Kai Bu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Kai Bu has a total of 92 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kui Ren
Zhejiang University
6 shared publications - Anxiao He
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
4 shared publications - Bin Xiao
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
4 shared publications Linfeng Cheng
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
3 shared publications- Qian-Ping Gu
Simon Fraser University
3 shared publications - Shigeng Zhang
Central South University
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 6 February 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (3) , 6183-6195
SwiftOracle: Orthogonality-Driven Private Multipath Validation
Path validation enables end-hosts to regulate and verify packet forwarding that otherwise remains transparent in the current internet architecture. It promises various guarantees in security and privacy for internet users. Recent advances in path validation start to secure multipath routing and protect path privacy. However, state-of-the-art private multipath validation limit in efficiency and may not apply to relatively large networks due to impractically long proofs. In this paper, we propose SwiftOracle that leverages orthogonality to achieve efficient private multipath validation. SwiftOracle uses orthogonal vectors as alternative keys; this enables much efficient proof computation. To protect path privacy, SwiftOracle only allows each router to know limited neighborship information. Furthermore, we develop constant-size proofs for SwiftOracle to guarantee scalability in large-scale networks. We implement SwiftOracle using DPDK and evaluate its performance in comparison with state-of-the-art VALNET. The results show that SwiftOracle can deliver 6$\times$ faster computation speed, support at least 4$\times$ larger network scale with more intricate topologies, and yield over 21$\times$ higher throughput on average.
- 6 February 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23  (3) , 6183-6195
SwiftOracle: Orthogonality-Driven Private Multipath Validation
Path validation enables end-hosts to regulate and verify packet forwarding that otherwise remains transparent in the current internet architecture. It promises various guarantees in security and privacy for internet users. Recent advances in path validation start to secure multipath routing and protect path privacy. However, state-of-the-art private multipath validation limit in efficiency and may not apply to relatively large networks due to impractically long proofs. In this paper, we propose SwiftOracle that leverages orthogonality to achieve efficient private multipath validation. SwiftOracle uses orthogonal vectors as alternative keys; this enables much efficient proof computation. To protect path privacy, SwiftOracle only allows each router to know limited neighborship information. Furthermore, we develop constant-size proofs for SwiftOracle to guarantee scalability in large-scale networks. We implement SwiftOracle using DPDK and evaluate its performance in comparison with state-of-the-art VALNET. The results show that SwiftOracle can deliver 6$\times$ faster computation speed, support at least 4$\times$ larger network scale with more intricate topologies, and yield over 21$\times$ higher throughput on average.
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22  (6) , 7319-7333
Privacy-Preserving Decision Graph Inference From Homomorphic Lookup Table
This paper studies MPC based decision graph inference (MDGI) where decision graphs (generalization of decision trees) are very popular machine learning models. In MDGI, a modeler holding a private model and a data owner holding private feature vectors jointly run model inference on each vector through an MPC protocol, which outputs the inference result without revealing the model or vector. Several noteworthy MDGI solutions have been proposed, but they remain unsatisfactory for large models due to the high communication cost of oblivious decision, the most complex component in MDGI. Oblivious decision securely evaluates binary tests (Boolean-valued functions) over features without revealing test type, parameter, feature index, or value. All constant-round oblivious decision protocols suffer from high communication costs due to bitwise encryption and transmission. Moreover, most support only one of the three common test types: threshold comparison, equality test, and set containment. We propose Homomorphic Lookup Table (HLT), a novel MPC technique for oblivious decision. HLT circumvents the bitwiseencryption and heavy-communication issue by adopting tablelookup-style computation and amortizing the cost of encrypted table transfer across many inferences. We carefully design the table structure and lookup rules, and integrate homomorphic encryption to optimize performance and support multiple test types. HLT achieves 78 × −4151× reduction in communication for oblivious decision, and is the first method to support all three common test types. Based on HLT, we design constant-round MDGI solutions for two widely used decision graphs: decision trees and scorecards. This is the first privacy-preserving solution for scorecards, and our decision tree solution reduces communication by 27 × −321×.
