Diarmaid Harkin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Diarmaid Harkin has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Adam Molnar
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
3 shared publications- Chad Whelan
Deakin University
3 shared publications - Benoît Dupont
Université de Montréal
2 shared publications - James Martin
Deakin University
2 shared publications - Andi Brown
School of Social Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
1 shared publication Erica Vowles
Melbourne, Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Police Practice and Research
- Vol. 27 (2) , 289-309
‘The name of the game’: policing perspectives on cybercrime disruption
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Police Practice and Research
- Vol. 27 (2) , 289-309
Top Cited PapersOpen Access‘The name of the game’: policing perspectives on cybercrime disruption
- Open Access
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in Policy & Internet
- Vol. 17 (2)
Regulating Tools for Hacking: Limitations, Challenges and Possibilities
Tools developed for the purpose of unilaterally exploiting computer systems and their communications will pose a persistent policy and regulatory problem. Regulation of hacking tools to date, however, has been piecemeal, inconsistent and often incoherent. Some of this incoherence is a result of semantic uncertainty about how to define hacking tools with scholarship, commentary, and regulatory efforts using a variety of terminology to refer to a related set of items that have no clear definitional boundaries or technical coherence. This paper attempts to reconcile these semantic issues with the need to take productive regulatory steps by articulating how hacking tools emerge from multiple sources that have different ecologies of production and distribution creating unique regulatory challenges and dynamics. Reflecting on these challenges can inform better governance of hacking capabilities whilst also identifying clear regulatory constraints that will persist over the long‐term.
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in Policy & Internet
- Vol. 17 (2)
Open AccessRegulating Tools for Hacking: Limitations, Challenges and Possibilities
Tools developed for the purpose of unilaterally exploiting computer systems and their communications will pose a persistent policy and regulatory problem. Regulation of hacking tools to date, however, has been piecemeal, inconsistent and often incoherent. Some of this incoherence is a result of semantic uncertainty about how to define hacking tools with scholarship, commentary, and regulatory efforts using a variety of terminology to refer to a related set of items that have no clear definitional boundaries or technical coherence. This paper attempts to reconcile these semantic issues with the need to take productive regulatory steps by articulating how hacking tools emerge from multiple sources that have different ecologies of production and distribution creating unique regulatory challenges and dynamics. Reflecting on these challenges can inform better governance of hacking capabilities whilst also identifying clear regulatory constraints that will persist over the long‐term.
- Open Access
- 24 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Deviant Behavior
- Vol. 46 (9) , 1213-1230
Expertise Integration in Cybercrime Policing: Exploring Civilian Career Lifecycles
- 24 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Deviant Behavior
- Vol. 46 (9) , 1213-1230
Open AccessExpertise Integration in Cybercrime Policing: Exploring Civilian Career Lifecycles
- Open Access
- 2 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Violence Against Women
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1039-1062
Safeguarding the “Internet of Things” for Victim-Survivors of Domestic and Family Violence: Anticipating Exploitative Use and Encouraging Safety-by-Design
Smart, Internet-connected devices—the so-called “Internet of Things” (IoT)—pose significant threats to victim-survivors of domestic and family violence (DFV). IoT systems have been used to abuse, harass, monitor, intimidate, and gaslight victim-survivors. We present findings from an abusability analysis that examined 13 IoT devices and allowed us to make several observations about common vulnerabilities to victim-survivors of DFV. We argue that IoT manufacturers must be encouraged to factor in the implications of DFV in the design of their products. Additionally, technology-facilitated abuse in DFV contexts must feature in industry and government safety-by-design approaches. Our results suggest ways IoT devices can be modified at low cost to alleviate opportunities for misuse, and we endorse IoT manufacturers to consider those risks early in the design stage.
