ZTZhili Tian

Zhili Tian

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Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Zhili Tian has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Direct and spillover promotional effects on drug prescriptions: Comparing differential physician- vs. patient-focused promotional effects

    by Zhili Tian, Sangkil Moon, Yong Cai

    We examine the impact of marketing strategies on new prescriptions. Companies promote drugs to both physicians, prescribing medications, and patients. We examine two antidepressant classes—SSRIs and SNRIs—highlighting two key findings: (1) Physician-targeted promotions, such as detailing, samples, and journal advertising, are more effective than patient-targeted promotions, direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA), in their direct effects on drug adoption. (2) Physician-focused promotions exhibit stronger spillover effects on competing brands than patient-focused promotions. We emphasize that physicians, as agents with medical expertise, are the primary decision-makers, while patients have limited influence on their prescriptions. Agency theory provides a rationale for the differential promotional effects, as the interests of physicians and patients diverge, and physicians have superior medical expertise and knowledge on a drug’s efficacy and safety. Our findings provide evidence for companies to reallocate their resources from DTCA to physician-targeted promotions. This policy leads to lower costs of patent-protected drugs for patients.


  • Optimal Enrollment in Late-Stage New Drug Development with Learning of Drug’s Efficacy for Group-Sequential Clinical Trials

    by Zhili Tian, Gordon B. Hazen, Hong Li

    Problem definition: The cost for developing a new drug ranged from $1 billion to more than $2 billion between 2010 and 2019. In addition to high development costs, the efficacy of the candidate drug, patient enrollment, the market exclusivity period (MEP), and the planning horizon are uncertain. Moreover, slow enrollment leads to increased costs, canceled clinical trials, and lost potential revenue. Many firms, hoping to detect efficacy versus futility of the candidate drug early to save development costs, plan interim analyses of patient-response data in their clinical trials. Academic/practical relevance: The problem for optimizing patient-enrollment rates has an uncertain planning horizon. We developed a continuous-time dynamic programming (DP) model with learning of a drug’s efficacy and MEP to assist firms in developing optimal enrollment policies in their clinical trials. We also established the optimality equation for this DP model. Through a clinical trial for testing a cancer drug developed by a leading pharmaceutical firm, we demonstrate that our DP model can help firms effectively manage their trials with a sizable profit gain (as large as $270 million per drug). Firms can also use our model in simulation to select their trial design parameters (e.g., the sample sizes of interim analyses). Methodology: We update a drug’s efficacy by Bayes’ rules. Using the stochastic order and the likelihood-ratio order of distribution functions, we prove the monotonic properties of the value function and an optimal policy. Results: We established that the value of the drug-development project increases as the average response from patients using the candidate drug increases. For drugs having low annual revenue or a strong market brand or treating rare diseases, we also established that the optimal enrollment policy is monotonic in the average patient response. Moreover, the optimal enrollment rate increases as the variance of the MEP decreases. Managerial implications: Firms can use the properties of the value function to select late-stage clinical trials for their drug-development project portfolios. Firms can also use our optimal policy to guide patient recruitment in their clinical trials considering competition from other drugs in the marketplace. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1162 .


  • Adaptive Learning of Drug Quality and Optimization of Patient Recruitment for Clinical Trials with Dropouts

    by Zhili Tian, Weidong Han, Warren B. Powell

    Problem definition: Clinical trials are crucial to new drug development. This study investigates optimal patient enrollment in clinical trials with interim analyses, which are analyses of treatment responses from patients at intermediate points. Our model considers uncertainties in patient enrollment and drug treatment effectiveness. We consider the benefits of completing a trial early and the cost of accelerating a trial by maximizing the net present value of drug cumulative profit. Academic/practical relevance: Clinical trials frequently account for the largest cost in drug development, and patient enrollment is an important problem in trial management. Our study develops a dynamic program, accurately capturing the dynamics of the problem, to optimize patient enrollment while learning the treatment effectiveness of an investigated drug. Methodology: The model explicitly captures both the physical state (enrolled patients) and belief states about the effectiveness of the investigated drug and a standard treatment drug. Using Bayesian updates and dynamic programming, we establish monotonicity of the value function in state variables and characterize an optimal enrollment policy. We also introduce, for the first time, the use of backward approximate dynamic programming (ADP) for this problem class. We illustrate the findings using a clinical trial program from a leading firm. Our study performs sensitivity analyses of the input parameters on the optimal enrollment policy. Results: The value function is monotonic in cumulative patient enrollment and the average responses of treatment for the investigated drug and standard treatment drug. The optimal enrollment policy is nondecreasing in the average response from patients using the investigated drug and is nonincreasing in cumulative patient enrollment in periods between two successive interim analyses. The forward ADP algorithm (or backward ADP algorithm) exploiting the monotonicity of the value function reduced the run time from 1.5 months using the exact method to a day (or 20 minutes) within 4% of the exact method. Through an application to a leading firm’s clinical trial program, the study demonstrates that the firm can have a sizable gain of drug profit following the optimal policy that our model provides. Managerial implications: We developed a new model for improving the management of clinical trials. Our study provides insights of an optimal policy and insights into the sensitivity of value function to the dropout rate and prior probability distribution. A firm can have a sizable gain in the drug’s profit by managing its trials using the optimal policies and the properties of value function. We illustrated that firms can use the ADP algorithms to develop their patient enrollment strategies.


  • Collaboration in Development of New Drugs

    by Zhili Tian, Haresh Gurnani, Yi Xu

    The development of a new drug is costly and uncertain. As such, pharmaceutical firms often collaborate to develop new drugs. We examine the conditions under which firms should collaborate rather than compete in new drug development. We model the collaboration vs. competition decision problem for two firms using a game‐theoretic model and derive the collaboration conditions. Our study demonstrates that development cost and uncertainties in drug treatment efficacy and safety and patient enrollment drive the collaboration or competition decision for firms. We establish conditions based on probabilities of success of drug development, cost rates, and potential market shares under which the firms should collaborate, and show that there exist scenarios under which the firms actually collaborate on the lower efficacy drug. As such, firms need to take into consideration various factors such as the probability of success, the potential market share, and the development cost of each competing drug when determining whether to collaborate or compete in developing new drugs. Finally, we apply our analytical model to illustrate a case study involving collaboration between Bristol‐Myers Squibb and Pfizer.


  • Soft Order Commitment in Supply Chains: Role of Penalties and Rationing Rules

    by Zhili Tian, Sammi Yu Tang, Panos (Panos) Kouvelis

    In some industries (e.g., semiconductors, electronics, and agribusiness), buyers place noncommitted orders (called soft orders) to manufacturers in an effort to guide the manufacturer's production decisions. After the buyers know their own demand, they place purchase orders (called firm orders). These orders are often placed very close to the production start time or even after the production start time so that it is not possible for the manufacturer to revise its production schedule. The discrepancies between the soft order and the firm order often result in high excess inventories at the manufacturer. Without any commitment related to the soft orders by the buyers and the production by the manufacturer, the soft orders are often not effective. We hence propose a penalty contract, through which the buyers pay a penalty for canceling some portion of their soft orders. This contract can perfectly coordinate the decentralized supply chain of one manufacturer and multiple buyers and can lead to Pareto improvement in profits relative to the wholesale price contract for all firms in the supply chain. Our results indicate that it is more likely for the contract to achieve coordination and Pareto improvement when the manufacturer allocates the supply in proportion to the firm orders than when it allocates the supply according to the soft orders. We also illustrate the contract by using the data from a leading manufacturer in the industry.