Thomas W. Hazlett
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Thomas W. Hazlett has a total of 66 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Randall Berry
Northwestern University, Evanston, USA
5 shared publications Michael Honig
4 shared publicationsDavid J. Teece
Institute for Business Innovation
3 shared publicationsJoshua D. Wright
George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty
3 shared publications- Martin B. H. Weiss
University of Pittsburgh
3 shared publications Sarah Oh
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Spectrum Sharing Rigidities: An Institutional Framework for Spectrum Access Rights
Debates over wireless spectrum policy typically focus on alternative spectrum access regimes, including exclusive licensing, unlicensed access, and a variety of hybrid frameworks. These institutional arrangements are often evaluated according to their anticipated assistance in delivering wireless services, with emphasis on spectrum utilization, interference management, or technological innovation. Such comparisons frequently treat regulatory categories as the primary object of analysis rather than the underlying spectrum access rights that those institutions create. Moreover, key characteristics of selected radio spectrum access regimes are largely ignored. Instead of compelling cost-benefit estimates to drive policy choices, analogies and sweeping generalizations about observed markets are extrapolated. These projections often fail to tabulate trade-offs over appropriate margins, consider relevant substitution between competing options, or correctly analyze transaction costs associated with policy choices. This paper seeks to develop an institutional framework for evaluating spectrum access rights based on four characteristics: exclusivity, flexibility, transferability, and coordination authority. These characteristics determine the extent to which spectrum access rights tend to adapt as technologies, markets, and demands evolve. We introduce the concept of institutional option value, defined as the net social gains produced from future opportunities requiring access rights adaptations. Institutional option value is one key determinant of long-run social welfare whose importance depends upon spectrum scarcity, technical progress, transaction costs, and aspects of economic coordination. The framework distinguishes between engineering flexibility, which expands the technical possibilities for spectrum sharing, and institutional flexibility, which determines whether spectrum access rights can evolve without requiring regulatory redesign. We argue that constraints embedded in spectrum access rules create institutional rigidities that may impede decentralized adaptation. Evidence from U.S. spectrum auctions, secondary markets, recent institutional innovations, and international spectrum policy illustrates how different bundles of spectrum access rights are associated with distinct economic values. Rather than advocating a universally preferred spectrum access regime, the framework emphasizes institutional fit and designing bundles of rights depending upon likely coordination requirements. The resulting framework provides a general guide to spectrum policies that facilitates the continued evolution of welfare-improving technologies and markets.
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSpectrum Sharing Rigidities: An Institutional Framework for Spectrum Access Rights
Debates over wireless spectrum policy typically focus on alternative spectrum access regimes, including exclusive licensing, unlicensed access, and a variety of hybrid frameworks. These institutional arrangements are often evaluated according to their anticipated assistance in delivering wireless services, with emphasis on spectrum utilization, interference management, or technological innovation. Such comparisons frequently treat regulatory categories as the primary object of analysis rather than the underlying spectrum access rights that those institutions create. Moreover, key characteristics of selected radio spectrum access regimes are largely ignored. Instead of compelling cost-benefit estimates to drive policy choices, analogies and sweeping generalizations about observed markets are extrapolated. These projections often fail to tabulate trade-offs over appropriate margins, consider relevant substitution between competing options, or correctly analyze transaction costs associated with policy choices. This paper seeks to develop an institutional framework for evaluating spectrum access rights based on four characteristics: exclusivity, flexibility, transferability, and coordination authority. These characteristics determine the extent to which spectrum access rights tend to adapt as technologies, markets, and demands evolve. We introduce the concept of institutional option value, defined as the net social gains produced from future opportunities requiring access rights adaptations. Institutional option value is one key determinant of long-run social welfare whose importance depends upon spectrum scarcity, technical progress, transaction costs, and aspects of economic coordination. The framework distinguishes between engineering flexibility, which expands the technical possibilities for spectrum sharing, and institutional flexibility, which determines whether spectrum access rights can evolve without requiring regulatory redesign. We argue that constraints embedded in spectrum access rules create institutional rigidities that may impede decentralized adaptation. Evidence from U.S. spectrum auctions, secondary markets, recent institutional innovations, and international spectrum policy illustrates how different bundles of spectrum access rights are associated with distinct economic values. Rather than advocating a universally preferred spectrum access regime, the framework emphasizes institutional fit and designing bundles of rights depending upon likely coordination requirements. The resulting framework provides a general guide to spectrum policies that facilitates the continued evolution of welfare-improving technologies and markets.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Valuing Federal Spectrum