- 2 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Violence Against Women
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1039-1062
Open AccessSafeguarding the “Internet of Things” for Victim-Survivors of Domestic and Family Violence: Anticipating Exploitative Use and Encouraging Safety-by-Design
Smart, Internet-connected devices—the so-called “Internet of Things” (IoT)—pose significant threats to victim-survivors of domestic and family violence (DFV). IoT systems have been used to abuse, harass, monitor, intimidate, and gaslight victim-survivors. We present findings from an abusability analysis that examined 13 IoT devices and allowed us to make several observations about common vulnerabilities to victim-survivors of DFV. We argue that IoT manufacturers must be encouraged to factor in the implications of DFV in the design of their products. Additionally, technology-facilitated abuse in DFV contexts must feature in industry and government safety-by-design approaches. Our results suggest ways IoT devices can be modified at low cost to alleviate opportunities for misuse, and we endorse IoT manufacturers to consider those risks early in the design stage.
- Open Access
- 14 June 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Digital Journalism
- Vol. 13 (10) , 1735-1754
Electronic Surveillance and Australian Journalism: Surveillance Normalization and Emergent Norms of Information Security
- 14 June 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Digital Journalism
- Vol. 13 (10) , 1735-1754
Open AccessElectronic Surveillance and Australian Journalism: Surveillance Normalization and Emergent Norms of Information Security
- 28 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Violence Against Women
- Vol. 29 (3-4) , 648-670
Technology-Based Responses to Technology-Facilitated Domestic and Family Violence: An Overview of the Limits and Possibilities of Tech-Based “Solutions”
It is increasingly common for domestic and family violence to have an element of technology-facilitated abuse (TFA). As a result, technology-based responses have emerged to address TFA. Using observations from several empirical research projects into TFA, it will be shown that technology-based responses are necessary without being sufficient, and that they have persistent limitations that need to be recognized. Relatedly, it will be argued that there should be an ongoing emphasis on the development of human resources as a support for those experiencing TFA, particularly the use of professional DV support workers.
- 28 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Violence Against Women
- Vol. 29 (3-4) , 648-670
Technology-Based Responses to Technology-Facilitated Domestic and Family Violence: An Overview of the Limits and Possibilities of Tech-Based “Solutions”
It is increasingly common for domestic and family violence to have an element of technology-facilitated abuse (TFA). As a result, technology-based responses have emerged to address TFA. Using observations from several empirical research projects into TFA, it will be shown that technology-based responses are necessary without being sufficient, and that they have persistent limitations that need to be recognized. Relatedly, it will be argued that there should be an ongoing emphasis on the development of human resources as a support for those experiencing TFA, particularly the use of professional DV support workers.
- Open Access
- 10 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Crime, Law and Social Change
- Vol. 79 (1) , 83-100
Exploring the social implications of buying and selling cyber security
Governments, businesses, private citizens and even organised crime are increasingly investing in cyber security, with the cyber security industry growing in size and relevance. This paper demonstrates that markets for the buying and selling of cyber security should be subject to many of the same critical inquiries typically targeted at the private security industry. Using a number of illustrative examples of emerging trends in the commodification of cyber security it will be highlighted how these markets create significant social impacts and present similar dilemmas of democracy, justice, sovereignty, and deleterious side-effects for wider society. Key conceptual differences between cyber security commodities and ‘conventional’ security commodities will also be considered before arguing for an inter-disciplinary research agenda into the considerable social implications of the buying and selling of cyber security commodities.
- 10 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Crime, Law and Social Change
- Vol. 79 (1) , 83-100
Open AccessExploring the social implications of buying and selling cyber security
Governments, businesses, private citizens and even organised crime are increasingly investing in cyber security, with the cyber security industry growing in size and relevance. This paper demonstrates that markets for the buying and selling of cyber security should be subject to many of the same critical inquiries typically targeted at the private security industry. Using a number of illustrative examples of emerging trends in the commodification of cyber security it will be highlighted how these markets create significant social impacts and present similar dilemmas of democracy, justice, sovereignty, and deleterious side-effects for wider society. Key conceptual differences between cyber security commodities and ‘conventional’ security commodities will also be considered before arguing for an inter-disciplinary research agenda into the considerable social implications of the buying and selling of cyber security commodities.
