Jiangyu Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jiangyu Wang has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Cheng Han Tan
2 shared publicationsMuthucumaraswamy Sornarajah
2 shared publicationsAndrew Godwin
Melbourne Law School
1 shared publicationAnnekatrin Kutzbach
White & Case LLP
1 shared publicationAurelio Gurrea-Martínez
Singapore Management University - School of Law
1 shared publicationCarsten Lösing
White & Case LLP
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
Paradigm Shift in the Making? Geopolitical Challenges and Institutional Changes in the International Monetary System: From Neoliberalism to a Pluralist Multipolar Financial Order
This paper examined the critical challenges facing the international monetary system, arguing that they have created conditions for a shift from a neoliberal framework to a pluralist multipolar financial order. Using an interdisciplinary approach that blends international law and international relations, the paper provides an analysis of the current Bretton Woods‐based international monetary system (IMS). It claims the IMS operates within a political order marked by American hegemony, neoliberal economic ideology, US dollar dominance, and a legalised monetary order. The paper develops a three‐element framework of strategic undermining, financial statecraft and financial nationalism to interpret geopolitical financial competition between the United States and China, and assess the institutional challenges to the global monetary order. In conclusion, it advocates for a new pluralist multipolar order that accommodates various monetary regimes across different levels. For this order to emerge and endure, a minimum level of multilateral cooperation is essential. The paper proposes a multilateral framework for the future monetary order, based on the following: (1) allowing nations to consider national security in financial regulations; (2) enhancing multilateral coordination for a global financial safety net; (3) protecting global financial infrastructure for seamless functioning of payment systems; and (4) supporting development finance for least developed countries.
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
Open AccessParadigm Shift in the Making? Geopolitical Challenges and Institutional Changes in the International Monetary System: From Neoliberalism to a Pluralist Multipolar Financial Order
This paper examined the critical challenges facing the international monetary system, arguing that they have created conditions for a shift from a neoliberal framework to a pluralist multipolar financial order. Using an interdisciplinary approach that blends international law and international relations, the paper provides an analysis of the current Bretton Woods‐based international monetary system (IMS). It claims the IMS operates within a political order marked by American hegemony, neoliberal economic ideology, US dollar dominance, and a legalised monetary order. The paper develops a three‐element framework of strategic undermining, financial statecraft and financial nationalism to interpret geopolitical financial competition between the United States and China, and assess the institutional challenges to the global monetary order. In conclusion, it advocates for a new pluralist multipolar order that accommodates various monetary regimes across different levels. For this order to emerge and endure, a minimum level of multilateral cooperation is essential. The paper proposes a multilateral framework for the future monetary order, based on the following: (1) allowing nations to consider national security in financial regulations; (2) enhancing multilateral coordination for a global financial safety net; (3) protecting global financial infrastructure for seamless functioning of payment systems; and (4) supporting development finance for least developed countries.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Comparative Legal Education
This chapter considers trends and developments in legal education in Asia through the lens of some representative polities, namely China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. The experience of these polities indicates that understanding of legal education in Asia cannot be divorced from colonisation and the imposition (or reception) of Western law. It has also been influenced more recently by globalisation as seen from increased cross-border flows of faculty and students, the teaching of transnational law subjects, the development of particular forms of teaching practice such as legal clinics and programmes equivalent to the Juris Doctor, explicit focus on transnational rankings, and transnational scholarly communities engaged in teaching and research collaboration.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessComparative Legal Education
This chapter considers trends and developments in legal education in Asia through the lens of some representative polities, namely China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. The experience of these polities indicates that understanding of legal education in Asia cannot be divorced from colonisation and the imposition (or reception) of Western law. It has also been influenced more recently by globalisation as seen from increased cross-border flows of faculty and students, the teaching of transnational law subjects, the development of particular forms of teaching practice such as legal clinics and programmes equivalent to the Juris Doctor, explicit focus on transnational rankings, and transnational scholarly communities engaged in teaching and research collaboration.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
CSR as CPR: The Political Logic of Corporate Social Responsibility in China
CSR has been flourishing in China though, in contrast with its counterpart in the West, Chinese CSR follows a political logic of being state-led and state-driven and maintaining the Chinese state’s performance-based legitimacy. In the past few years, ESG investment has been gaining increasing attention among institutional investors in China’s capital markets, starting as a market-driven, bottom-up initiative. The Chinese government has very recently jumped on the bandwagon of ESG promotion. It is an open question whether ESG will be “nationalized” by the Chinese government, but there is no doubt the same political logic will shape the direction of ESG development in China.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCSR as CPR: The Political Logic of Corporate Social Responsibility in China
CSR has been flourishing in China though, in contrast with its counterpart in the West, Chinese CSR follows a political logic of being state-led and state-driven and maintaining the Chinese state’s performance-based legitimacy. In the past few years, ESG investment has been gaining increasing attention among institutional investors in China’s capital markets, starting as a market-driven, bottom-up initiative. The Chinese government has very recently jumped on the bandwagon of ESG promotion. It is an open question whether ESG will be “nationalized” by the Chinese government, but there is no doubt the same political logic will shape the direction of ESG development in China.