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22  (6) , 7319-7333
Privacy-Preserving Decision Graph Inference From Homomorphic Lookup Table
This paper studies MPC based decision graph inference (MDGI) where decision graphs (generalization of decision trees) are very popular machine learning models. In MDGI, a modeler holding a private model and a data owner holding private feature vectors jointly run model inference on each vector through an MPC protocol, which outputs the inference result without revealing the model or vector. Several noteworthy MDGI solutions have been proposed, but they remain unsatisfactory for large models due to the high communication cost of oblivious decision, the most complex component in MDGI. Oblivious decision securely evaluates binary tests (Boolean-valued functions) over features without revealing test type, parameter, feature index, or value. All constant-round oblivious decision protocols suffer from high communication costs due to bitwise encryption and transmission. Moreover, most support only one of the three common test types: threshold comparison, equality test, and set containment. We propose Homomorphic Lookup Table (HLT), a novel MPC technique for oblivious decision. HLT circumvents the bitwiseencryption and heavy-communication issue by adopting tablelookup-style computation and amortizing the cost of encrypted table transfer across many inferences. We carefully design the table structure and lookup rules, and integrate homomorphic encryption to optimize performance and support multiple test types. HLT achieves 78 × −4151× reduction in communication for oblivious decision, and is the first method to support all three common test types. Based on HLT, we design constant-round MDGI solutions for two widely used decision graphs: decision trees and scorecards. This is the first privacy-preserving solution for scorecards, and our decision tree solution reduces communication by 27 × −321×.
- 16 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21  (5) , 4574-4588
TreasureCache: Hiding Cache Evictions Against Side-Channel Attacks
Cache side-channel attacks remain a stubborn source of cross-core secret leakage. Such attacks exploit the timing difference between cache hits and misses. Most defenses thus choose to prevent cache evictions. Given that two possible types of evictions—flush-based and conflict-based—use different architectural features, these defenses have to integrate hybrid defense strategies, incur OS modification, and sacrifice performance to completely throttle cache side-channel attacks. In this paper, we present TreasureCache against cache side-channel attacks without modifying OS or sacrificing performance. Instead of preventing cache evictions with various costs, we advocate to allow cache evictions as is and hide exploitable evictions in our specialized small eviction-hidden buffer. The buffer guarantees a fast hit time comparative to LLC hits. This instantly closes the timing gap between accessing exploitable blocks when they are in and out of the LLC. Moreover, with the help of our buffer, we no longer have to disable flush instructions or shared memory. A lightweight constant-time flush instruction can help TreasureCache to prevent both flush-based and conflict-based side-channel attacks. We validate TreasureCache security and performance through extensive experiments. With a hardware overhead of less than 0.5%, TreasureCache reduces the secret-leakage resolution by about 1,000 times without introducing any performance slowdown.
- 16 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21  (5) , 4574-4588
TreasureCache: Hiding Cache Evictions Against Side-Channel Attacks
Cache side-channel attacks remain a stubborn source of cross-core secret leakage. Such attacks exploit the timing difference between cache hits and misses. Most defenses thus choose to prevent cache evictions. Given that two possible types of evictions—flush-based and conflict-based—use different architectural features, these defenses have to integrate hybrid defense strategies, incur OS modification, and sacrifice performance to completely throttle cache side-channel attacks. In this paper, we present TreasureCache against cache side-channel attacks without modifying OS or sacrificing performance. Instead of preventing cache evictions with various costs, we advocate to allow cache evictions as is and hide exploitable evictions in our specialized small eviction-hidden buffer. The buffer guarantees a fast hit time comparative to LLC hits. This instantly closes the timing gap between accessing exploitable blocks when they are in and out of the LLC. Moreover, with the help of our buffer, we no longer have to disable flush instructions or shared memory. A lightweight constant-time flush instruction can help TreasureCache to prevent both flush-based and conflict-based side-channel attacks. We validate TreasureCache security and performance through extensive experiments. With a hardware overhead of less than 0.5%, TreasureCache reduces the secret-leakage resolution by about 1,000 times without introducing any performance slowdown.
- 14 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21  (4) , 2720-2734
SwiftParade: Anti-Burst Multipath Validation
Path validation promises a necessary security add-on for future Internet architectures. It authenticates not only source identities but also the exact path where a packet forwards through. This offers users more flexibility and reliability in network services. Most existing solutions focus on single-path validation that pre-correlates a packet to a specific forwarding path. However, parallel transmissions in multipath routing tend to induce bursty traffic that is hardly validated in time by existing solutions. In this paper, we present SwiftParade as the first attempt toward anti-burst multipath validation. It proposes a composite validation technique that can simultaneously validate a group of packets likely from multiple different paths. This helps to amortize the validation overhead across packets of the entire group instead of imposing the validation overhead equally on every packet. To implement composite validation, SwiftParade further explores a noncommutative homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme. We prove effectiveness and security of SwiftParade through theoretical analysis. We also conduct extensive experiments to evaluate SwiftParade performance. The results show that SwiftParade offers high efficiency and applicability to multipath validation with complex routing topologies. In comparison with the state-of-the-art multipath validation solution—Atlas, SwiftParade speeds up packet processing by 2.5× $\sim 8.3\times$ and increases communication throughput by 2.8× $\sim 10.2\times$ .
