Antoni Rubí-Barceló
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Antoni Rubí-Barceló has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Cardona
Universitat de les Illes Balears and CREB
3 shared publications Daniel Cardona
Departament d'Economia Aplicada Universitat de les Illes Balears Palma Spain
2 shared publications- Jenny De Freitas
Departament d'Economia Aplicada Universitat de les Illes Balears Palma Spain
2 shared publications - Tomás Lejarraga
Department of Business Economics, University of the Balearic Islands
2 shared publications Abel Lucena
Departament d’Economia de l’Empresa, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Spain
1 shared publication- Carlos Rey
Human Evolution and Cognition Group (EvoCog), University of the Balearic Islands and IFISC
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Prolonged Mental Effort in Losses
This study examines the varying effects of potential losses compared to gains on mental effort and problem-solving performance. Building on prospect theory and previous studies, we hypothesized that individuals would engage in longer effort when faced with potential losses compared to equivalent potential gains, and that this extended effort would enhance problem-solving performance, particularly in more challenging tasks. Two experimental studies were conducted. Study 1 established that participants persisted longer in tasks designed to avoid monetary losses than to achieve gains, confirming the hypothesis regarding prolonged effort. However, this increased persistence did not translate into better performance across various tasks, suggesting that losses encourage mental effort but do not inherently improve problem-solving efficacy. Study 2, which employed anagrams of varying difficulty, revealed that losses indeed correlated with longer persistence times but only improved performance in tasks deemed more difficult. These findings indicate that the effect of losses on performance is nuanced, highlighting the importance of task difficulty and the sensitivity of performance measures in understanding the interactions between loss aversion and cognitive processing. Overall, the results suggest that while losses prompt greater cognitive engagement, their influence on performance is contingent on task complexity, necessitating further exploration into the conditions under which losses enhance mental effort and problem-solving capabilities.
- 27 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessProlonged Mental Effort in Losses
This study examines the varying effects of potential losses compared to gains on mental effort and problem-solving performance. Building on prospect theory and previous studies, we hypothesized that individuals would engage in longer effort when faced with potential losses compared to equivalent potential gains, and that this extended effort would enhance problem-solving performance, particularly in more challenging tasks. Two experimental studies were conducted. Study 1 established that participants persisted longer in tasks designed to avoid monetary losses than to achieve gains, confirming the hypothesis regarding prolonged effort. However, this increased persistence did not translate into better performance across various tasks, suggesting that losses encourage mental effort but do not inherently improve problem-solving efficacy. Study 2, which employed anagrams of varying difficulty, revealed that losses indeed correlated with longer persistence times but only improved performance in tasks deemed more difficult. These findings indicate that the effect of losses on performance is nuanced, highlighting the importance of task difficulty and the sensitivity of performance measures in understanding the interactions between loss aversion and cognitive processing. Overall, the results suggest that while losses prompt greater cognitive engagement, their influence on performance is contingent on task complexity, necessitating further exploration into the conditions under which losses enhance mental effort and problem-solving capabilities.
- Open Access
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 96 (2) , 333-349
Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n-player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game, a contest game, and a public good game.
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 96 (2) , 333-349
Open AccessExploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n-player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game, a contest game, and a public good game.
- Open Access
- 23 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 24 (4) , 709-732
Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests
In lobbying competition to influence a policy ranging over a continuum, lottery and share contests can be regarded as two alternative conflict resolution protocols. In the lottery contest, the policy is selected probabilistically whereas in the share contest the policy choice is deterministic. Although these two contest settings are equivalent for risk‐neutral lobbyists, this equivalence fails to hold when they are risk‐averse. We demonstrate that when lobbyists have concave preferences over policies and select their policy proposals, they strategically moderate their claims only under the (probabilistic) lottery setting. This action defuses the conflict and reduces the exerted effort. Consequently, risk‐averse contestants might unanimously prefer the lottery to the share contest.
- 23 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 24 (4) , 709-732
Open AccessLobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests
In lobbying competition to influence a policy ranging over a continuum, lottery and share contests can be regarded as two alternative conflict resolution protocols. In the lottery contest, the policy is selected probabilistically whereas in the share contest the policy choice is deterministic. Although these two contest settings are equivalent for risk‐neutral lobbyists, this equivalence fails to hold when they are risk‐averse. We demonstrate that when lobbyists have concave preferences over policies and select their policy proposals, they strategically moderate their claims only under the (probabilistic) lottery setting. This action defuses the conflict and reduces the exerted effort. Consequently, risk‐averse contestants might unanimously prefer the lottery to the share contest.
- 9 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 28 (3) , 654-684
Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes
- 9 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 28 (3) , 654-684
Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes
- 3 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 179, 442-459
Beliefs estimated from choices in Proposer-Responder Games
- 3 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 179, 442-459
Beliefs estimated from choices in Proposer-Responder Games
- Open Access
Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques
It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents strategically add and remove ties to smooth those differentials, thereby providing a game-theoretic rationale for the existence of bridge-agents. The present paper ties back to the initial empirical literature by explicitly assuming that agents are exogenously linked forming cliques, as in a firm environment. In this setting, bridge-agents cannot be sustained under the same conditions of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Instead, they can be sustained when the deviation possibilities are restricted and only when they connect small groups of agents to the rest.
Open AccessStructural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques
It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents strategically add and remove ties to smooth those differentials, thereby providing a game-theoretic rationale for the existence of bridge-agents. The present paper ties back to the initial empirical literature by explicitly assuming that agents are exogenously linked forming cliques, as in a firm environment. In this setting, bridge-agents cannot be sustained under the same conditions of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Instead, they can be sustained when the deviation possibilities are restricted and only when they connect small groups of agents to the rest.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 44, 97-111
Group-contests with endogenous claims
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 44, 97-111
Group-contests with endogenous claims
- Open Access
Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining
We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.
Open AccessTime-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining
We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.
- 10 October 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 161 (3) , 345-366
On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
- 10 October 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 161 (3) , 345-366
On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
- 17 May 2013
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 9 (2) , 131-145
Efficiency and stability in a strategic model of hedonic coalitions
This paper analyzes the partitioning of a society into coalitions in a setting where heterogeneous players produce private and club goods. Their preferences are hedonic and are represented by a utility function with two arguments, namely their consumptions of these two goods. The focus is on the compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to move the coalition or accept new coalition mates under alternative utility specifications and agents’ productivities.
- 17 May 2013
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 9 (2) , 131-145
Efficiency and stability in a strategic model of hedonic coalitions
This paper analyzes the partitioning of a society into coalitions in a setting where heterogeneous players produce private and club goods. Their preferences are hedonic and are represented by a utility function with two arguments, namely their consumptions of these two goods. The focus is on the compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to move the coalition or accept new coalition mates under alternative utility specifications and agents’ productivities.