Lars Peter Østerdal
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Lars Peter Østerdal has a total of 55 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Juan D. Moreno Ternero
Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain
15 shared publications Jens Leth Hougaard
9 shared publications- Jens Leth Hougaard
University of Copenhagen
4 shared publications - Trine Tornøe Platz
University of Southern Denmark
4 shared publications Andreas Hasman
Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain
3 shared publicationsCharles M. Harvey
University of Houston
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
- Vol. 33 (2) , e70037
Balance and Baselines: An Impossibility Theorem and an Axiomatisation of Additive Aggregation
A feature in many multicriteria problems is a preference for ‘balance’, understood as achieving a desired distribution (e.g., equality or target proportions) of resources across stakeholders or conceptual categories. This paper presents a normative exploration of the implications of balance preferences when baselines are uncertain or contested. We prove an impossibility theorem showing that if a decision maker is strictly outcome‐based yet expresses a strict preference for balance over gains whatever the baseline, then an inconsistency arises. We then show that if the balance preference is weakened and combined with standard conditions (such as monotonicity and continuity), the only consistent aggregation rule is a simple additive one. Our results highlight that deliberative decision making necessarily involves reconciling preference intuitions ‘in the small’ (over a fragment of the decision space) and ‘in the large’ (over the whole of that space).
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
- Vol. 33 (2) , e70037
Open AccessBalance and Baselines: An Impossibility Theorem and an Axiomatisation of Additive Aggregation
A feature in many multicriteria problems is a preference for ‘balance’, understood as achieving a desired distribution (e.g., equality or target proportions) of resources across stakeholders or conceptual categories. This paper presents a normative exploration of the implications of balance preferences when baselines are uncertain or contested. We prove an impossibility theorem showing that if a decision maker is strictly outcome‐based yet expresses a strict preference for balance over gains whatever the baseline, then an inconsistency arises. We then show that if the balance preference is weakened and combined with standard conditions (such as monotonicity and continuity), the only consistent aggregation rule is a simple additive one. Our results highlight that deliberative decision making necessarily involves reconciling preference intuitions ‘in the small’ (over a fragment of the decision space) and ‘in the large’ (over the whole of that space).
- Open Access
- 14 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 108, 103156
Integrating equity and productivity in health evaluation
- 14 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 108, 103156
Open AccessIntegrating equity and productivity in health evaluation
- Open Access
- 3 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 154, 97-118
Rationalizing sharing rules
- 3 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 154, 97-118
Open AccessRationalizing sharing rules
- Open Access
- 28 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 153, 10-29
Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future?
- 28 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 153, 10-29
Open AccessOptimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future?
- Open Access
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- p. 1-10
Setting Limits for the Principle of Equal Entitlement to Continued Life
The normative principle that every individual is equally entitled to continued life is a subject of debate in ethics, health economics and policy. We reconsider this principle in the context of setting priorities for healthcare interventions. When applied without restriction, the principle overlooks quality of life concerns entirely. However, we contend that it remains ethically relevant in certain situations, particularly when patients suffer from conditions unrelated to the therapeutic areas and treatments under consideration. Thus, we defend the principle while also emphasizing the need for its application within tight limits.
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- p. 1-10
Open AccessSetting Limits for the Principle of Equal Entitlement to Continued Life
The normative principle that every individual is equally entitled to continued life is a subject of debate in ethics, health economics and policy. We reconsider this principle in the context of setting priorities for healthcare interventions. When applied without restriction, the principle overlooks quality of life concerns entirely. However, we contend that it remains ethically relevant in certain situations, particularly when patients suffer from conditions unrelated to the therapeutic areas and treatments under consideration. Thus, we defend the principle while also emphasizing the need for its application within tight limits.
- Open Access
- 21 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 324 (1) , 200-220
Value-driven multidimensional welfare analysis: A dominance approach with application to comparisons of European populations
- 21 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 324 (1) , 200-220
Open AccessValue-driven multidimensional welfare analysis: A dominance approach with application to comparisons of European populations
- Open Access
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 95, 102885
Quality- and productivity-adjusted life years: From QALYs to PALYs and beyond
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 95, 102885
Open AccessQuality- and productivity-adjusted life years: From QALYs to PALYs and beyond
- Open Access
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 336 (3) , 1551-1572
Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue
We consider a queueing system which opens at a given point in time and serves a finite number of users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). Each user must decide individually when to join the queue. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no continuous asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. For an illustrative example, we implement a numerical procedure for computing the symmetric equilibrium strategy based on our constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium. We then compare its social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 336 (3) , 1551-1572
Open AccessEquilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue
We consider a queueing system which opens at a given point in time and serves a finite number of users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). Each user must decide individually when to join the queue. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no continuous asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. For an illustrative example, we implement a numerical procedure for computing the symmetric equilibrium strategy based on our constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium. We then compare its social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.
- Open Access
- 30 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 87, 102714
QALYs, DALYs, and HALYs: A unifying framework for the evaluation of population health
- 30 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 87, 102714
Open AccessQALYs, DALYs, and HALYs: A unifying framework for the evaluation of population health
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (8) , 6024-6038
Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies
We study the optimal management of evolving hierarchies of revenue-generating agents. The initiator invests into expanding the hierarchy by adding another agent, who will bring revenues to the joint venture and who will invest herself into expanding the hierarchy further, and so on. The higher the investments (which are private information), the higher the probability of expanding the hierarchy. An allocation scheme specifies how revenues are distributed, as the hierarchy evolves. We obtain schemes that are socially optimal and initiator-optimal, respectively. Our results have potential applications for blockchain, cryptocurrencies, social mobilization, and multilevel marketing. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (8) , 6024-6038
Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies
We study the optimal management of evolving hierarchies of revenue-generating agents. The initiator invests into expanding the hierarchy by adding another agent, who will bring revenues to the joint venture and who will invest herself into expanding the hierarchy further, and so on. The higher the investments (which are private information), the higher the probability of expanding the hierarchy. An allocation scheme specifies how revenues are distributed, as the hierarchy evolves. We obtain schemes that are socially optimal and initiator-optimal, respectively. Our results have potential applications for blockchain, cryptocurrencies, social mobilization, and multilevel marketing. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, behavioral economics and decision analysis.