- 14 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 21  (4) , 2720-2734
SwiftParade: Anti-Burst Multipath Validation
Path validation promises a necessary security add-on for future Internet architectures. It authenticates not only source identities but also the exact path where a packet forwards through. This offers users more flexibility and reliability in network services. Most existing solutions focus on single-path validation that pre-correlates a packet to a specific forwarding path. However, parallel transmissions in multipath routing tend to induce bursty traffic that is hardly validated in time by existing solutions. In this paper, we present SwiftParade as the first attempt toward anti-burst multipath validation. It proposes a composite validation technique that can simultaneously validate a group of packets likely from multiple different paths. This helps to amortize the validation overhead across packets of the entire group instead of imposing the validation overhead equally on every packet. To implement composite validation, SwiftParade further explores a noncommutative homomorphic asymmetric encryption scheme. We prove effectiveness and security of SwiftParade through theoretical analysis. We also conduct extensive experiments to evaluate SwiftParade performance. The results show that SwiftParade offers high efficiency and applicability to multipath validation with complex routing topologies. In comparison with the state-of-the-art multipath validation solution—Atlas, SwiftParade speeds up packet processing by 2.5× $\sim 8.3\times$ and increases communication throughput by 2.8× $\sim 10.2\times$ .
- 27 February 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 72  (8) , 2321-2335
Hitchhiker: Accelerating ORAM With Dynamic Scheduling
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) remains a bittersweet protection of memory access patterns because of its prohibitively high overhead. The root cause is that ORAM hides intended accesses among a sufficiently large number of dummy accesses. Most existing optimizations mitigate memory accesses using architectural enhancements (e.g., cache) yet few of them improve the efficiency of ORAM primitives per se. In this paper, we identify path-grained static scheduling as a fundamental ORAM performance bottleneck. We propose level-grained dynamic scheduling that directly optimizes ORAM primitives to boost efficiency. It enables ORAM to service more than one request per path and write paths batch wise. We can thus boost ORAM efficiency through handling queued requests as soon as possible and remove as many redundant accesses as possible. Since optimized memory accesses still target the same set of paths, dynamic scheduling preserves ORAM security. We implement dynamic scheduling through Hitchhiker ORAM. In comparison with the state-of-the-art primitive-optimized Fork Path ORAM, Hitchhiker ORAM yields 31.5% fewer memory accesses, 60.2% shorter latency, and 40.7% less energy consumption, being 2.5× faster. In comparison with the state-of-the-art architecture-optimized$\rho$ , Hitchhiker ORAM is 1.5× faster and the integrated version—$\rho$ -Hitchhiker ORAM is 2.0× faster.- 27 February 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 72  (8) , 2321-2335
Hitchhiker: Accelerating ORAM With Dynamic Scheduling
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) remains a bittersweet protection of memory access patterns because of its prohibitively high overhead. The root cause is that ORAM hides intended accesses among a sufficiently large number of dummy accesses. Most existing optimizations mitigate memory accesses using architectural enhancements (e.g., cache) yet few of them improve the efficiency of ORAM primitives per se. In this paper, we identify path-grained static scheduling as a fundamental ORAM performance bottleneck. We propose level-grained dynamic scheduling that directly optimizes ORAM primitives to boost efficiency. It enables ORAM to service more than one request per path and write paths batch wise. We can thus boost ORAM efficiency through handling queued requests as soon as possible and remove as many redundant accesses as possible. Since optimized memory accesses still target the same set of paths, dynamic scheduling preserves ORAM security. We implement dynamic scheduling through Hitchhiker ORAM. In comparison with the state-of-the-art primitive-optimized Fork Path ORAM, Hitchhiker ORAM yields 31.5% fewer memory accesses, 60.2% shorter latency, and 40.7% less energy consumption, being 2.5× faster. In comparison with the state-of-the-art architecture-optimized$\rho$ , Hitchhiker ORAM is 1.5× faster and the integrated version—$\rho$ -Hitchhiker ORAM is 2.0× faster.- 13 January 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 18  (15566013) , 1268-1282
Hummingbird: Dynamic Path Validation With Hidden Equal-Probability Sampling
Path validation has already been incrementally deployed in the Internet architecture. It secures packet forwarding by enabling end hosts to negotiate specific forwarding paths and enforcing on-path routers to prove their forwarding behaviors along these paths. Most existing path validation solutions target static paths, paying less attention to fully dynamic paths that support flexible routing. In this paper, we present Hummingbird as the first validation solution over fully dynamic paths. It features a hidden equal-probability sampling technique. Gaining efficiency via routers probabilistically sampling packets to validate, we craft the sampling probability such that each router validates a similar amount of packets given an unknown path length. We further hide the state of whether a packet has been sampled and validated using a lightweight, non-cryptographic scheme. This prevents attackers from differentiating and selectively mis-forwarding packets. We validate security and efficiency of Hummingbird through both theoretical proof and experimental evaluation.