- 7 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 9 (3) , 448-457
Applying the CISG to Hong Kong: Legal Analysis and Policy Recommendations
- 7 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 9 (3) , 448-457
Applying the CISG to Hong Kong: Legal Analysis and Policy Recommendations
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 10 (1) , 140-153
China’s Approach to International Law: From Traditional Westphalianism to Aggressive Instrumentalism in the Xi Jinping Era
China has been expanding its engagement with the international legal order for decades,1 yet its general approach to international law remains mysterious or at least hard to understand. This article provides a preliminary examination of China’s contemporary international legal stance. It argues that, although China has appeared to be a follower of the traditional Westphalianism, it is at heart an instrumentalist in terms of complying with international law. In the Xi Jinping era, China’s approach to international law can be characterized as ‘aggressive instrumentalism’, though Xi Jinping’s ‘Community of Shared Future for Mankind’ concept has arguably also demonstrated a certain degree of idealism.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 10 (1) , 140-153
China’s Approach to International Law: From Traditional Westphalianism to Aggressive Instrumentalism in the Xi Jinping Era
China has been expanding its engagement with the international legal order for decades,1 yet its general approach to international law remains mysterious or at least hard to understand. This article provides a preliminary examination of China’s contemporary international legal stance. It argues that, although China has appeared to be a follower of the traditional Westphalianism, it is at heart an instrumentalist in terms of complying with international law. In the Xi Jinping era, China’s approach to international law can be characterized as ‘aggressive instrumentalism’, though Xi Jinping’s ‘Community of Shared Future for Mankind’ concept has arguably also demonstrated a certain degree of idealism.
- 2 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia Pacific Law Review
- Vol. 29 (1) , 70-85
Flexible institutionalization: a critical examination of the Chinese perspectives on dispute settlement for the Belt and Road
This paper critically introduces a few Chinese perspectives on dispute settlement for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as presented in the articles included in this special issue. It starts with proposing the theory of ‘flexible institutionalisation’ as an analytical framework to capture the nature and intention behind China’s effort in developing BRI dispute resolution mechanism, followed by an examination of the legal characteristics of – and the legal changes facing – dispute settlement in the BRI, which has not been thoroughly addressed and analysed in the existing literature. It then offers an overview of the Chinese effort to establish a China-led dispute settlement system for the BRI. With this background, the paper presents the main argument and perspective in each article in this special issue. It concludes with reflections on the shortcomings of the special issue to the literature on BRI dispute settlement, as well as, the concerns China has to take into consideration in its ambition to construct China-led mechanisms for dispute settlement for the Belt and Road.
