NRNapat Rujeerapaiboon

Napat Rujeerapaiboon

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Napat Rujeerapaiboon has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Robust Data-Driven CARA Optimization

    by Li Chen, Arjun Ramachandra, Napat Rujeerapaiboon

  • Open Access

    Optimal Influence in Markovian Opinion Networks

    by Sarit Pasiphol, Rong Li, Napat Rujeerapaiboon

    The proliferation of digital social networks has intensified ideological polarization and created new arenas for information warfare. We develop a mathematical framework for strategic influence competition between two (or more) opposing groups in a network of opinion setters, each represented by a disjoint set of influencers. For a randomly selected social media user, we model the evolving identity of the most influential opinion setter using a Markov chain. From the perspective of one group, we maximize the discounted cumulative probability that this opinion setter belongs to that group, capturing the tradeoff between immediate and long-term influence. The transition matrix serves as the decision variable and is constrained by finite manipulation budgets. Although the resulting problem appears intractable at first glance, we derive a convex, and in some cases linear, reformulation through suitable variable transformations. Experiments on real-world U.S. political datasets show that the proposed model can reverse the baseline influence outcome, enabling a group with initially weaker influence to achieve dominance.

  • Open Access

    Equitable Auction Design with Provable Regret Guarantees

    by Ruiqin Wang, Cagil Kocyigit, Napat Rujeerapaiboon

    We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires that allocations to the minority group are at least a predetermined fraction (equity level) of those made to the rest of the bidders. Such constraints arise in various settings, including government procurement and corporate supply chain policies that prioritize small businesses, environmentally responsible suppliers, or enterprises owned by historically disadvantaged individuals. We include the equity requirements as constraints in the design of a mechanism, and our goal is to characterize equitable mechanisms with provable performance guarantees. Motivated by settings where reliable information about the bidders' values is unavailable, our main focus is a regret-based mechanism design problem, which makes no assumptions about the distribution of the bidders' values and aims to minimize the maximum (worst-case) ex-post regret in view of all possible bidders' values. Here, regret is defined as the difference between the highest revenue achievable in hindsight and the revenue generated by a mechanism. For this problem, we propose a closedform mechanism and prove that its ex-post regret is at most a constant multiple (dependent on the equity level) of the optimal worst-case regret. We find that, when bidders' value supports are identical, this factor is less than 1.31 across all possible equity levels. We also show that the proposed mechanism is asymptotically optimal as the equity level decreases and increases. Additionally, we show that this mechanism is also equipped with an additional layer of pricing protection for the minority group. As a benchmark based on distributional information, we also study a stochastic mechanism design problem, which assumes that the bidders' values are random variables following a known distribution and aims to maximize the expected revenue. We characterize the optimal mechanism in this benchmark problem under standard independence and regularity assumptions. Both mechanisms can be interpreted as set-asides, a common policy tool that reserves a fraction of goods for minority groups. Numerical results demonstrate that the stochastic mechanism performs well when the bidders' value distribution is accurately estimated, while the regret-based mechanism exhibits greater robustness under estimation errors.

  • Open Access

    Optimal Model Aggregation for Robust Prediction via Data-Driven Weighting

    by Shuting Yang, Qingxuan Yang, Yilin Xue, Napat Rujeerapaiboon

    We develop a robust satisficing framework for aggregating predictive models to mitigate overfitting and improve generalizability in the presence of limited data and potential distributional shifts. The proposed approach constructs an ensemble by optimally combining a collection of base predictors through a meta-model that determines aggregation weights. Departing from the conventional empirical-loss minimization approach, which serves as a baseline, we develop two Wasserstein-based robust satisficing formulations that explicitly account for discrepancies between the training samples and the unknown data-generating distribution. The first formulation minimizes the expected loss under Wasserstein-based distributional shifts, while the second evaluates performance relative to a benchmark predictor and minimizes the resulting excess loss under such shifts. The resulting aggregation schemes are model-agnostic and can be applied to arbitrary base predictors, including complex black-box models. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we demonstrate that incorporating robustness into the aggregation process improves generalization and yields more stable out-of-sample performance. These results highlight the value of combining ensembling with robust satisficing as a systematic approach to reliable predictive modeling.

  • Open Access

    Robust Procurement under Cost-Sharing Contracts and Real Options

    by Z Ky, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Jing Zhou

    Procurement decisions are increasingly exposed to substantial cost uncertainty, particularly when materials must be purchased from volatile spot markets. Motivated by this challenge, we study a procurement problem that integrates external risk mitigation through cost-sharing contracts and internal risk mitigation through real options, namely advance reservations that provide the right to purchase at future dates. To address ambiguity in the joint distribution of demand and price uncertainties, we formulate the problem as a two-stage distributionally robust optimization model with type-1 and type-$\infty$ Wasserstein ambiguity sets. Despite the nonconvexity and nonconcavity of the cash flow induced by the cost-sharing contract, we derive exact, tractable, and readily implementable reformulations of the resulting optimization problems. Numerical experiments based on real rebar data from China show that the proposed procurement strategy outperforms the sample average approximation benchmark and that option-based procurement can substantially reduce the expected total cost. More broadly, our framework offers practical decision support for industries in which procurement is governed by cost-sharing arrangements, real options, or both.

  • Utility elicitation and maximization from uncertain certainty equivalents

    by Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Yilin Xue, Chunling Luo

  • Open Access

    Optimal Competitive Ratio in Opaque Sales

    by Mingyang Fu, Xiaobo Li, Napat Rujeerapaiboon

  • Open Access

    Equitable Auction Design: With and Without Distributions

    by Ruiqin Wang, Cagil Kocyigit, Napat Rujeerapaiboon

    We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires that allocations to the minority group are at least a predetermined fraction (equity level) of those made to the rest of the bidders. Such constraints arise in various settings, including government procurement and corporate supply chain policies that prioritize small businesses, environmentally responsible suppliers, or enterprises owned by historically disadvantaged individuals. We analyze two variants of this problem: stochastic mechanism design, which assumes bidders' values follow a known distribution and seeks to maximize expected revenue, and regret-based mechanism design, which makes no distributional assumptions and aims to minimize the worst-case regret. We characterize a closed-form optimal stochastic mechanism and propose a closed-form regret-based mechanism, and establish that the ex-post regret under the latter is at most a constant multiple (dependent on the equity level) of the optimal worst-case regret. We further quantify that this approximation constant is at most 1.31 across different equity levels. Both mechanisms can be interpreted as set-asides, a common policy tool that reserves a fraction of goods for minority groups. Furthermore, numerical results demonstrate that the stochastic mechanism performs well when the bidders' value distribution is accurately estimated, while the regret-based mechanism exhibits greater robustness under estimation errors.