Indridi H. Indridason
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Indridi H. Indridason has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
André Blais
Université de Montréal, Canada
4 shared publications- Albert Falcó-Gimeno
Political Science, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
2 shared publications Christopher Kam
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia
2 shared publicationsGunnar Helgi Kristinsson
University of Iceland
2 shared publicationsJohn H. Aldrich
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
2 shared publicationsA I Mushlin
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Re-analyzing ``I Hope to Hell Nothing Goes Back to The Way It Was Before'': COVID-19, Marginalization, and Native Nations
Foxworth et al. (2022) examine the influence of partisanship, along with socio-economic factors, on the spread of COVID-19 among Native American tribes and conclude that tribes in states with Republican governors and where Trump received more votes in the 2016 election fared worse. While their argument and findings sound plausible, the study is flawed methodologically. The most significant issue is that the analysis focuses on the count of cases while not accounting adequately for vast differences in the population of the tribes. Re-analyze the data, I demonstrate that partisanship does appear to be correlated with the spread of COVID-19, but the magnitude of the effect is an order of magnitude smaller than that implied by Foxworth et al.’s (2022) analysis. However, the large proportion of tribes that register no COVID cases casts doubts on those findings, as it is unclear whether these represent the actual absence of COVID or issues with the data collection.
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessRe-analyzing ``I Hope to Hell Nothing Goes Back to The Way It Was Before'': COVID-19, Marginalization, and Native Nations
Foxworth et al. (2022) examine the influence of partisanship, along with socio-economic factors, on the spread of COVID-19 among Native American tribes and conclude that tribes in states with Republican governors and where Trump received more votes in the 2016 election fared worse. While their argument and findings sound plausible, the study is flawed methodologically. The most significant issue is that the analysis focuses on the count of cases while not accounting adequately for vast differences in the population of the tribes. Re-analyze the data, I demonstrate that partisanship does appear to be correlated with the spread of COVID-19, but the magnitude of the effect is an order of magnitude smaller than that implied by Foxworth et al.’s (2022) analysis. However, the large proportion of tribes that register no COVID cases casts doubts on those findings, as it is unclear whether these represent the actual absence of COVID or issues with the data collection.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (1)
Private members’ bills & parliamentary motions: Who bothers?
While the role of legislators in parliamentary systems may sometimes seem to involve little more than to support the government of the day, legislators in many parliaments regularly take advantage of their, often limited, opportunities to introduce members’ bills and parliamentary motions. The success of these efforts is typically limited, which raises the question of why legislators bother. We argue that the legislators’ behavior is in part driven by the incentives their parties present them with. Government and opposition MPs behave in a different manner because government and opposition parties value legislative activity and types of legislative activity differently. Government MPs are expected to stay out of the way of the government’s agenda or focus their attention on less salient issues. In contrast, opposition MPs are expected to do the opposite and to present their parties as viable government alternatives. Examining members’ bills and parliamentary motions in Iceland over a thirty-year period, we observe patterns consistent with the importance of parties in shaping legislative behavior, while also finding some evidence of MPs’ career concerns affecting their behavior.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (1)
Open AccessPrivate members’ bills & parliamentary motions: Who bothers?
While the role of legislators in parliamentary systems may sometimes seem to involve little more than to support the government of the day, legislators in many parliaments regularly take advantage of their, often limited, opportunities to introduce members’ bills and parliamentary motions. The success of these efforts is typically limited, which raises the question of why legislators bother. We argue that the legislators’ behavior is in part driven by the incentives their parties present them with. Government and opposition MPs behave in a different manner because government and opposition parties value legislative activity and types of legislative activity differently. Government MPs are expected to stay out of the way of the government’s agenda or focus their attention on less salient issues. In contrast, opposition MPs are expected to do the opposite and to present their parties as viable government alternatives. Examining members’ bills and parliamentary motions in Iceland over a thirty-year period, we observe patterns consistent with the importance of parties in shaping legislative behavior, while also finding some evidence of MPs’ career concerns affecting their behavior.
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 59-72
Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches in coalition theory
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 59-72
Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches in coalition theory
- Open Access
- 7 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in French Politics
- Vol. 23 (2) , 174-216
No hard feelings? The effects of competition on vote transfers in two-round elections
Runoff elections are a useful method for solving coordination problems in majoritarian electoral systems based on single-member districts in that they provide a formal mechanism for ideologically similar parties to coordinate on a single candidate. The mechanism is, however, not free of problems as it places ideological neighbors in competition with one another on the first ballot. The temptation to campaign against the members of one’s own bloc carries risk, as it may reduce the willingness of the supporters of the losing party on the first ballot to cast their vote for the party that will represent its ideological bloc on the second ballot. We revisit and extend Tsebelis’ (Br J Polit Sci 18(2):145–70, 1988a) work on the conditions under which parties are able to curb their incentives to engage in intra-bloc campaigning by deriving additional testable hypotheses and expanding the analysis temporally to include elections from 1958 to 2012.