- 2 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asia Pacific Law Review
- Vol. 29 (1) , 70-85
Flexible institutionalization: a critical examination of the Chinese perspectives on dispute settlement for the Belt and Road
This paper critically introduces a few Chinese perspectives on dispute settlement for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as presented in the articles included in this special issue. It starts with proposing the theory of ‘flexible institutionalisation’ as an analytical framework to capture the nature and intention behind China’s effort in developing BRI dispute resolution mechanism, followed by an examination of the legal characteristics of – and the legal changes facing – dispute settlement in the BRI, which has not been thoroughly addressed and analysed in the existing literature. It then offers an overview of the Chinese effort to establish a China-led dispute settlement system for the BRI. With this background, the paper presents the main argument and perspective in each article in this special issue. It concludes with reflections on the shortcomings of the special issue to the literature on BRI dispute settlement, as well as, the concerns China has to take into consideration in its ambition to construct China-led mechanisms for dispute settlement for the Belt and Road.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting
- Vol. 115, 315-320
U.S.-China Trade Relations in the Biden Era: Trade War, Industrial Policy, and Rule-Based International Order
Presidential candidate Joe Biden's team declared President Trump's trade war with China a failure when Democratic nominee Senator Kamala Harris told Vice President Mike Pence at the U.S. vice presidential debate that “You lost that trade war.” Half a year has passed since Biden took over the White House, the U.S.-China trade war is still going on, though in a much less pompous manner than what President Donald Trump once liked it to be. President Biden refused to make significant change to Trump's tough stance on U.S.-China trade relations on the ground of the accusations of China's “stealing” intellectual property (IP), state subsidies to enterprises, forced technology transfer from foreign companies, among others. On the other hand, China has not backed off from the trade war, though it arguably made many concessions in the so-called “Phase 1 trade deal” signed by the United States and China on January 15, 2020, in which China pledged to buy US$ 200 billion more of American goods and services in 2020 and 2021, in addition to the commitments to strengthen protection and remove forced technology transfer. Evidence suggested that China was still far behind prorated targets of a full year when Biden assumed presidency in January 2021. More significantly, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been taking the opportunities offered by the trade war to remake the Chinese economy toward state capitalism. Additionally, as the trade war was happening, the Trump administration intensified its assault on the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and effectively paralyzed the Appellate Body, a crucial part of the WTO's Dispute Settlement System.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting
- Vol. 115, 315-320
U.S.-China Trade Relations in the Biden Era: Trade War, Industrial Policy, and Rule-Based International Order
Presidential candidate Joe Biden's team declared President Trump's trade war with China a failure when Democratic nominee Senator Kamala Harris told Vice President Mike Pence at the U.S. vice presidential debate that “You lost that trade war.” Half a year has passed since Biden took over the White House, the U.S.-China trade war is still going on, though in a much less pompous manner than what President Donald Trump once liked it to be. President Biden refused to make significant change to Trump's tough stance on U.S.-China trade relations on the ground of the accusations of China's “stealing” intellectual property (IP), state subsidies to enterprises, forced technology transfer from foreign companies, among others. On the other hand, China has not backed off from the trade war, though it arguably made many concessions in the so-called “Phase 1 trade deal” signed by the United States and China on January 15, 2020, in which China pledged to buy US$ 200 billion more of American goods and services in 2020 and 2021, in addition to the commitments to strengthen protection and remove forced technology transfer. Evidence suggested that China was still far behind prorated targets of a full year when Biden assumed presidency in January 2021. More significantly, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been taking the opportunities offered by the trade war to remake the Chinese economy toward state capitalism. Additionally, as the trade war was happening, the Trump administration intensified its assault on the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and effectively paralyzed the Appellate Body, a crucial part of the WTO's Dispute Settlement System.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 8 (2) , 279-280
Editorial
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 8 (2) , 279-280
Editorial
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 8 (1) , 29
Editorial Comment
The three articles in this collection are the speeches of three senior judges from Singapore and China delivered at the International Conference on Dispute Settlement in the Belt and Road Initiative, which was held on 14–15 November 2019 in Singapore. They offer deep insights into the roles that the judiciaries in Singapore and China have respectively set for themselves in order to seize the opportunities offered and meet the challenges brought about by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the speech of Justice Steven Chong of the Singapore Court of Appeal is more wide-ranging, the main role that the three judges have identified is the same—that is, to offer a forum...
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 8 (1) , 29
Editorial Comment
The three articles in this collection are the speeches of three senior judges from Singapore and China delivered at the International Conference on Dispute Settlement in the Belt and Road Initiative, which was held on 14–15 November 2019 in Singapore. They offer deep insights into the roles that the judiciaries in Singapore and China have respectively set for themselves in order to seize the opportunities offered and meet the challenges brought about by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the speech of Justice Steven Chong of the Singapore Court of Appeal is more wide-ranging, the main role that the three judges have identified is the same—that is, to offer a forum...