SRStephen G. Ryan

Stephen G. Ryan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Stephen G. Ryan has a total of 49 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Attribution Locus and the Timeliness of Long-lived Asset Write-downs

    by Yao-Lin Chang, Chun-Yang Lin, Chi-Chun Liu, Stephen G. Ryan

    We examine the relative timeliness with which write-downs of long-lived assets incorporate adverse macroeconomic and industry outcomes versus adverse firm-specific outcomes. We posit that users of financial reports are more likely to attribute adverse firm-specific outcomes to suboptimal managerial actions, which provide managers with more incentive to delay write downs. We provide evidence that, controlling for other incentives to manage earnings, firms record write-downs in the current year that are driven by adverse macroeconomic and industry outcomes during both the current year and the next year, but they record write-downs driven by adverse firm-specific outcomes only in the current year.

  • Banks’ Motivations for Designating Securities as Held to Maturity

    by Sehwa Kim, Seil Kim, Stephen G. Ryan

    We provide evidence that banks classify fixed-rate debt investment securities as held to maturity (HTM) rather than as available for sale (AFS) when HTM classification provides preferred financial accounting and regulatory capital treatments, not because they have a distinct economically motivated intent and ability to hold the securities to maturity. Specifically, we document predictably divergent security classifications by three categories of banks that differ in whether the regulatory accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) filter, which removes AOCI from Tier 1 capital, applies in four subperiods of our 2012–2022 sample period. The boundaries of the subperiods reflect changes in the AOCI filter’s applicability in 2014 and 2019 and the sharp rise in interest rates beginning in late 2021. We further find that the bank categories differ in the interest rate risk of their AFS securities and the extents to which they economically hedge that risk using derivatives and uninsured deposits. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.


  • Bank Regulation/Supervision and Bank Auditing

    by Al (Aloke) Ghosh, Henry Jarva, Stephen G. Ryan


  • Debiasing the Measurement of Conditional Conservatism

    by Marc Badia, Miguel Duro, Fernando Penalva, Stephen G. Ryan

    Basu's [“The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1997): 3–37] measurement of conditional conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings underlies hundreds of studies. However, many subsequent studies cast doubt on the extent to which Basu's measure captures conditional conservatism versus statistical biases or alternative constructs (collectively, “biases”), thereby questioning the validity of the inferences that empirical researchers draw from analyses using the measure. We modify Basu's measure in four simple ways to remove these biases. Our key modification is the inclusion of interactive controls for return variance, a volatility proxy that captures Patatoukas and Thomas’ [“More Evidence of Bias in Differential Timeliness Estimates of Conditional Conservatism.” The Accounting Review 86 (2011): 1765–1794] return variance effect and various sources of economic optionality and adjustment costs. This inclusion captures volatility‐related effects on both the level of earnings and the sensitivity of earnings to returns, and it allows the magnitudes of these effects to vary with the sign of returns. We conduct validation analyses using placebo‐dependent variables, synthetic returns, and nonconditionally conservative earnings components that show our modified Basu measure is largely free of known biases. We further show that our measure is associated with contracting and other economic variables as predicted by theory. Our findings suggest that researchers can rely on our modified Basu measure to identify the determinants and effects of conditional conservatism.


  • Using Loan Loss Indicators by Loan Type to Sharpen the Evaluation of Banks' Loan Loss Accruals

    by Gauri Bhat, Joshua A. Lee, Stephen G. Ryan

    SYNOPSIS: Prior research acknowledges that the determinants, timeliness, and economic implications of banks' provisions for loan losses (PLL) vary across loan types. However, the lack of machine-readable data on PLL by loan type has precluded researchers from incorporating loan type into the evaluation of PLL beyond either controlling for or partitioning the sample on crude proxies for loan portfolio composition. We calculate PLL by loan type as the change in the allowance for loan losses by loan type, which we hand collect from Form 10-K filings, plus net charge-offs by loan type, which we obtain from regulatory filings. Using these data, we show that prior findings that banks exercise discretion over PLL to smooth earnings and increase regulatory capital are driven by commercial loans, a thin slice of banks' loan portfolios, and that commonly used measures of PLL timeliness vary substantially across loan types. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.


  • Economic Consequences of the AOCI Filter Removal for Advanced Approaches Banks

    by Sehwa Kim, Seil Kim, Stephen G. Ryan

    We examine economic consequences of U.S. bank regulators' phased removal of the prudential filter for accumulated other comprehensive income for advanced approaches banks beginning on January 1, 2014. The primary effect of the AOCI filter is to exclude unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities from banks' regulatory capital. We predict and find that, to mitigate regulatory capital volatility resulting from the filter removal, advanced approaches banks increased the proportion of investment securities classified as held-to-maturity, thereby limiting their financing and interest rate risk management options, and they decreased securities risk, thereby reducing their interest rate spread. We further predict and find that these banks borrow more under securities repurchase agreements potentially collateralized by held-to-maturity securities and reduce loan supply owing to their reduced financing options, and that they increase loan risk to mitigate the decrease in their interest rate spread. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.


  • Fair Value versus Amortized Cost Measurement and the Timeliness of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

    by Urooj Khan, Stephen G. Ryan, Abhishek Varma

    We investigate the impact of recurring fair value versus amortized cost measurement for accounting recognition purposes on the timeliness of insurers' other-than-temporary (OTT) impairments of non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities (NAMBS) around the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Unlike largely predetermined amortized cost measurement, recurring fair value measurement requires firms to invest in information and control systems to assess relevant economic conditions and estimate fair values quarterly. We expect these systems discipline insurers' OTT impairments. Exploiting statutory requirements that PC (life) insurers measure securities with NAIC designations from 3 to 5 at fair value (amortized cost) and disclose security-level accounting information, we predict and find that PC insurers record timelier OTT impairments of the same NAMBS with NAIC designations of 3 to 5 than life insurers. We predict and find weaker evidence of spillover effects to the timeliness of OTT impairments of the same NAMBS with NAIC designations of 1 or 2. JEL Classifications: G22; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.