David Yates
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Vol. 8 (1) , 97-116
A strange kind of power: Vetter on the formal adequacy of dispositionalism
- 1 January 2020
- Vol. 8 (1) , 97-116
Open AccessA strange kind of power: Vetter on the formal adequacy of dispositionalism
- 22 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 39 (5) , 1057-1072
Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness
- 22 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 39 (5) , 1057-1072
Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 78 (3) , 557-562
Emergence
Paul Humphreys’ main aim in this wide-ranging and ambitious book is to defend a novel account of ontological emergence he refers to as transformational emergence.1 His secondary aims are many: to show how ontological emergence so understood can be usefully seen against the backdrop of a reductionist position he calls generative atomism; to compare and contrast his preferred position with historical and contemporary alternatives; and to consider a range of scientific cases both as potential examples of ontological emergence and of weaker forms of emergence stemming from our computational or conceptual limitations. Humphreys is clear from the outset that the range of...
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 78 (3) , 557-562
Emergence
Paul Humphreys’ main aim in this wide-ranging and ambitious book is to defend a novel account of ontological emergence he refers to as transformational emergence.1 His secondary aims are many: to show how ontological emergence so understood can be usefully seen against the backdrop of a reductionist position he calls generative atomism; to compare and contrast his preferred position with historical and contemporary alternatives; and to consider a range of scientific cases both as potential examples of ontological emergence and of weaker forms of emergence stemming from our computational or conceptual limitations. Humphreys is clear from the outset that the range of...
- 12 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 195 (10) , 4525-4550
Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers
- 12 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 195 (10) , 4525-4550
Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers
- 2 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 175 (2) , 461-481
Three arguments for humility
- 2 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 175 (2) , 461-481
Three arguments for humility
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 3 (20201214)
Demystifying Emergence
- 1 January 2016
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 3 (20201214)
Open AccessDemystifying Emergence
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 138-156
Is Powerful Causation an Internal Relation?
In this chapter it is argued that there is a tension in the view that powerful causation is an internal relation. Powers are ontologically dependent on other powers for their individuation, but in that case—given an Aristotelian conception of properties as immanent universals—powers will not be intrinsic on several extant analyses of ‘intrinsic’, since to possess a given power P requires the existence of other concrete particulars as bearers of the powers that individuate P. Several ways to resolve this tension are suggested, but it is argued that all tenable options involve individuative type-level causal relations between powers. While these individuative relations are internal in the sense that powers are essentially related, this is a different sense of ‘internal’ to the one that justifies reduction of token causal relations to the intrinsic powers of their relata, and does not license a reduction of the type-level relations.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 138-156
Open AccessIs Powerful Causation an Internal Relation?
In this chapter it is argued that there is a tension in the view that powerful causation is an internal relation. Powers are ontologically dependent on other powers for their individuation, but in that case—given an Aristotelian conception of properties as immanent universals—powers will not be intrinsic on several extant analyses of ‘intrinsic’, since to possess a given power P requires the existence of other concrete particulars as bearers of the powers that individuate P. Several ways to resolve this tension are suggested, but it is argued that all tenable options involve individuative type-level causal relations between powers. While these individuative relations are internal in the sense that powers are essentially related, this is a different sense of ‘internal’ to the one that justifies reduction of token causal relations to the intrinsic powers of their relata, and does not license a reduction of the type-level relations.
- 21 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 91 (2) , 411-424
Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators
- 21 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 91 (2) , 411-424
Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators
- 9 August 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 73 (4) , 801-806
Mind and Cosmos
The central premises of Nagel’s argument against what he terms ‘the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature’ (hereafter ‘neo-Darwinism’) are the following: (1) Remarkable features of the cosmos such as consciousness, cognition and value are intelligible to us; (2) such phenomena are not materialistically reducible; (3) only phenomena that are materialistically reducible are intelligible within the framework of neo-Darwinism.1 In Chapter 2, ‘Antireductionism and the Natural Order’, Nagel argues for (1) and offers suggestive remarks on what ‘intelligible’ means, without ever approaching a definition. The remaining three chapters argue in turn that consciousness, cognition and value are not reducible, provide arguments as to why this renders them unintelligible for neo-Darwinists, and develop a sketch of an alternative way of understanding them. As Nagel puts it:
- 9 August 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 73 (4) , 801-806
Mind and Cosmos
The central premises of Nagel’s argument against what he terms ‘the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature’ (hereafter ‘neo-Darwinism’) are the following: (1) Remarkable features of the cosmos such as consciousness, cognition and value are intelligible to us; (2) such phenomena are not materialistically reducible; (3) only phenomena that are materialistically reducible are intelligible within the framework of neo-Darwinism.1 In Chapter 2, ‘Antireductionism and the Natural Order’, Nagel argues for (1) and offers suggestive remarks on what ‘intelligible’ means, without ever approaching a definition. The remaining three chapters argue in turn that consciousness, cognition and value are not reducible, provide arguments as to why this renders them unintelligible for neo-Darwinists, and develop a sketch of an alternative way of understanding them. As Nagel puts it:
- 21 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 62 (247) , 420-422
The Waning of Materialism. Edited by R.Koons and G.Bealer. (Oxford UP, 2010. Pp. xxxi + 490. Price: £62.50 (hardcover), £24.00 (paperback).)
- 21 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 62 (247) , 420-422
The Waning of Materialism. Edited by R.Koons and G.Bealer. (Oxford UP, 2010. Pp. xxxi + 490. Price: £62.50 (hardcover), £24.00 (paperback).)