In the United States, large portions of the most valuable radio spectrum remain assigned for the use of federal agencies. As demands for commercial wireless services continue to grow, a natural tension develops. While federal assignments often support critical public missions, there are strong reasons for believing that deployments do not achieve their priorities efficiently. Indeed, current spectrum governance provides limited mechanisms for measuring or comparing social values between federal assignments, or across public and private (commercial) deployments. However, recent U.S. legislation, including the 2025 budget reconciliation bill, requires the systematic valuation of federal spectrum to better inform decisions about spectrum allocation. This task prompts questions about how to calculate such magnitudes. This paper develops an economic framework for valuing federal spectrum by distinguishing among license prices, opportunity costs, and net social benefits, while examining methodological and institutional challenges confronted. The framework seeks to advance understanding of the tradeoffs between value generated per federal spectrum assignments and bandwidth opened to commercial access.
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessValuing Federal Spectrum
In the United States, large portions of the most valuable radio spectrum remain assigned for the use of federal agencies. As demands for commercial wireless services continue to grow, a natural tension develops. While federal assignments often support critical public missions, there are strong reasons for believing that deployments do not achieve their priorities efficiently. Indeed, current spectrum governance provides limited mechanisms for measuring or comparing social values between federal assignments, or across public and private (commercial) deployments. However, recent U.S. legislation, including the 2025 budget reconciliation bill, requires the systematic valuation of federal spectrum to better inform decisions about spectrum allocation. This task prompts questions about how to calculate such magnitudes. This paper develops an economic framework for valuing federal spectrum by distinguishing among license prices, opportunity costs, and net social benefits, while examining methodological and institutional challenges confronted. The framework seeks to advance understanding of the tradeoffs between value generated per federal spectrum assignments and bandwidth opened to commercial access.
- Open Access
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Telecommunications Policy
- Vol. 50 (8)
The evolution of spectrum property regimes: Experiments with disruptive technologies in the U.S.
- 12 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Telecommunications Policy
- Vol. 50 (8)
Open AccessThe evolution of spectrum property regimes: Experiments with disruptive technologies in the U.S.
- Open Access
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Who Benefits from a TikTok Ban? An Event Study of American Social Media Companies
This study examines U.S. social media company stock market reactions to changes in the likelihood of a TikTok ban from 2019-2025. The results indicate that large social media companies benefit from a TikTok ban while small social media companies are unaffected. These findings are inconsistent with theories of increased industry concentration. Rather, the results suggest that financial markets anticipate that a forced divestiture will result in a discounted sale price of ByteDance’s U.S. operations; an opportunity that only firms large enough to absorb such operations can take advantage of. These findings highlight a significant externality to regulatory interventions targeting foreign-owned subsidiaries and provide evidence of a new dimension through which firm distress, beyond financial distress, can cause “fire sale” discounting of assets.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWho Benefits from a TikTok Ban? An Event Study of American Social Media Companies
This study examines U.S. social media company stock market reactions to changes in the likelihood of a TikTok ban from 2019-2025. The results indicate that large social media companies benefit from a TikTok ban while small social media companies are unaffected. These findings are inconsistent with theories of increased industry concentration. Rather, the results suggest that financial markets anticipate that a forced divestiture will result in a discounted sale price of ByteDance’s U.S. operations; an opportunity that only firms large enough to absorb such operations can take advantage of. These findings highlight a significant externality to regulatory interventions targeting foreign-owned subsidiaries and provide evidence of a new dimension through which firm distress, beyond financial distress, can cause “fire sale” discounting of assets.
