Axel Cronert
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Axel Cronert has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pär Nyman
Stockholm University
4 shared publications Pär Nyman
Stockholm University
2 shared publicationsAxel Hadenius
Uppsala University, Sweden
1 shared publication- Marcus Österman
Department of Government, Uppsala Center for Labor Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
1 shared publication Richard Forsén
Department of Government, Uppsala University , Uppsala, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 104
Small time costs matter: Reform-induced polling station congestion reduces turnout in a high-turnout PR system
- 5 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 104
Open AccessSmall time costs matter: Reform-induced polling station congestion reduces turnout in a high-turnout PR system
- Open Access
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- p. 1-13
Electoral opportunism and economic policy: disentangling myopia and moderation
This study jointly considers two opportunistic behaviors among political incumbents that may be triggered by electoral uncertainty—policy myopia and policy moderation—which hitherto have been the focus of separate research traditions. We evaluate their prevalence in economic policy-making among Swedish local governments, using a new measure of electoral competitiveness, capturing the incumbent government’s re-election probability, for which plausibly exogenous variation is generated by exploiting national-level polls. We find a substantial moderating effect of competitiveness on incumbents’ tax rate decisions—shifting policy towards the political center—but little evidence of policy myopia, whether in taxation, budget balance, or public investment. Corroborated by evidence from a politician survey, these findings caution against the popular understanding of democratic policy-making as inherently short-sighted.
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- p. 1-13
Open AccessElectoral opportunism and economic policy: disentangling myopia and moderation
This study jointly considers two opportunistic behaviors among political incumbents that may be triggered by electoral uncertainty—policy myopia and policy moderation—which hitherto have been the focus of separate research traditions. We evaluate their prevalence in economic policy-making among Swedish local governments, using a new measure of electoral competitiveness, capturing the incumbent government’s re-election probability, for which plausibly exogenous variation is generated by exploiting national-level polls. We find a substantial moderating effect of competitiveness on incumbents’ tax rate decisions—shifting policy towards the political center—but little evidence of policy myopia, whether in taxation, budget balance, or public investment. Corroborated by evidence from a politician survey, these findings caution against the popular understanding of democratic policy-making as inherently short-sighted.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e114
Bargaining Complexity Beyond Arithmetic
Political scientists lack a generally accepted definition of bargaining complexity, and attempts to quantify the complexity of political negotiations as such are rare. We argue that bargaining complexity is best defined as the amount of choice facing the negotiating actors, and best operationalized as the entropy of the probability distribution across potential bargaining outcomes. We apply this general approach to 343 government formation processes in advanced democracies, predicting the selection probability of each potential government using a state-of-the-art government formation model that integrates both arithmetic factors based on the number and size of parties and interparty relations, such as ideological dispersion and pre-electoral coalitions. We then demonstrate how to use our measure to disentangle between different determinants of bargaining complexity. Lastly, we show that bargaining complexity is robustly related to how many potential governments and partners were considered but ultimately set aside during negotiations and to the resulting cabinet’s durability.
- 27 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55, e114
Open AccessBargaining Complexity Beyond Arithmetic
Political scientists lack a generally accepted definition of bargaining complexity, and attempts to quantify the complexity of political negotiations as such are rare. We argue that bargaining complexity is best defined as the amount of choice facing the negotiating actors, and best operationalized as the entropy of the probability distribution across potential bargaining outcomes. We apply this general approach to 343 government formation processes in advanced democracies, predicting the selection probability of each potential government using a state-of-the-art government formation model that integrates both arithmetic factors based on the number and size of parties and interparty relations, such as ideological dispersion and pre-electoral coalitions. We then demonstrate how to use our measure to disentangle between different determinants of bargaining complexity. Lastly, we show that bargaining complexity is robustly related to how many potential governments and partners were considered but ultimately set aside during negotiations and to the resulting cabinet’s durability.
