Pau Balart
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Pau Balart has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz
Department of Economics, Public University of Navarre, Pamplona/Iruña, Spain
3 shared publications - Lara Ezquerra
Department of Business Economics, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Palma, Spain
3 shared publications - Orestis Troumpounis
Lancaster University
3 shared publications Matthijs Oosterveen
Department of Economics, Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands
2 shared publications- Sabine Flamand
Universitat Rovira i Virgili
2 shared publications - Agustin Casas
Department of Economics, CUNEF, Madrid, Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (18)
Using pledges to improve the effectiveness of environmental information campaigns: The case of biowaste recycling
Through a field study (N = 1,519) that uses a technology to record real-time data on waste sorting, we find that offering the opportunity to sign a pledge increases the effectiveness of an environmental campaign. With a timespan of over four years, the pledge increased waste sorting participation by 4.55 to 5.10 percentage points (SD = 0.1997). The effect is greater immediately after the campaign (around 9 to 10 pp during the first 15 wk), but it remains sizable and statistically significant 150 to 210 wk after signing (3.11 to 4.45 pp).
- 2 May 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (18)
Open AccessUsing pledges to improve the effectiveness of environmental information campaigns: The case of biowaste recycling
Through a field study (N = 1,519) that uses a technology to record real-time data on waste sorting, we find that offering the opportunity to sign a pledge increases the effectiveness of an environmental campaign. With a timespan of over four years, the pledge increased waste sorting participation by 4.55 to 5.10 percentage points (SD = 0.1997). The effect is greater immediately after the campaign (around 9 to 10 pp during the first 15 wk), but it remains sizable and statistically significant 150 to 210 wk after signing (3.11 to 4.45 pp).
- Open Access
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1298
Correction to: Framing effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment in multiple choice tests
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1298
Open AccessCorrection to: Framing effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment in multiple choice tests
- Open Access
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1268-1297
Framing effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment in multiple-choice tests
We exploit testing data to gain better understanding on framing effects on decision-making and performance under risk. In a randomized field experiment, we modified the framing of scoring rules for penalized multiple-choice tests. In penalized multiple-choice tests, right answers are typically framed as gains while wrong answers are framed as losses (Mixed-framing). In the Loss-framing proposed, both non-responses and wrong answers are presented in a loss domain. According to our theoretical model, we expect the change in the framing to decrease students’ non-response and to increase students’ performance. Under the Loss-framing, students’ non-response reduces by a 18%-20%. However, it fails to increase students’ scores. Indeed, our results support the possibility of impaired performance in the Loss-framing.
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1268-1297
Open AccessFraming effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment in multiple-choice tests
We exploit testing data to gain better understanding on framing effects on decision-making and performance under risk. In a randomized field experiment, we modified the framing of scoring rules for penalized multiple-choice tests. In penalized multiple-choice tests, right answers are typically framed as gains while wrong answers are framed as losses (Mixed-framing). In the Loss-framing proposed, both non-responses and wrong answers are presented in a loss domain. According to our theoretical model, we expect the change in the framing to decrease students’ non-response and to increase students’ performance. Under the Loss-framing, students’ non-response reduces by a 18%-20%. However, it fails to increase students’ scores. Indeed, our results support the possibility of impaired performance in the Loss-framing.
- Open Access
- 18 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-2
Addendum: Females show more sustained performance during test-taking than males
- 18 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-2
Open AccessAddendum: Females show more sustained performance during test-taking than males
- Open Access
- 3 September 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-11
Females show more sustained performance during test-taking than males
Females tend to perform worse than males on math and science tests, but they perform better on verbal reading tests. Here, by analysing performance during a cognitive test, we provide evidence that females are better able to sustain their performance during a test across all of these topics, including math and science (study 1). This finding suggests that longer cognitive tests decrease the gender gap in math and science. By analysing a dataset with multiple tests that vary in test length, we find empirical support for this idea (study 2).
- 3 September 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-11
Open AccessFemales show more sustained performance during test-taking than males
Females tend to perform worse than males on math and science tests, but they perform better on verbal reading tests. Here, by analysing performance during a cognitive test, we provide evidence that females are better able to sustain their performance during a test across all of these topics, including math and science (study 1). This finding suggests that longer cognitive tests decrease the gender gap in math and science. By analysing a dataset with multiple tests that vary in test length, we find empirical support for this idea (study 2).
- Open Access
- 19 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization
We focus on changes in technology and campaign management to study the documented simultaneous increase in campaign spending and polarization. In our model, some voters are ideological while others are impressionable. If the distribution of voters between types is endogenous and depends on parties' platform choices, our results show that a) an increase in the effectiveness of electoral advertising or a decrease in the electorate's political awareness, surely increases polarization and may also increase campaign spending, while b) a decrease in the cost of advertising does not affect neither polarization nor spending.