- 7 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in French Politics
- Vol. 23 (2) , 174-216
Open AccessNo hard feelings? The effects of competition on vote transfers in two-round elections
Runoff elections are a useful method for solving coordination problems in majoritarian electoral systems based on single-member districts in that they provide a formal mechanism for ideologically similar parties to coordinate on a single candidate. The mechanism is, however, not free of problems as it places ideological neighbors in competition with one another on the first ballot. The temptation to campaign against the members of one’s own bloc carries risk, as it may reduce the willingness of the supporters of the losing party on the first ballot to cast their vote for the party that will represent its ideological bloc on the second ballot. We revisit and extend Tsebelis’ (Br J Polit Sci 18(2):145–70, 1988a) work on the conditions under which parties are able to curb their incentives to engage in intra-bloc campaigning by deriving additional testable hypotheses and expanding the analysis temporally to include elections from 1958 to 2012.
- Open Access
- 18 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 13 (1) , 76-95
Roll-call voting under random seating assignment
Social connections between individuals can profoundly impact their political behavior. A growing body of research on legislative politics examines how spatial proximity to fellow legislators affects voting behavior within the institution. However, studies that examine this question often suffer from a fundamental identification problem in which proximity effects may reflect actual behavioral diffusion between members or, instead, homophily, in which legislators of a similar political feather flock together. We overcome this observational equivalence by exploiting a unique random seating lottery for seating assignments in the world's oldest existing parliament, Iceland's national legislature, Alþingi. Utilizing this naturally occurring randomization, we employ spatial analyses of more than 20,000 estimates of spatial dependence and find little evidence that seating proximity leads to similar voting behavior by members in this legislative context.
- 18 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 13 (1) , 76-95
Open AccessRoll-call voting under random seating assignment
Social connections between individuals can profoundly impact their political behavior. A growing body of research on legislative politics examines how spatial proximity to fellow legislators affects voting behavior within the institution. However, studies that examine this question often suffer from a fundamental identification problem in which proximity effects may reflect actual behavioral diffusion between members or, instead, homophily, in which legislators of a similar political feather flock together. We overcome this observational equivalence by exploiting a unique random seating lottery for seating assignments in the world's oldest existing parliament, Iceland's national legislature, Alþingi. Utilizing this naturally occurring randomization, we employ spatial analyses of more than 20,000 estimates of spatial dependence and find little evidence that seating proximity leads to similar voting behavior by members in this legislative context.
- Open Access
- 3 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 47 (1) , 61-87
Pieces of the puzzle? Coalition formation and tangential preferences
- 3 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 47 (1) , 61-87
Open AccessPieces of the puzzle? Coalition formation and tangential preferences
- 10 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 324-356
Iceland: Political Change and Coalition Politics
The chapter surveys coalition formation and coalition governance in Iceland since the 1990s. Coalition politics have been altered in a significant manner during this time period with many of the changes coinciding with the economic crash of 2008. Up to the crises, coalition governance followed a fairly predictable pattern but increased electoral volatility and decline in party cohesion complicated the formation of stable two-party coalitions. In response to these developments, governments have sought to improve coalitions management and coordination within the cabinet, which represents a shift from the ministerial model of government that has characterized Icelandic coalitions since the founding of the republic.
- 10 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 324-356
Iceland: Political Change and Coalition Politics
The chapter surveys coalition formation and coalition governance in Iceland since the 1990s. Coalition politics have been altered in a significant manner during this time period with many of the changes coinciding with the economic crash of 2008. Up to the crises, coalition governance followed a fairly predictable pattern but increased electoral volatility and decline in party cohesion complicated the formation of stable two-party coalitions. In response to these developments, governments have sought to improve coalitions management and coordination within the cabinet, which represents a shift from the ministerial model of government that has characterized Icelandic coalitions since the founding of the republic.
- 1 October 2020
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 82 (4) , 1458-1473
Coalition Policy Perceptions
- 1 October 2020
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 82 (4) , 1458-1473
Coalition Policy Perceptions
- Open Access
- 10 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (1) , 198-205
Betting on the underdog: the influence of social networks on vote choice
People are commonly expected not to waste their vote on parties with small probabilities of being elected. Yet, many end up voting for underdogs. We argue that voters gauge the popular support for their preferred party from their social networks. When social networks function as echo chambers, a feature observed in real-life networks, voters overestimate underdogs’ chances of winning. We conduct voting experiments in which some treatment groups receive signals from a simulated network. We compare the effect of networks with a high degree of homogeneity against random networks. We find that homophilic networks increase the level of support for underdogs, which provides evidence to back up anecdotal claims that echo chambers foster the development of fringe parties.
- 10 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (1) , 198-205
Open AccessBetting on the underdog: the influence of social networks on vote choice
People are commonly expected not to waste their vote on parties with small probabilities of being elected. Yet, many end up voting for underdogs. We argue that voters gauge the popular support for their preferred party from their social networks. When social networks function as echo chambers, a feature observed in real-life networks, voters overestimate underdogs’ chances of winning. We conduct voting experiments in which some treatment groups receive signals from a simulated network. We compare the effect of networks with a high degree of homogeneity against random networks. We find that homophilic networks increase the level of support for underdogs, which provides evidence to back up anecdotal claims that echo chambers foster the development of fringe parties.
- 9 May 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 6 (2) , 211-227
Luck of the Draw? Private Members’ Bills and the Electoral Connection
The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, members of parliament (MPs) do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.
- 9 May 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 6 (2) , 211-227
Luck of the Draw? Private Members’ Bills and the Electoral Connection
The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, members of parliament (MPs) do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.