- Open Access
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Birds of a Feather Govern Together: Inter-Party Ties and Legislative Cooperation
This study seeks to advance our understanding of how inter-party personal ties among politicians impact legislative cooperation between parties. Considering that parliamentary bargaining is typically featured by weak or lacking formal institutions and high uncertainty—the kind of context in which organizational sociology research has found personal ties to be particularly influential for human interactions—we argue that personal ties between parties should increase the likelihood of cooperation. We evaluate our argument analyzing Swedish local governments, combining registry data on horizontal dynastic ties—i.e., two politicians in different parties being first- or second-degree relatives or partners—with survey data on self-reported inter-party personal connections. Our analyses consistently substantiate that inter-party ties—and especially so close family ties—impact government formation and other types of legislative cooperation. These findings have implications for our understanding of parliamentary dynamics as well as the representation of less-connected groups.
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessBirds of a Feather Govern Together: Inter-Party Ties and Legislative Cooperation
This study seeks to advance our understanding of how inter-party personal ties among politicians impact legislative cooperation between parties. Considering that parliamentary bargaining is typically featured by weak or lacking formal institutions and high uncertainty—the kind of context in which organizational sociology research has found personal ties to be particularly influential for human interactions—we argue that personal ties between parties should increase the likelihood of cooperation. We evaluate our argument analyzing Swedish local governments, combining registry data on horizontal dynastic ties—i.e., two politicians in different parties being first- or second-degree relatives or partners—with survey data on self-reported inter-party personal connections. Our analyses consistently substantiate that inter-party ties—and especially so close family ties—impact government formation and other types of legislative cooperation. These findings have implications for our understanding of parliamentary dynamics as well as the representation of less-connected groups.
- Open Access
- 24 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Electoral Overoptimism among Political Elites: Evidence from a PR System
This study makes a three-fold contribution to the growing literature on politicians’ cognitive biases. First, we introduce a new, probabilistic measurement of politicians’ overoptimism about their party’s prospects of winning government office, devised for PR systems. Second, we propose an argument for why political leaders—although known to be positively selected on cognitive ability—should be more prone to optimism bias than non-leaders. Third, we evaluate this argument using original survey data from Swedish local governments. We document substantial overoptimism, particularly among opposition politicians and those in elite positions. We furthermore provide quasi-experimental evidence suggesting that political leaders’ overoptimism is partly due to confirmation bias when interpreting voter preferences, as they are only more prone to optimism bias than non-leaders when their party has gained in recent polls. The observed overoptimism has implications for policy-making by potentially deterring opportunistic, myopic policies aimed at short-term vote maximization at the expense of long-term priorities.
- 24 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessElectoral Overoptimism among Political Elites: Evidence from a PR System
This study makes a three-fold contribution to the growing literature on politicians’ cognitive biases. First, we introduce a new, probabilistic measurement of politicians’ overoptimism about their party’s prospects of winning government office, devised for PR systems. Second, we propose an argument for why political leaders—although known to be positively selected on cognitive ability—should be more prone to optimism bias than non-leaders. Third, we evaluate this argument using original survey data from Swedish local governments. We document substantial overoptimism, particularly among opposition politicians and those in elite positions. We furthermore provide quasi-experimental evidence suggesting that political leaders’ overoptimism is partly due to confirmation bias when interpreting voter preferences, as they are only more prone to optimism bias than non-leaders when their party has gained in recent polls. The observed overoptimism has implications for policy-making by potentially deterring opportunistic, myopic policies aimed at short-term vote maximization at the expense of long-term priorities.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1108-1128
Do voters' biases impede future‐oriented policy‐making?
In research on public economics, climate politics and the welfare state, voters' informational and cognitive biases are commonly understood as impeding future‐oriented policy‐making, by incentivizing policymakers to trade off long‐term investments against short‐term consumption when facing competitive elections or liquidity constraints. Yet, the assumptions about how policymakers perceive these alleged trade‐offs have not yet been verified. This study reports results from a survey of Swedish local government politicians, centring around experiments about environmental‐friendly public investments. We find that most politicians perceive that electoral competition stimulates rather than impedes investments. Politicians are, however, less supportive of investments if these need to be financed through absolute losses rather than gains foregone, which illustrates the relevance of endowment effects in long‐term governance. We furthermore show that our micro‐level observations are consistent with macro‐level investment expenditure patterns. These findings demonstrate that accounting for policymakers' own perceptions is important for advancing our understanding of future‐oriented policy‐making.