- 13 January 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 18  (15566013) , 1268-1282
Hummingbird: Dynamic Path Validation With Hidden Equal-Probability Sampling
Path validation has already been incrementally deployed in the Internet architecture. It secures packet forwarding by enabling end hosts to negotiate specific forwarding paths and enforcing on-path routers to prove their forwarding behaviors along these paths. Most existing path validation solutions target static paths, paying less attention to fully dynamic paths that support flexible routing. In this paper, we present Hummingbird as the first validation solution over fully dynamic paths. It features a hidden equal-probability sampling technique. Gaining efficiency via routers probabilistically sampling packets to validate, we craft the sampling probability such that each router validates a similar amount of packets given an unknown path length. We further hide the state of whether a packet has been sampled and validated using a lightweight, non-cryptographic scheme. This prevents attackers from differentiating and selectively mis-forwarding packets. We validate security and efficiency of Hummingbird through both theoretical proof and experimental evaluation.
- 8 August 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 31  (1) , 395-407
RuleOut Forwarding Anomalies for SDN
Reliable Software-Defined Networking (SDN) should mitigate forwarding anomalies due to cross-plane rule inconsistencies. Most existing countermeasures either inject probe packets to infer forwarding correctness or collect packet traces to detect forwarding anomalies. They, however, cannot detect or filter forwarding anomalies for production packets in real time. In this paper, we propose RuleOut as the first attempt to automatically throttle SDN forwarding anomalies. It disambiguates dependent rules via augmenting their matching fields with unique tags. Leveraging source routing, we further bind each packet with the tag sequence corresponding to rules the packet should match. RuleOut thus renders each packet to match at most one rule on each switch. This completely addresses the root cause of forwarding ambiguity. To implement RuleOut, we develop a non-overlapping rule dependency graph, a series of algorithms for incremental rule update and tag generation upon it, and various optimization techniques toward scalability and efficiency. We prototype RuleOut on the Ryu controller and Open vSwitch and evaluate its performance over public rule sets such as Stanford, Internet2, and Airtel1. RuleOut can use tags of only several bits long to disambiguate thousands to millions of rules and generate tags fairly fast within a few milliseconds.
- 8 August 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 31  (1) , 395-407
RuleOut Forwarding Anomalies for SDN
Reliable Software-Defined Networking (SDN) should mitigate forwarding anomalies due to cross-plane rule inconsistencies. Most existing countermeasures either inject probe packets to infer forwarding correctness or collect packet traces to detect forwarding anomalies. They, however, cannot detect or filter forwarding anomalies for production packets in real time. In this paper, we propose RuleOut as the first attempt to automatically throttle SDN forwarding anomalies. It disambiguates dependent rules via augmenting their matching fields with unique tags. Leveraging source routing, we further bind each packet with the tag sequence corresponding to rules the packet should match. RuleOut thus renders each packet to match at most one rule on each switch. This completely addresses the root cause of forwarding ambiguity. To implement RuleOut, we develop a non-overlapping rule dependency graph, a series of algorithms for incremental rule update and tag generation upon it, and various optimization techniques toward scalability and efficiency. We prototype RuleOut on the Ryu controller and Open vSwitch and evaluate its performance over public rule sets such as Stanford, Internet2, and Airtel1. RuleOut can use tags of only several bits long to disambiguate thousands to millions of rules and generate tags fairly fast within a few milliseconds.
