Angelo Zago
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Angelo Zago has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Antonio Peyrache
School of Economics, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Australia
2 shared publications- Camilla Mastromarco
University of Salento
1 shared publication Cristina Vaquero-Piñeiro
1 shared publication- Francesco Aiello
Department of Economics, Statistics and Finance ‘Giovanni Anania’, University of Calabria, Rende, Italy
1 shared publication - Giam Pietro Cipriani
Department of Economics, University of Verona and IZA, Verona, Italy
1 shared publication - Gian Paolo Barbetta
Department of Economics and Finance Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Food Policy
- Vol. 135
Synergies among ownership forms and cooperating territories: The case of wine
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Food Policy
- Vol. 135
Open AccessSynergies among ownership forms and cooperating territories: The case of wine
- Open Access
- 25 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Productivity Analysis
- Vol. 62 (2) , 217-238
The inefficiency of courts of justice: industry structure, capacity and misallocation
In this paper, we introduce an optimization model to quantify the trade-off between resource capacity utilization and disposition time for the caseload of courts of justice. The optimization model takes into account the impact of an increase in demand that may arise when disposition time is reduced. We employ the model to measure the impact of various policy reform scenarios on the length of trials, both at the court and system level. We do so by taking into account the potential reallocation of resources, using the population of Italian courts of justice over the 2005–2012 period. Our results show that if all policy scenarios we discuss were to be implemented, the average length of trials for civil cases would be more than halved, from the current 15.5 months to about 7 months. Implementing best practices, the single most effective policy would be equivalent to a 25% increase in the number of judges (which would otherwise cost around 100 million euros per year).
- 25 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Productivity Analysis
- Vol. 62 (2) , 217-238
Open AccessThe inefficiency of courts of justice: industry structure, capacity and misallocation
In this paper, we introduce an optimization model to quantify the trade-off between resource capacity utilization and disposition time for the caseload of courts of justice. The optimization model takes into account the impact of an increase in demand that may arise when disposition time is reduced. We employ the model to measure the impact of various policy reform scenarios on the length of trials, both at the court and system level. We do so by taking into account the potential reallocation of resources, using the population of Italian courts of justice over the 2005–2012 period. Our results show that if all policy scenarios we discuss were to be implemented, the average length of trials for civil cases would be more than halved, from the current 15.5 months to about 7 months. Implementing best practices, the single most effective policy would be equivalent to a 25% increase in the number of judges (which would otherwise cost around 100 million euros per year).
- 9 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 100 (1) , 286-310
What is in a Name? Information, Heterogeneity, and Quality in a Theory of Nested Names
Collective labels are widespread in food markets, and are either separated or nested with private brands—the latter are known as “nested names”. We propose a model to explain the rationale of nested names, with collective labels being effective in reaching unaware consumers, while individual brands help firms to reach aware consumers. We also incorporate decision‐making within the group of producers joining collective labels, taking into account their heterogeneity in providing quality. We show that nested names emerge when consumers become more aware of information on the label's quality, as well as when producers become more heterogeneous. Welfare may decrease, however, when the group switches to nested names because they may lead to lower quality incentives for the majority of producers. Our results also provide insights into the historical and recent trends in food industries, such as within‐label differentiation and label fragmentation, as well as their respective welfare implications.
- 9 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 100 (1) , 286-310
What is in a Name? Information, Heterogeneity, and Quality in a Theory of Nested Names
Collective labels are widespread in food markets, and are either separated or nested with private brands—the latter are known as “nested names”. We propose a model to explain the rationale of nested names, with collective labels being effective in reaching unaware consumers, while individual brands help firms to reach aware consumers. We also incorporate decision‐making within the group of producers joining collective labels, taking into account their heterogeneity in providing quality. We show that nested names emerge when consumers become more aware of information on the label's quality, as well as when producers become more heterogeneous. Welfare may decrease, however, when the group switches to nested names because they may lead to lower quality incentives for the majority of producers. Our results also provide insights into the historical and recent trends in food industries, such as within‐label differentiation and label fragmentation, as well as their respective welfare implications.
- 30 October 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Review of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 42 (5) , 707-711
Introduction: Collective action in agriculture
- 30 October 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Review of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 42 (5) , 707-711
Introduction: Collective action in agriculture
- Open Access
- 1 January 2015
- Published by OpenEdition in Économie Rurale
- Vol. 345 (345) , 29-51
La réputation collective sur les marchés agricoles
Dans l’agriculture, il existe de nombreux exemples où la coordination est assurée via la réputation collective, par exemple par les indications géographiques, les coopératives de commercialisation et de transformation, l’adhésion à des labels tels que le Label Rouge, etc. L’auteur traite ici de certains des problèmes rencontrés dans ce domaine sur les marchés agricoles, où ces initiatives sont gérées par des entreprises par ailleurs indépendantes, dans le cadre d’un processus de décision démocratique. Après avoir procédé à un examen sélectif de la littérature publiée sur ce sujet, il présente certains des problèmes rencontrés par le secteur et par les autorités et suggère quelques pistes pour les recherches à venir.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by OpenEdition in Économie Rurale
- Vol. 345 (345) , 29-51
Open AccessLa réputation collective sur les marchés agricoles
Dans l’agriculture, il existe de nombreux exemples où la coordination est assurée via la réputation collective, par exemple par les indications géographiques, les coopératives de commercialisation et de transformation, l’adhésion à des labels tels que le Label Rouge, etc. L’auteur traite ici de certains des problèmes rencontrés dans ce domaine sur les marchés agricoles, où ces initiatives sont gérées par des entreprises par ailleurs indépendantes, dans le cadre d’un processus de décision démocratique. Après avoir procédé à un examen sélectif de la littérature publiée sur ce sujet, il présente certains des problèmes rencontrés par le secteur et par les autorités et suggère quelques pistes pour les recherches à venir.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2015
- Published by OpenEdition in Économie Rurale
- Vol. 345 (345)
Collective Reputation in Agricultural Markets
In agriculture, there are many instances of coordination obtained via collective reputation, such as geographical indications, marketing and processing cooperatives, membership in labels such as Label Rouge, etc. We discuss some of their problems in agricultural markets, where they are managed by otherwise independent firms through a democratic decision-process. After selectively reviewing the published literature, we highlight some relevant problems for the industry and for policy-making and we suggest some venues for future research.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by OpenEdition in Économie Rurale
- Vol. 345 (345)
Open AccessCollective Reputation in Agricultural Markets
In agriculture, there are many instances of coordination obtained via collective reputation, such as geographical indications, marketing and processing cooperatives, membership in labels such as Label Rouge, etc. We discuss some of their problems in agricultural markets, where they are managed by otherwise independent firms through a democratic decision-process. After selectively reviewing the published literature, we highlight some relevant problems for the industry and for policy-making and we suggest some venues for future research.
- 16 February 2011
- Published by Wiley in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 73 (3) , 428-447
Productivity or Discrimination? Beauty and the Exams*
- 16 February 2011
- Published by Wiley in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 73 (3) , 428-447
Productivity or Discrimination? Beauty and the Exams*
- 10 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 41 (3) , 787-815
Be productive or face decline. On the sources and determinants of output growth in Italian manufacturing firms
- 10 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 41 (3) , 787-815
Be productive or face decline. On the sources and determinants of output growth in Italian manufacturing firms
- 9 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 40 (2) , 537-558
Credit quality and technical efficiency in banking
- 9 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 40 (2) , 537-558
Credit quality and technical efficiency in banking