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1108-1128
Open AccessDo voters' biases impede future‐oriented policy‐making?
In research on public economics, climate politics and the welfare state, voters' informational and cognitive biases are commonly understood as impeding future‐oriented policy‐making, by incentivizing policymakers to trade off long‐term investments against short‐term consumption when facing competitive elections or liquidity constraints. Yet, the assumptions about how policymakers perceive these alleged trade‐offs have not yet been verified. This study reports results from a survey of Swedish local government politicians, centring around experiments about environmental‐friendly public investments. We find that most politicians perceive that electoral competition stimulates rather than impedes investments. Politicians are, however, less supportive of investments if these need to be financed through absolute losses rather than gains foregone, which illustrates the relevance of endowment effects in long‐term governance. We furthermore show that our micro‐level observations are consistent with macro‐level investment expenditure patterns. These findings demonstrate that accounting for policymakers' own perceptions is important for advancing our understanding of future‐oriented policy‐making.
- Open Access
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 42 (4) , 705-729
Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a globally spread—but differently timed—implementation of school closures and other disruptive containment measures as governments worldwide intervened to curb transmission of disease. This study argues that the timing of such disruptive interventions reflects how governments balance the principles of precaution and proportionality in their pandemic decision-making. A theory is proposed of how their trade-off is impacted by two interacting institutional factors: electoral democratic institutions, which incentivise political leaders to increasingly favour precaution, and high state administrative capacity, which instead makes a proportional strategy involving later containment measures more administratively and politically feasible. Global patterns consistent with this theory are documented among 170 countries in early 2020, using Cox models of school closures and other non-pharmaceutical interventions. Corroborating the theorised mechanisms, additional results indicate that electoral competition prompts democratic leaders’ faster response, and that this mechanism is weaker where professional state agencies have more influence over policymaking.
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 42 (4) , 705-729
Open AccessPrecaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a globally spread—but differently timed—implementation of school closures and other disruptive containment measures as governments worldwide intervened to curb transmission of disease. This study argues that the timing of such disruptive interventions reflects how governments balance the principles of precaution and proportionality in their pandemic decision-making. A theory is proposed of how their trade-off is impacted by two interacting institutional factors: electoral democratic institutions, which incentivise political leaders to increasingly favour precaution, and high state administrative capacity, which instead makes a proportional strategy involving later containment measures more administratively and politically feasible. Global patterns consistent with this theory are documented among 170 countries in early 2020, using Cox models of school closures and other non-pharmaceutical interventions. Corroborating the theorised mechanisms, additional results indicate that electoral competition prompts democratic leaders’ faster response, and that this mechanism is weaker where professional state agencies have more influence over policymaking.
- Open Access
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Electoral Opportunism: Disentangling Myopia and Moderation
A central component of representative democracy, competitive elections imply that incumbents face uncertainty about being re-elected into office. This study jointly considers two opportunistic behaviors that may be triggered by such uncertainty—policy myopia and policy moderation—which hitherto have been the focus of separate research traditions. Disentangling the two behaviors theoretically and empirically, we evaluate their prevalence in economic policy–making among Swedish local governments. We apply a new measure of electoral competitiveness that captures the incumbent government’s re-election probability, for which plausibly exogenous variation is generated by exploiting national-level polls. We find a substantial moderating effect of competitiveness on incumbents’ tax rate decisions—shifting policy towards the political center—but little evidence of policy myopia whether in taxation, budget balance, or public investment. Corroborated by original survey evidence on politicians’ perceptions of their re-election prospects and opportunistic policy options, these findings thus caution against the popular understanding of democratic policy-making as inherently short-sighted.
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessElectoral Opportunism: Disentangling Myopia and Moderation
A central component of representative democracy, competitive elections imply that incumbents face uncertainty about being re-elected into office. This study jointly considers two opportunistic behaviors that may be triggered by such uncertainty—policy myopia and policy moderation—which hitherto have been the focus of separate research traditions. Disentangling the two behaviors theoretically and empirically, we evaluate their prevalence in economic policy–making among Swedish local governments. We apply a new measure of electoral competitiveness that captures the incumbent government’s re-election probability, for which plausibly exogenous variation is generated by exploiting national-level polls. We find a substantial moderating effect of competitiveness on incumbents’ tax rate decisions—shifting policy towards the political center—but little evidence of policy myopia whether in taxation, budget balance, or public investment. Corroborated by original survey evidence on politicians’ perceptions of their re-election prospects and opportunistic policy options, these findings thus caution against the popular understanding of democratic policy-making as inherently short-sighted.