- 19 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTechnological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization
We focus on changes in technology and campaign management to study the documented simultaneous increase in campaign spending and polarization. In our model, some voters are ideological while others are impressionable. If the distribution of voters between types is endogenous and depends on parties' platform choices, our results show that a) an increase in the effectiveness of electoral advertising or a decrease in the electorate's political awareness, surely increases polarization and may also increase campaign spending, while b) a decrease in the cost of advertising does not affect neither polarization nor spending.
- 4 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (5) , 703-724
Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests
Groups competing for a prize need to determine how to distribute it among their members in case of victory. Considering competition between two groups of different size, we show that the small group's sharing rule is a strategic complement to the large group's sharing rule in the sense that if the small group chooses a more meritocratic sharing rule, the large group wishes to choose a more meritocratic rule as well. On the contrary, the large group's sharing rule is a strategic substitute to the small group's sharing rule, hence the timing of choice is crucial. For sufficiently private prizes, a switch from a simultaneous choice to the small group being the leader consists in a Pareto improvement and reduces aggregate effort. On the contrary, when the large group is the leader, aggregate effort increases. As a result, the equilibrium timing is such that the small group chooses its sharing rule first. If the prize is not private enough, the small group retires from the competition and switching from a simultaneous to a sequential timing may reverse the results in terms of aggregate effort. The sequential timing also guarantees that the small group never outperforms the large one.
- 4 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (5) , 703-724
Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests
Groups competing for a prize need to determine how to distribute it among their members in case of victory. Considering competition between two groups of different size, we show that the small group's sharing rule is a strategic complement to the large group's sharing rule in the sense that if the small group chooses a more meritocratic sharing rule, the large group wishes to choose a more meritocratic rule as well. On the contrary, the large group's sharing rule is a strategic substitute to the small group's sharing rule, hence the timing of choice is crucial. For sufficiently private prizes, a switch from a simultaneous choice to the small group being the leader consists in a Pareto improvement and reduces aggregate effort. On the contrary, when the large group is the leader, aggregate effort increases. As a result, the equilibrium timing is such that the small group chooses its sharing rule first. If the prize is not private enough, the small group retires from the competition and switching from a simultaneous to a sequential timing may reverse the results in terms of aggregate effort. The sequential timing also guarantees that the small group never outperforms the large one.
- Open Access
- 14 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 8 (4) , 417-473
Non-cognitive skills and individual earnings: new evidence from PIAAC
- 14 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 8 (4) , 417-473
Open AccessNon-cognitive skills and individual earnings: new evidence from PIAAC
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (3) , 363-384
The Increase in College Premium and the Decline in Low‐Skill Wages: A Signaling Story
The increase in the college premium over the last 30 years in the United States is to a large extent driven by a reduction in noncollege wages. We show that the signaling effects triggered by an improvement in the incentives to attend higher education can explain this fact, as well as the increase in the number of college graduates. Under imperfect credit markets and wealth heterogeneity, higher education is not only a signal of ability but also of individuals' (parents') wealth. General conditions on the distribution of wealth guarantee that after an increase in incentives to attend higher education, the absence of a college degree becomes a more evident signal of low ability. This results in a reduction in low‐skill wages but not necessarily in increased high skill wages. The increased incentives to enroll in college can either arise from a skill‐biased technology change or an improvement in access to higher education. An important difference is that while skill‐biased technology change always results in an increase in the college premium, that is not necessarily the case when the increased incentives to enroll arise from improved access to higher education.
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (3) , 363-384
The Increase in College Premium and the Decline in Low‐Skill Wages: A Signaling Story
The increase in the college premium over the last 30 years in the United States is to a large extent driven by a reduction in noncollege wages. We show that the signaling effects triggered by an improvement in the incentives to attend higher education can explain this fact, as well as the increase in the number of college graduates. Under imperfect credit markets and wealth heterogeneity, higher education is not only a signal of ability but also of individuals' (parents') wealth. General conditions on the distribution of wealth guarantee that after an increase in incentives to attend higher education, the absence of a college degree becomes a more evident signal of low ability. This results in a reduction in low‐skill wages but not necessarily in increased high skill wages. The increased incentives to enroll in college can either arise from a skill‐biased technology change or an improvement in access to higher education. An important difference is that while skill‐biased technology change always results in an increase in the college premium, that is not necessarily the case when the increased incentives to enroll arise from improved access to higher education.
- 13 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 46 (2) , 239-262
Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests
- 13 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 46 (2) , 239-262
Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests