YRYaroslav Rosokha

Yaroslav Rosokha

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Yaroslav Rosokha has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Advice as an Algorithm: Evaluating Intergenerational Knowledge Transfer in a Dynamic Social Learning Experiment

    by Yaroslav Rosokha, Nathaniel Wilcox, Prithu Sharma

    We study intergenerational knowledge transfer in a social learning experiment in which subjects complete a 20-period consumption-and-saving task and then write free-form advice for the next generation who face a similar but distinct task. To measure the decision value of advice, we use a large language model to translate the text of advice into an executable consumption policy and evaluate that policy via simulations in the experimental environment. We refer to this simulated decision value as advice quality. We find that better-performing subjects write higher-quality advice, that mentor incentives raise advice quality, and that performance converts into advice quality more strongly when the task is more demonstrable. Importantly, we show that advice quality matters. It predicts successor performance and adds value beyond what the successor can infer from observation alone. However, we do not find that advice quality improves across generations. Instead, it reproduces only indirectly via the performance channel. Taken together, our results show that natural-language advice contains measurable behavioral content beyond word count and the observation of predecessor behavior.

  • Open Access

    Identifying Level -K Reasoning in Repeated Games: Strategies, Beliefs, and Cognitive Ability 

    by David Gill, Yaroslav Rosokha

    In this paper, we identify level-k reasoning in repeated games that operates at the level of a supergame strategy, rather than at the level of individual rounds. First, we develop a model of level-k reasoning that incorporates choices over strategies as well as beliefs about strategies chosen by others. Then, using data from the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma that includes elicited strategies and beliefs about strategies, we classify a substantial fraction of subjects as level-1 or level-2. Moreover, we show that when level-k reasoning operates at the level of a strategy, cognitive ability and experience both predict higher level reasoning.

  • Public Leaderboard Feedback in Sampling Competition: An Experimental Investigation

    by Stanton Hudja, Brian Roberson, Yaroslav Rosokha

    We investigate the role of performance feedback, in the form of a public leaderboard, in a sequential-sampling contest with costly observations. We show theoretically that for contests with a fixed ending date (i.e., finite horizon), providing public performance feedback may result in fewer expected observations and a lower expected value of the winning observation. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that the experimental results largely support the theory. In addition, we investigate how individual characteristics affect competitive sequential-sampling activity.


  • Cooperation under the shadow of political inequality

    by Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi, Sergey Gavrilets


  • Cooperation in Queueing Systems

    by Yaroslav Rosokha, Chen Wei

    We study a social dilemma in a single-queue system in which human servers have discretion over the effort with which to process orders that arrive stochastically. We show theoretically that the efficient outcome in the form of high effort can be sustained in the subgame-perfect equilibrium if the interactions are long term (even when each server has a short-term incentive to free-ride and provide low effort). In addition, we show that queue visibility plays an important role in the type of strategies that can sustain a high-effort equilibrium. In particular, we show that limiting feedback about the current state of the queue may be beneficial if the expected duration of interaction is long. We conduct two controlled laboratory experiments to test the theoretical predictions and find that effort increases with the expected duration of an interaction. We also find that visibility has a strong impact on the strategies that human subjects use to provide effort in a dynamic setting. We discuss implications for managers and firms that are trying to improve service systems. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.00603 .


  • Open Access

    Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power

    by Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi, Sergey Gavrilets

    Social and political inequality among individuals is a common driving force behind the breakdown in cooperation. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally study cooperation among individuals facing a sequence of collective-action problems in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power that is obtained through a contest. We have three main results. First, we find that cooperation predictably responds to the fundamental parameters of the collective-action problem. Specifically, it is increasing in the benefit to cooperation and how much benefit is gained from partial group cooperation, and decreasing in the number of players. Second, we find that when players are unrestricted in their expenditures in the contest, cooperation is much lower than when expenditures are set to a specific proportion of earnings. Finally, we find that individual norms and beliefs account for a substantial proportion of explained variance in individuals’ decisions to cooperate.


  • Analyzing Frictions in Generalized Second-Price Auction Markets

    by Karthik Kannan, Vandith Pamuru, Yaroslav Rosokha

    Generalized second-price auction is the preferred mechanism for sponsored-search advertisements. In this paper, we take a twofold approach using Q-learning-based simulations and human-subject experiments to show that the low-value advertisers (who do not win the auction) exhibit highly exploratory behavior and impact the allocative efficiency of the mechanism. Moreover, we find the presence of bid-adjustment frictions (e.g., bid fee) moderates this phenomenon and results in higher allocative efficiency of the auction. Our focus on the bid-adjustment costs is motivated by the fact that both the sponsored-search platforms and policymakers can best observe and influence these types of frictions as compared with frictions that are difficult to observe (e.g., resources spent on the analysis of the market and sophistication of algorithms by the advertisers).


  • Open Access

    Cooperation under the Shadow of Political Inequality

    by Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi, Sergey Gavrilets

    We study cooperation among individuals and groups facing a dynamic social dilemma in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power obtained in a contest. The main theoretical and experimental results focus on the role of the incumbency advantage. Specifically, an incumbency advantage in the political contest leads to a rapid breakdown of cooperation in the social dilemma. In addition, we provide simulations based on the individual evolutionary learning model of Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) to shed light on the difference between the behavior of individuals and groups.


  • Open Access

    On the Emergence of International Currencies: An Experimental Approach

    by Marcos Cardozo, Yaroslav Rosokha, Cathy Zhang

    We integrate theory and experimental evidence to study the emergence of different international monetary arrangements based on the circulation of two intrinsically worthless fiat currencies as media of exchange. Our framework is based on a two-country, two-currency search model where the value of each currency is jointly determined by private agents’ decisions and monetary policy formalized as changes in a country’s money growth rate. Results from the experiments indicate subjects coordinate on a regime where both currencies are accepted even when other regimes are theoretical possibilities. At the same time, we find the emergence of international currency depends on relative inflation rates where sellers tend to reject payment with a more inflationary foreign currency.

  • Open Access

    Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power

    by Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi, Sergey Gavrilets

    Social and political inequality among individuals is a common driving force behind the breakdown in cooperation. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally study cooperation among individuals faced with a sequence of collective-action problems in which the benefits to cooperation are divided according to political power that is obtained through a contest. We have three main results. First, we find that cooperation predictably responds to the fundamental parameters of the collective-action problem. Specifically, it is increasing in the benefit to cooperation and how much benefit is gained from partial group cooperation, and decreasing in the number of players. Second, we find that when players are unrestricted in their expenditures in the contest, cooperation is much lower than when expenditures are set to a specific proportion of earnings. Finally, we find that individual norms and beliefs account for a substantial proportion of explained variance in individuals' decisions to cooperate.