Marco Marini

This paper extends the CES model of monopolistic competition to the case where varieties are both horizontally and vertically differentiated. A distinctive feature of our model is the presence of a network externality, which operates through the number of varieties available at each quality level. Depending on the quality gap, there are corner equilibria in which consumers purchase only high-quality or low-quality varieties, or an interior equilibrium in which consumers are split between the two qualities. Unlike the CES model of monopolistic competition, the equilibrium is never efficient and the market may even select the outcome with the lowest surplus.

Anti‐consumerism is a doctrine that aims to discourage excessive consumption because of its damaging effect on the environment. It can either focus on creating psychic costs for consumers (a ‘stick’) or psychic benefits for non‐consumers (a ‘carrot’). This paper examines the impact of these two approaches on competition and welfare. The competitive effect is comparable in both cases—anti‐consumerism reduces competitive pressure as well as prices, outputs and profits. In terms of consumer and social welfare, however, the carrot performs strictly better than the stick.

In a vertically differentiated duopoly where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the hedonic and environmental attributes of goods, we explore the effects of antihedonism and environmentalism, intended here as cultural paradigms altering consumers' preferences. We find that in a market where consumers prioritize hedonic concerns, antihedonism can reduce consumer surplus (CS), whereas an increase in environmentalism can raise CS. However, advocating for environmentalism over hedonism so that consumers prioritize environmental concerns can result in a significantly lower environmental surplus.

We investigate whether climate activism favors pro-environmental consumption by examining the impact of Fridays for Future (FFF) protests in Italy on secondhand automobile sales in rally-affected areas. Leveraging data on 10 million automobile transactions occurring before and after FFF mobilizations, we exploit rainfall on the day of the event as an exogenous source of attendance variation. Our findings reveal a reduction in both the total number of cars purchased and their average CO 2 emissions, with an uptick in the market share of low-emission vehicles and a corresponding decrease in the market share of high-emission counterparts. We test for two potential mechanisms at work: one mediated by an increase in environmental awareness, the other induced by a rational anticipation of future stricter regulations. Empirical evidence suggests that the latter mechanism is generally more pronounced than the former. However, the first channel seems likely to be at work among individuals aged 18-25, a group that is potentially more involved in the FFF movement.

Anti-consumerism is a doctrine that aims to discourage excessive consumption because of its damaging effect on the environment. It can either focus on creating psychic costs for consumers (a ‘stick’) or psychic benefits for non-consumers (a ‘carrot’). This paper examines the impact of these two approaches on competition and welfare. The competitive effect is comparable in both cases – anti-consumerism (weakly) reduces competitive pressure as well as prices, outputs and profits. In terms of consumer and social welfare, however, the carrot performs strictly better than the stick.

This special issue features 14 new research papers investigating the role of farmers’ organizations (e.g., collective action, self‐help groups, producer companies/organizations, and cooperatives) in supporting sustainable development. The key findings include: (1) farmer groups and cooperatives promote farmers’ adoption of good farm management practices, new agricultural technologies and sustainable farming practices, although not substantially improving farm yield; (2) outsourcing services provided by agricultural cooperatives help to increase the technical efficiency of crop production; (3) cooperative membership enhances members’ bargaining power and enables them to sell their products at higher prices; (4) cooperatives motivate rural laborers to work in off‐farm sectors, while self‐help groups empower rural women in decision‐making; (5) internet use improves agricultural cooperatives’ economic, social, and innovative performances; (6) direct administrative intervention supporting cooperative development may lead to the emergence of shell cooperatives; (7) participation in forest farmer organizations enables wood value chain upgrading; (8) increasing the cooperative size in terms of income, equity, and assets increases the profitability of savings and credit cooperatives; and (9) creating cross‐border cooperation between cooperatives generates benefits for all parties involved. These findings can inspire the design of policies aimed to support farmers’ organizations in achieving sustainable development goals.