- Open Access
- 3 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis
- Vol. 16 (S1) , 60-83
Benefit–cost analysis in the 5.9 GHz band
In 2020 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revisited a spectrum allocation decision it made in 1999. The Agency found that frequencies set aside for specific technologies used by vehicles – Intelligent Transportation Services (ITS) – had been left largely unused. It crafted new rules, shifting 45 MHz of the 75 MHz allocation to newly designated wireless services focusing on Wi-Fi applications, while leaving the remaining (40% of bandwidth) reserved for ITS. The FCC decision was premised on a cost–benefit analysis performed by the agency, supported by two similar studies submitted by outside interests. Yet, upon examination, the cost–benefit calculations prove stunningly uncompelling. In their economic logic, their understanding of existing market data and their use of FCC policy, fundamental errors render net benefit estimates irrelevant to decision-making. In particular, the value of marginal products (VMPs) as well as the opportunity costs of rival allocations are ignored. These failings are stunning, both on their own and given that the FCC, in its reallocation, critiqued its 1999 decision as socially unproductive – and yet deployed just the same basic methodological format, relying on FCC administrative determinations to select favored business models for supplying wireless services.
- 3 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis
- Vol. 16 (S1) , 60-83
Open AccessBenefit–cost analysis in the 5.9 GHz band
In 2020 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revisited a spectrum allocation decision it made in 1999. The Agency found that frequencies set aside for specific technologies used by vehicles – Intelligent Transportation Services (ITS) – had been left largely unused. It crafted new rules, shifting 45 MHz of the 75 MHz allocation to newly designated wireless services focusing on Wi-Fi applications, while leaving the remaining (40% of bandwidth) reserved for ITS. The FCC decision was premised on a cost–benefit analysis performed by the agency, supported by two similar studies submitted by outside interests. Yet, upon examination, the cost–benefit calculations prove stunningly uncompelling. In their economic logic, their understanding of existing market data and their use of FCC policy, fundamental errors render net benefit estimates irrelevant to decision-making. In particular, the value of marginal products (VMPs) as well as the opportunity costs of rival allocations are ignored. These failings are stunning, both on their own and given that the FCC, in its reallocation, critiqued its 1999 decision as socially unproductive – and yet deployed just the same basic methodological format, relying on FCC administrative determinations to select favored business models for supplying wireless services.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
What Parties Does TikTok Exclusion in the USA Harm? A Financial Event Study
We examine financial market responses to news of a potential TikTok ban. Focusing on U.S. legislative actions from 2019 through 2024, our event study suggests that markets anticipate higher probabilities of a ban to increase returns for large technology platforms while small firms' returns remain flat. We interpret the results to imply a reduction in competitive pressure following elimination of TikTok from the U.S. market. Further, results for competitors and complements as well as acquirers and non-acquirers do not strongly indicate that one group benefits disproportionately to the other when the likelihood of a ban changes. Double-sorting on size reveals that firm size dominates the industry position or acquirer status in predicting the company's price reaction to a potential TikTok ban, presumably from expectations of heightened market concentration in the sector. These findings provide empirical evidence of the unintended economic consequences of regulatory interventions targeting foreign-owned digital platforms, raising broad concerns about competition, innovation, and the consequences of a TikTok ban in the U.S.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhat Parties Does TikTok Exclusion in the USA Harm? A Financial Event Study
We examine financial market responses to news of a potential TikTok ban. Focusing on U.S. legislative actions from 2019 through 2024, our event study suggests that markets anticipate higher probabilities of a ban to increase returns for large technology platforms while small firms' returns remain flat. We interpret the results to imply a reduction in competitive pressure following elimination of TikTok from the U.S. market. Further, results for competitors and complements as well as acquirers and non-acquirers do not strongly indicate that one group benefits disproportionately to the other when the likelihood of a ban changes. Double-sorting on size reveals that firm size dominates the industry position or acquirer status in predicting the company's price reaction to a potential TikTok ban, presumably from expectations of heightened market concentration in the sector. These findings provide empirical evidence of the unintended economic consequences of regulatory interventions targeting foreign-owned digital platforms, raising broad concerns about competition, innovation, and the consequences of a TikTok ban in the U.S.
