Jonathan M. Spring
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jonathan M. Spring has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
David Pym
University College London
3 shared publications- Eric Hatleback
Carnegie Mellon University
3 shared publications Leigh Metcalf
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
2 shared publicationsAlbese Demjaha
1 shared publicationAlec Summers
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
1 shared publicationAllen Householder
Software Eng. Inst., USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 26 March 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 23 (2) , 107-108
Secure by Design for Everyone
- 26 March 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 23 (2) , 107-108
Secure by Design for Everyone
- Open Access
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Cybersecurity
- Vol. 11 (1)
Journal of Cybersecurity Special Collection: Philosophy of information security
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Cybersecurity
- Vol. 11 (1)
Open AccessJournal of Cybersecurity Special Collection: Philosophy of information security
- 1 January 2025
- Published by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Likely Exploited Vulnerabilities:
- 1 January 2025
- Published by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Likely Exploited Vulnerabilities:
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 131
An analysis of how many undiscovered vulnerabilities remain in information systems
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 131
An analysis of how many undiscovered vulnerabilities remain in information systems
- Open Access
- 8 June 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
- Vol. 2 (3) , 1-22
The Ecosystem of Detection and Blocklisting of Domain Generation
Malware authors use domain generation algorithms to establish more reliable communication methods that can avoid reactive defender blocklisting techniques. Network defense has sought to supplement blocklists with methods for detecting machine-generated domains. We present a repeatable evaluation and comparison of the available open source detection methods. We designed our evaluation with multiple interrelated aspects, to improve both interpretability and realism. In addition to evaluating detection methods, we assess the impact of the domain generation ecosystem on prior results about the nature of blocklists and how they are maintained. The results of the evaluation of open source detection methods finds all methods are inadequate for practical use. The results of the blocklist impact study finds that generated domains decrease the overlap among blocklists; however, while the effect is large in relative terms, the baseline is so small that the core conclusions of the prior work are sustained. Namely, that blocklist construction is very targeted, context-specific, and as a result blocklists do no overlap much. We recommend that Domain Generation Algorithm detection should also be similarly narrowly targeted to specific algorithms and specific malware families, rather than attempting to create general-purpose detection for machine-generated domains.
- 8 June 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
- Vol. 2 (3) , 1-22
Open AccessThe Ecosystem of Detection and Blocklisting of Domain Generation
Malware authors use domain generation algorithms to establish more reliable communication methods that can avoid reactive defender blocklisting techniques. Network defense has sought to supplement blocklists with methods for detecting machine-generated domains. We present a repeatable evaluation and comparison of the available open source detection methods. We designed our evaluation with multiple interrelated aspects, to improve both interpretability and realism. In addition to evaluating detection methods, we assess the impact of the domain generation ecosystem on prior results about the nature of blocklists and how they are maintained. The results of the evaluation of open source detection methods finds all methods are inadequate for practical use. The results of the blocklist impact study finds that generated domains decrease the overlap among blocklists; however, while the effect is large in relative terms, the baseline is so small that the core conclusions of the prior work are sustained. Namely, that blocklist construction is very targeted, context-specific, and as a result blocklists do no overlap much. We recommend that Domain Generation Algorithm detection should also be similarly narrowly targeted to specific algorithms and specific malware families, rather than attempting to create general-purpose detection for machine-generated domains.
- Open Access
- 20 April 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-47
Review of Human Decision-making during Computer Security Incident Analysis
We review practical advice on decision-making during computer security incident response. Scope includes standards from the IETF, ISO, FIRST, and the US intelligence community. To focus on human decision-making, the scope is the evidence collection, analysis, and reporting phases of response, which includes human decision-making within and connecting these phases. The results indicate both strengths and gaps. A strength is available advice on how to accomplish many specific tasks. However, there is little guidance on how to prioritize tasks in limited time or how to interpret, generalize, and convincingly report results. Future work should focus on these gaps in explication and specification of decision-making during incident analysis.
- 20 April 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-47
Open AccessReview of Human Decision-making during Computer Security Incident Analysis
We review practical advice on decision-making during computer security incident response. Scope includes standards from the IETF, ISO, FIRST, and the US intelligence community. To focus on human decision-making, the scope is the evidence collection, analysis, and reporting phases of response, which includes human decision-making within and connecting these phases. The results indicate both strengths and gaps. A strength is available advice on how to accomplish many specific tasks. However, there is little guidance on how to prioritize tasks in limited time or how to interpret, generalize, and convincingly report results. Future work should focus on these gaps in explication and specification of decision-making during incident analysis.
- 22 March 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 19 (2) , 74-78
Time to Change the CVSS?
According to its creators, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) "provides a way to capture the principal characteristics of a vulnerability ... reflecting its severity ... to help organizations properly assess and prioritize their vulnerability management processes."1 However, the CVSS scoring algorithm is not justified, either formally or empirically. According to the specification, using CVSS directly as a risk score is a mistake. Yet some compliance bodies recommend such misuse explicitly, for example, the U.S. government and the global payment card industry. The CVSS is suggested for misuse by federal civilian departments and agencies via National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidance (for example, Special Publications 800-115, page 7-4 and 800-40r3, page 4). PCI Data Security Standard requires such misuse in, for example, the regulation on Approved Scanning Vendors (v3). But even those organizations that use CVSS to "properly assess and prioritize their vulnerability management processes" are using unreliable output. We argue that the current CVSS version is still inadequate for both its intended purpose and as a proxy for risk to a vulnerable system. This article will summarize the ways the CVSS formula is unjustified and the ways it fails to properly inform vulnerability management before suggesting a way forward to reduce these problems.
- 22 March 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 19 (2) , 74-78
Time to Change the CVSS?
According to its creators, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) "provides a way to capture the principal characteristics of a vulnerability ... reflecting its severity ... to help organizations properly assess and prioritize their vulnerability management processes."1 However, the CVSS scoring algorithm is not justified, either formally or empirically. According to the specification, using CVSS directly as a risk score is a mistake. Yet some compliance bodies recommend such misuse explicitly, for example, the U.S. government and the global payment card industry. The CVSS is suggested for misuse by federal civilian departments and agencies via National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidance (for example, Special Publications 800-115, page 7-4 and 800-40r3, page 4). PCI Data Security Standard requires such misuse in, for example, the regulation on Approved Scanning Vendors (v3). But even those organizations that use CVSS to "properly assess and prioritize their vulnerability management processes" are using unreliable output. We argue that the current CVSS version is still inadequate for both its intended purpose and as a proxy for risk to a vulnerable system. This article will summarize the ways the CVSS formula is unjustified and the ways it fails to properly inform vulnerability management before suggesting a way forward to reduce these problems.
- Open Access
- 7 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 9 (2) , 19
A refinement to the general mechanistic account
- 7 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 9 (2) , 19
Open AccessA refinement to the general mechanistic account
- 12 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 32 (2) , 339-362
On Malfunction, Mechanisms and Malware Classification
- 12 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 32 (2) , 339-362
On Malfunction, Mechanisms and Malware Classification