- Open Access
- 29 December 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 21 (1) , 367-395
Like worker, like union? Labor market risk exposure, white-collar predominance and trade unions’ policy advocacy
This study seeks to advance the scholarship on trade union heterogeneity. Expanding on previous research, we develop a theoretical framework that distinguishes unions along two dimensions—members’ labor market risk exposure and the predominance of white-collar workers—that help shape their labor market policy preferences and advocacy. The framework is then assessed in a within-country mixed-methods analysis. We first document how members in 35 Swedish unions map onto the two dimensions, using fine-grained survey data, and then qualitatively analyze the advocacy of seven unions with different membership characteristics. Our results confirm the relevance of isolating the two dimensions in analyses of both membership preferences and elite advocacy. These findings contrast with existing accounts of the contemporary Swedish union movement and carry implications for many other countries with fragmented union landscapes. They particularly demonstrate the importance of disaggregating union membership in micro- and macro-level research involving unions and their power resources.
- 29 December 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 21 (1) , 367-395
Open AccessLike worker, like union? Labor market risk exposure, white-collar predominance and trade unions’ policy advocacy
This study seeks to advance the scholarship on trade union heterogeneity. Expanding on previous research, we develop a theoretical framework that distinguishes unions along two dimensions—members’ labor market risk exposure and the predominance of white-collar workers—that help shape their labor market policy preferences and advocacy. The framework is then assessed in a within-country mixed-methods analysis. We first document how members in 35 Swedish unions map onto the two dimensions, using fine-grained survey data, and then qualitatively analyze the advocacy of seven unions with different membership characteristics. Our results confirm the relevance of isolating the two dimensions in analyses of both membership preferences and elite advocacy. These findings contrast with existing accounts of the contemporary Swedish union movement and carry implications for many other countries with fragmented union landscapes. They particularly demonstrate the importance of disaggregating union membership in micro- and macro-level research involving unions and their power resources.
- Open Access
- 16 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1141-1159
When the paper tiger bites: Evidence of compliance with unenforced regulation among employers in Sweden
Little evidence exists on whether and why organizations comply with regulations that are not monitored or enforced. To address that shortage, this study evaluates the 2007 repeal of an essentially unenforced regulation mandating private and local government employers in Sweden to post their vacancies publicly at the Public Employment Service. Exploiting the fact that central government employers were not affected, difference‐in‐differences analyses identify a substantial negative effect of the repeal on local government employers' vacancy posting propensity – with similar results for the private sector. At odds with deterrence models of regulatory compliance, these findings hint at an important role for organizational factors related to cultures and norms. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that local governments with more law‐abiding organizational culture and stronger social responsibility commitment were more prone to comply with the unenforced regulation. The results thus simultaneously point to an untapped potential and to some possible preconditions for unenforced regulatory strategies.
- 16 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1141-1159
Open AccessWhen the paper tiger bites: Evidence of compliance with unenforced regulation among employers in Sweden
Little evidence exists on whether and why organizations comply with regulations that are not monitored or enforced. To address that shortage, this study evaluates the 2007 repeal of an essentially unenforced regulation mandating private and local government employers in Sweden to post their vacancies publicly at the Public Employment Service. Exploiting the fact that central government employers were not affected, difference‐in‐differences analyses identify a substantial negative effect of the repeal on local government employers' vacancy posting propensity – with similar results for the private sector. At odds with deterrence models of regulatory compliance, these findings hint at an important role for organizational factors related to cultures and norms. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that local governments with more law‐abiding organizational culture and stronger social responsibility commitment were more prone to comply with the unenforced regulation. The results thus simultaneously point to an untapped potential and to some possible preconditions for unenforced regulatory strategies.