- 9 December 2024
- Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press in Journal of Information Policy
- Vol. 14, 747-784
Spectrum Rights in Outer Space
This article presents a comprehensive summary of the regulatory environment confronting low earth orbit, non-geostationary satellite orbit (LEO NGSO) communication satellites and critically evaluates analogies from terrestrial spectrum management as possibilities for LEO NGSO satellites. This analysis provides a framework for empirical analysis of the alternatives considered.
- 9 December 2024
- Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press in Journal of Information Policy
- Vol. 14, 747-784
Spectrum Rights in Outer Space
This article presents a comprehensive summary of the regulatory environment confronting low earth orbit, non-geostationary satellite orbit (LEO NGSO) communication satellites and critically evaluates analogies from terrestrial spectrum management as possibilities for LEO NGSO satellites. This analysis provides a framework for empirical analysis of the alternatives considered.
- 21 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 201 (3-4) , 409-428
Governing complex externalities: property rights for sharing radio spectrum
- 21 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 201 (3-4) , 409-428
Governing complex externalities: property rights for sharing radio spectrum
- Open Access
- 20 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- Vol. 35 (1) , 73-108
U.S. Antitrust Policy in the Age of Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Netflix and Facebook
Sweeping changes have disrupted society courtesy of the Information Revolution, presenting great opportunities in radically transformed economic markets but also great challenges in adapting to new and different forms of organization. Antitrust laws and other elements of competition policy are being re-examined. Specifically, the House Judiciary Committee conducted hearings in 2020 in which it asked key questions about the pattern of development in U.S. markets and options for policy reform. This paper, answering such queries, finds strong evidence for the view that, relative to practical alternatives that include E.U.-style regulation, digital markets in the U.S. appear robust, generating considerable innovation that produces pro-consumer outcomes. The global Internet is dominated by U.S.-developed technologies and business models discovered and deployed in a process of competitive rivalry. Even given imperfect rules and regulations, U.S. markets have contributed strongly to economic advances embraced around the world.
- 20 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- Vol. 35 (1) , 73-108
Open AccessU.S. Antitrust Policy in the Age of Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Netflix and Facebook
Sweeping changes have disrupted society courtesy of the Information Revolution, presenting great opportunities in radically transformed economic markets but also great challenges in adapting to new and different forms of organization. Antitrust laws and other elements of competition policy are being re-examined. Specifically, the House Judiciary Committee conducted hearings in 2020 in which it asked key questions about the pattern of development in U.S. markets and options for policy reform. This paper, answering such queries, finds strong evidence for the view that, relative to practical alternatives that include E.U.-style regulation, digital markets in the U.S. appear robust, generating considerable innovation that produces pro-consumer outcomes. The global Internet is dominated by U.S.-developed technologies and business models discovered and deployed in a process of competitive rivalry. Even given imperfect rules and regulations, U.S. markets have contributed strongly to economic advances embraced around the world.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Evaluating the CBRS Experiment
In 2015, the FCC established the Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) for sharing the 3.5 GHz Band (3550-3700 MHz) among federal and non-federal users in the United States. This rulemaking created an experiment in a novel three-tier rights structure: strong protections for incumbents, including government radar systems; Priority Access Licenses (PALs) granting exclusive rights to high bidders in an FCC auction, in part of the band and subject to avoiding interference with incumbents; and Generalized Authorized Access (GAA) for unlicensed users, subject to avoiding interference with both PALs and incumbents. The first commercial deployments in this band were approved in 2019 for GAA devices, and an auction of PALs completed in 2020 generated $4.5 billion in revenues. It is now timely to evaluate this experiment and glean lessons for applications to other spectrum bands, such as the neighboring 3.1-3.45 GHz band or portions