must apply an interest rate that covers their costs and risk, while generating profits, Also microentrepreneurs need, to this end, to ensure the profitability of their activities. This paper presents the microfinance sector in Morocco. It focuses then on the interest rate applied by the Moroccan microfinance institutions; it provides also a comparative study between Morocco and other comparable countries in terms of interest rates charged to borrowers. Finally, this article presents a stochastic model of the interest rate in microcredit built in random loan repayment periods and on a real example of the program of loans of microfinance institution in Morocco.
- 6 December 2016
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions
- Vol. 6 (4) , 268-273
Open AccessStochastic model of microcredit interest rate in Morocco
Access to microcredit can have a beneficial effect on the well-being of low-income households excluded from the traditional banking system. It allows this population to receive affordable financial services to help them to meet their needs and to improve their living conditions. However to provide access to credit, microfinance institutions should ensure not only their social mission but also commercial and financial mission to enable the institution to perpetuate and become self-sufficient. To this end, MFIs (microfinance institutions) must apply an interest rate that covers their costs and risk, while generating profits, Also microentrepreneurs need, to this end, to ensure the profitability of their activities. This paper presents the microfinance sector in Morocco. It focuses then on the interest rate applied by the Moroccan microfinance institutions; it provides also a comparative study between Morocco and other comparable countries in terms of interest rates charged to borrowers. Finally, this article presents a stochastic model of the interest rate in microcredit built in random loan repayment periods and on a real example of the program of loans of microfinance institution in Morocco.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 13 (4) , 520-525
Profit and loss sharing contracts as a prisoners dilemma: An agent based simulation with game theory application to participative finance
PLS contracts, Like Musharakah in participative finance, represent a practice of profit and loss sharing contracts. It is claimed to be a fair economic mode of investment as it entails the sharing, by the participants, of profits and risks. This mode of financing, however, suffers from asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection and moral hazards. In this Agent based simulation we managed to apply a repeated game theoretical approach to PLS financing using an agent based simulation tool called Net- logo. The purpose is to test whether PLS contracts are representative of a prisoner’s dilemma game. We have identified different parameters which are used to calculate the payoffs of the bank and the enterprise which seeks financing. Each agent in this simu- lation has some strategies that he/she can use through the game. We have managed to run the simulation1000 times for different model parameters under each combination of the agent’s strategies. We have found evidence that PLS contracts are not represen- tatives of a a prisoner dilemma game as mutual cooperation does not lead to a better payoff to the corporation than mutual defection. Over a repeated process, however, we found simulation evidence that the threat by the bank to apply an unforgiving strat- egy towards defection, leads to a cooperative behavior by the corporation through the strategy Tit-for-Tats.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 13 (4) , 520-525
Open AccessProfit and loss sharing contracts as a prisoners dilemma: An agent based simulation with game theory application to participative finance
PLS contracts, Like Musharakah in participative finance, represent a practice of profit and loss sharing contracts. It is claimed to be a fair economic mode of investment as it entails the sharing, by the participants, of profits and risks. This mode of financing, however, suffers from asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection and moral hazards. In this Agent based simulation we managed to apply a repeated game theoretical approach to PLS financing using an agent based simulation tool called Net- logo. The purpose is to test whether PLS contracts are representative of a prisoner’s dilemma game. We have identified different parameters which are used to calculate the payoffs of the bank and the enterprise which seeks financing. Each agent in this simu- lation has some strategies that he/she can use through the game. We have managed to run the simulation1000 times for different model parameters under each combination of the agent’s strategies. We have found evidence that PLS contracts are not represen- tatives of a a prisoner dilemma game as mutual cooperation does not lead to a better payoff to the corporation than mutual defection. Over a repeated process, however, we found simulation evidence that the threat by the bank to apply an unforgiving strat- egy towards defection, leads to a cooperative behavior by the corporation through the strategy Tit-for-Tats.