- Open Access
- 21 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Policy & Internet
- Vol. 14 (1) , 96-113
Consumer IoT and its under‐regulation: Findings from an Australian study
The expansive growth of consumer internet of things (IoT) has created a range of concerns around privacy, security, and their broader societal impacts. This article reports on findings from interviews with 32 key stakeholders from the fields of information security, policy and regulation, the IoT industry, consumer and privacy law, and academia in Australia. It details a broad variety of issues and concerns that go beyond the well‐recognised issue of privacy or the technical standards of information security, to encompass a wider set of issues regarding the implications for vulnerable communities, the environment and industrial standards of IoT production. Most key stakeholders expressed the view that more robust regulation is required in Australia, but no clear regulatory priority or strategy was identified by our sample. The implications of these findings for further regulation of consumer IoT and future regulatory strategies are considered.
- 21 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Policy & Internet
- Vol. 14 (1) , 96-113
Open AccessConsumer IoT and its under‐regulation: Findings from an Australian study
The expansive growth of consumer internet of things (IoT) has created a range of concerns around privacy, security, and their broader societal impacts. This article reports on findings from interviews with 32 key stakeholders from the fields of information security, policy and regulation, the IoT industry, consumer and privacy law, and academia in Australia. It details a broad variety of issues and concerns that go beyond the well‐recognised issue of privacy or the technical standards of information security, to encompass a wider set of issues regarding the implications for vulnerable communities, the environment and industrial standards of IoT production. Most key stakeholders expressed the view that more robust regulation is required in Australia, but no clear regulatory priority or strategy was identified by our sample. The implications of these findings for further regulation of consumer IoT and future regulatory strategies are considered.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Criminology
- Vol. 54 (4) , 521-538
The uncertain commodity of ‘security’: Are private security companies ‘value for money’ for domestic violence services?
Reflecting on Loader and White ’s (2018) suggestion that the labour of private security workers is difficult to ‘commodify’, this paper uses original empirical data to show that there are four elements to what private security workers ‘do’ for victims of domestic violence when contracted by domestic violence advocacy services: they provide (a) practical ‘target-hardening’ measures, (b) ‘expert’ advice on security, (c) forms of ‘security therapy’ as workers talk clients through their safety-based anxieties and (d) forms of ‘security theatre’ as workers provide the appearance of providing security despite the efficacy often being unclear or uncertain. Each of these elements have significant risks that can threaten the interests of victims and domestic violence services.
- 11 October 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Criminology
- Vol. 54 (4) , 521-538
The uncertain commodity of ‘security’: Are private security companies ‘value for money’ for domestic violence services?
Reflecting on Loader and White ’s (2018) suggestion that the labour of private security workers is difficult to ‘commodify’, this paper uses original empirical data to show that there are four elements to what private security workers ‘do’ for victims of domestic violence when contracted by domestic violence advocacy services: they provide (a) practical ‘target-hardening’ measures, (b) ‘expert’ advice on security, (c) forms of ‘security therapy’ as workers talk clients through their safety-based anxieties and (d) forms of ‘security theatre’ as workers provide the appearance of providing security despite the efficacy often being unclear or uncertain. Each of these elements have significant risks that can threaten the interests of victims and domestic violence services.
- 17 June 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Violence Against Women
- Vol. 27 (6-7) , 851-875
Operating-System Design and Its Implications for Victims of Family Violence: The Comparative Threat of Smart Phone Spyware for Android Versus iPhone Users
Spyware products sold to general consumer audiences are a greater threat to those who own Android devices than those who own iPhones. This is a consequence of the Android operating system being more permissive of software functionality, allowing third-party developers greater latitude to build programs of less-restrained capability. Such risks, however, are disproportionately carried by victims of family violence who are significantly threatened by the rise of spyware. This article reflects on the connections between coding choices and personal security risks, and the implications for responding to the use of spyware in the context of family violence.
- 17 June 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Violence Against Women
- Vol. 27 (6-7) , 851-875
Operating-System Design and Its Implications for Victims of Family Violence: The Comparative Threat of Smart Phone Spyware for Android Versus iPhone Users
Spyware products sold to general consumer audiences are a greater threat to those who own Android devices than those who own iPhones. This is a consequence of the Android operating system being more permissive of software functionality, allowing third-party developers greater latitude to build programs of less-restrained capability. Such risks, however, are disproportionately carried by victims of family violence who are significantly threatened by the rise of spyware. This article reflects on the connections between coding choices and personal security risks, and the implications for responding to the use of spyware in the context of family violence.