of the upper mid-band spectrum 7-24 GHz. In fact, a number of perspectives on CBRS have been recently published. In this paper we review these developments and suggest related policy questions that should be considered when evaluating the use of CBRS-style allocation rules in future bands. The CBRS policy involves several different innovations, seeking to accomplish multiple objectives. One can evaluate this approach from a technical point of view, as an experiment to show that dynamic sharing can provide multiple tiers of commercial access to a band of spectrum while protecting incumbent users. The approach involves coordinated access via a cloud-based Spectrum Access System (SAS) and an Environmental Sensing Capability (ESC) to monitor incumbent users of the band, with requirements standardized through the Wireless Innovation Forum (WInnForum) and implementations certified by the FCC. From an economic and policy point of view, this type of dynamic sharing is asserted to reduce the costs and delays involved in making additional spectrum available for commercial use, as it seeks to avoid relocating incumbents. Of course, costs and benefits should be observed, not simply assumed, and the process undertaken should be compared to those associated with the relevant policy alternatives. CBRS adopted the PAL and GAA tiers for commercial access in an attempt to provide spectrum that could not only support deployments by traditional wireless providers, but also enable new uses of the spectrum by non-traditional entities. How well the spectrum can support these uses, and whether this type of approach leads to an economically efficient mix of uses, provides another economic and policy lens through which this system can be evaluated. This paper explores the technical implementation of the CBRS spectrum sharing approach, and then attempts to appraise the economic welfare results of the novel allocation policy.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEvaluating the CBRS Experiment
In 2015, the FCC established the Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) for sharing the 3.5 GHz Band (3550-3700 MHz) among federal and non-federal users in the United States. This rulemaking created an experiment in a novel three-tier rights structure: strong protections for incumbents, including government radar systems; Priority Access Licenses (PALs) granting exclusive rights to high bidders in an FCC auction, in part of the band and subject to avoiding interference with incumbents; and Generalized Authorized Access (GAA) for unlicensed users, subject to avoiding interference with both PALs and incumbents. The first commercial deployments in this band were approved in 2019 for GAA devices, and an auction of PALs completed in 2020 generated $4.5 billion in revenues. It is now timely to evaluate this experiment and glean lessons for applications to other spectrum bands, such as the neighboring 3.1-3.45 GHz band or portions of the upper mid-band spectrum 7-24 GHz. In fact, a number of perspectives on CBRS have been recently published. In this paper we review these developments and suggest related policy questions that should be considered when evaluating the use of CBRS-style allocation rules in future bands. The CBRS policy involves several different innovations, seeking to accomplish multiple objectives. One can evaluate this approach from a technical point of view, as an experiment to show that dynamic sharing can provide multiple tiers of commercial access to a band of spectrum while protecting incumbent users. The approach involves coordinated access via a cloud-based Spectrum Access System (SAS) and an Environmental Sensing Capability (ESC) to monitor incumbent users of the band, with requirements standardized through the Wireless Innovation Forum (WInnForum) and implementations certified by the FCC. From an economic and policy point of view, this type of dynamic sharing is asserted to reduce the costs and delays involved in making additional spectrum available for commercial use, as it seeks to avoid relocating incumbents. Of course, costs and benefits should be observed, not simply assumed, and the process undertaken should be compared to those associated with the relevant policy alternatives. CBRS adopted the PAL and GAA tiers for commercial access in an attempt to provide spectrum that could not only support deployments by traditional wireless providers, but also enable new uses of the spectrum by non-traditional entities. How well the spectrum can support these uses, and whether this type of approach leads to an economically efficient mix of uses, provides another economic and policy lens through which this system can be evaluated. This paper explores the technical implementation of the CBRS spectrum sharing approach, and then attempts to appraise the economic welfare results of the novel allocation policy.