- Open Access
Towards Practical Deployment-Stage Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networks
One major goal of the AI security community is to securely and reliably produce and deploy deep learning models for real-world applications. To this end, data poisoning based backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) in the production stage (or training stage) and corresponding defenses are extensively explored in recent years. Ironically, backdoor attacks in the deployment stage, which can often happen in unprofessional users' devices and are thus arguably far more threatening in real-world scenarios, draw much less attention of the community. We attribute this imbalance of vigilance to the weak practicality of existing deployment-stage backdoor attack algorithms and the insufficiency of real-world attack demonstrations. To fill the blank, in this work, we study the realistic threat of deployment-stage backdoor attacks on DNNs. We base our study on a commonly used deployment-stage attack paradigm -- adversarial weight attack, where adversaries selectively modify model weights to embed backdoor into deployed DNNs. To approach realistic practicality, we propose the first gray-box and physically realizable weights attack algorithm for backdoor injection, namely subnet replacement attack (SRA), which only requires architecture information of the victim model and can support physical triggers in the real world. Extensive experimental simulations and system-level real-world attack demonstrations are conducted. Our results not only suggest the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed attack algorithm, but also reveal the practical risk of a novel type of computer virus that may widely spread and stealthily inject backdoor into DNN models in user devices. By our study, we call for more attention to the vulnerability of DNNs in the deployment stage.
Open AccessTowards Practical Deployment-Stage Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networks
One major goal of the AI security community is to securely and reliably produce and deploy deep learning models for real-world applications. To this end, data poisoning based backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) in the production stage (or training stage) and corresponding defenses are extensively explored in recent years. Ironically, backdoor attacks in the deployment stage, which can often happen in unprofessional users' devices and are thus arguably far more threatening in real-world scenarios, draw much less attention of the community. We attribute this imbalance of vigilance to the weak practicality of existing deployment-stage backdoor attack algorithms and the insufficiency of real-world attack demonstrations. To fill the blank, in this work, we study the realistic threat of deployment-stage backdoor attacks on DNNs. We base our study on a commonly used deployment-stage attack paradigm -- adversarial weight attack, where adversaries selectively modify model weights to embed backdoor into deployed DNNs. To approach realistic practicality, we propose the first gray-box and physically realizable weights attack algorithm for backdoor injection, namely subnet replacement attack (SRA), which only requires architecture information of the victim model and can support physical triggers in the real world. Extensive experimental simulations and system-level real-world attack demonstrations are conducted. Our results not only suggest the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed attack algorithm, but also reveal the practical risk of a novel type of computer virus that may widely spread and stealthily inject backdoor into DNN models in user devices. By our study, we call for more attention to the vulnerability of DNNs in the deployment stage.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Networks
- Vol. 193
Securing middlebox policy enforcement in SDN
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Networks
- Vol. 193
Securing middlebox policy enforcement in SDN
- 25 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
- Vol. 52  (7) , 6095-6108
Adversarial CAPTCHAs
Following the principle of to set one’s own spear against one’s own shield, we study how to design adversarial completely automated public turing test to tell computers and humans apart (CAPTCHA) in this article. We first identify the similarity and difference between adversarial CAPTCHA generation and existing hot adversarial example (image) generation research. Then, we propose a framework for text-based and image-based adversarial CAPTCHA generation on top of state-of-the-art adversarial image generation techniques. Finally, we design and implement an adversarial CAPTCHA generation and evaluation system, called aCAPTCHA, which integrates 12 image preprocessing techniques, nine CAPTCHA attacks, four baseline adversarial CAPTCHA generation methods, and eight new adversarial CAPTCHA generation methods. To examine the performance of aCAPTCHA, extensive security and usability evaluations are conducted. The results demonstrate that the generated adversarial CAPTCHAs can significantly improve the security of normal CAPTCHAs while maintaining similar usability. To facilitate the CAPTCHA security research, we also open source the aCAPTCHA system, including the source code, trained models, datasets, and the usability evaluation interfaces.
- 25 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
- Vol. 52  (7) , 6095-6108
Adversarial CAPTCHAs
Following the principle of to set one’s own spear against one’s own shield, we study how to design adversarial completely automated public turing test to tell computers and humans apart (CAPTCHA) in this article. We first identify the similarity and difference between adversarial CAPTCHA generation and existing hot adversarial example (image) generation research. Then, we propose a framework for text-based and image-based adversarial CAPTCHA generation on top of state-of-the-art adversarial image generation techniques. Finally, we design and implement an adversarial CAPTCHA generation and evaluation system, called aCAPTCHA, which integrates 12 image preprocessing techniques, nine CAPTCHA attacks, four baseline adversarial CAPTCHA generation methods, and eight new adversarial CAPTCHA generation methods. To examine the performance of aCAPTCHA, extensive security and usability evaluations are conducted. The results demonstrate that the generated adversarial CAPTCHAs can significantly improve the security of normal CAPTCHAs while maintaining similar usability. To facilitate the CAPTCHA security research, we also open source the aCAPTCHA system, including the source code, trained models, datasets, and the usability evaluation interfaces.