Eric Van Den Steen
Research Subjects
Eric Van Den Steen has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hongyi Li
UNSW: University of New South Wales
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 6 (2) , 166-189
Birds of a Feather … Enforce Social Norms? Interactions among Culture, Norms, and Strategy
Does culture eat strategy for breakfast? This paper investigates the interactions among corporate culture, norms, and strategy, in order to better understand this issue and related questions. It first shows, through microfoundations, how the forces that drive toward “culture as shared beliefs and preferences” also cause the emergence of social norms (when these beliefs and preferences are unobservable), with people even endogenously enforcing norms that go against their own beliefs and preferences. The latter effect may cause a disconnect between the organization’s norms and its underlying beliefs and preferences. The paper then makes predictions on the kinds of shared beliefs, preferences, and norms that are likely to emerge, and when they are most likely to emerge. It shows, for example, that social norms are more likely in attractive organizations, for behaviors that have modest personal consequences, and on dimensions along which employees depend on others’ choices to a moderate degree. Building on these insights and on the definition of “strategy as core guidance,” we finally discuss how corporate culture and strategy interact. We show, in particular, how culture is not just an input into strategy but also a direct substitute for strategy and often even a competitor. The results throw light on ways to deal with the “breakfast” issue.
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 6 (2) , 166-189
Birds of a Feather … Enforce Social Norms? Interactions among Culture, Norms, and Strategy
Does culture eat strategy for breakfast? This paper investigates the interactions among corporate culture, norms, and strategy, in order to better understand this issue and related questions. It first shows, through microfoundations, how the forces that drive toward “culture as shared beliefs and preferences” also cause the emergence of social norms (when these beliefs and preferences are unobservable), with people even endogenously enforcing norms that go against their own beliefs and preferences. The latter effect may cause a disconnect between the organization’s norms and its underlying beliefs and preferences. The paper then makes predictions on the kinds of shared beliefs, preferences, and norms that are likely to emerge, and when they are most likely to emerge. It shows, for example, that social norms are more likely in attractive organizations, for behaviors that have modest personal consequences, and on dimensions along which employees depend on others’ choices to a moderate degree. Building on these insights and on the definition of “strategy as core guidance,” we finally discuss how corporate culture and strategy interact. We show, in particular, how culture is not just an input into strategy but also a direct substitute for strategy and often even a competitor. The results throw light on ways to deal with the “breakfast” issue.
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 3 (4) , 574-591
The Strategy in Competitive Interactions
This paper reviews, discusses, and expands the “core guidance” definition of strategy as “the smallest set of choices to optimally guide (or force) other choices.” It first discusses what this definition contributes relative to the existing proposed definitions. It then considers the extension of this definition to the context of competitive interactions: whether the definition makes sense in that context and what it implies for decisions to be strategic in such context. As part of this analysis, it also uses the definition to explore a new issue: why quantity-based competitive moves might be more strategic than price-based moves.
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 3 (4) , 574-591
The Strategy in Competitive Interactions
This paper reviews, discusses, and expands the “core guidance” definition of strategy as “the smallest set of choices to optimally guide (or force) other choices.” It first discusses what this definition contributes relative to the existing proposed definitions. It then considers the extension of this definition to the context of competitive interactions: whether the definition makes sense in that context and what it implies for decisions to be strategic in such context. As part of this analysis, it also uses the definition to explore a new issue: why quantity-based competitive moves might be more strategic than price-based moves.
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (10) , 4533-4551
Strategy and the Strategist: How It Matters Who Develops the Strategy
This paper addresses primarily two questions. First, when (and why) should a company’s strategy be developed by its CEO versus by some outside analyst or other insider? Second, how does strategy interact with vision (in the sense of a strong belief about the right course of action)? The paper studies these questions using a functional definition of strategy as “the smallest set of choices to optimally guide other choices.” Among other things, the paper shows that strategy formulation by the CEO leads to both better strategy and better execution, and that a strategist’s vision may improve execution. In the process, the paper also identifies criteria that make a decision strategic and derives explanations why strategies often reflect the background of the strategist. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (10) , 4533-4551
Strategy and the Strategist: How It Matters Who Develops the Strategy
This paper addresses primarily two questions. First, when (and why) should a company’s strategy be developed by its CEO versus by some outside analyst or other insider? Second, how does strategy interact with vision (in the sense of a strong belief about the right course of action)? The paper studies these questions using a functional definition of strategy as “the smallest set of choices to optimally guide other choices.” Among other things, the paper shows that strategy formulation by the CEO leads to both better strategy and better execution, and that a strategist’s vision may improve execution. In the process, the paper also identifies criteria that make a decision strategic and derives explanations why strategies often reflect the background of the strategist. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
- 8 November 2010
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 617-648
On the origin of shared beliefs (and corporate culture)
- 8 November 2010
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 617-648
On the origin of shared beliefs (and corporate culture)
- 3 December 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 26 (2) , 385-426
Disagreement and the Allocation of Control
This article studies the allocation of control when there is disagreement—in the sense of differing priors—about the right course of action. People then value control rights since they believe that their decisions are better than those of others. More disagreement (due to, e.g., fundamental uncertainty) increases the value that players attach to control. The article shows that all income and control of a project should then be concentrated in one hand: income rights should go more to people with more control since such people value income higher (because they have a higher opinion of the decisions made); control rights should go more to people with more income since they care more (and believe that they make better decisions). Different projects may be optimally “owned” by different people. Furthermore—with residual income exogenously allocated—complementary decisions should be more co-located, whereas substitute decisions should be more distributed. Confident people with a lot at stake should—in a wide range of settings—get more control. (JEL D7, D8, L2, M1)
- 3 December 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 26 (2) , 385-426
Disagreement and the Allocation of Control
This article studies the allocation of control when there is disagreement—in the sense of differing priors—about the right course of action. People then value control rights since they believe that their decisions are better than those of others. More disagreement (due to, e.g., fundamental uncertainty) increases the value that players attach to control. The article shows that all income and control of a project should then be concentrated in one hand: income rights should go more to people with more control since such people value income higher (because they have a higher opinion of the decisions made); control rights should go more to people with more income since they care more (and believe that they make better decisions). Different projects may be optimally “owned” by different people. Furthermore—with residual income exogenously allocated—complementary decisions should be more co-located, whereas substitute decisions should be more distributed. Confident people with a lot at stake should—in a wide range of settings—get more control. (JEL D7, D8, L2, M1)