IIIndridi H. Indridason

Indridi H. Indridason

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Indridi H. Indridason has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Re-analyzing ``I Hope to Hell Nothing Goes Back to The Way It Was Before'': COVID-19, Marginalization, and Native Nations

    by Indridi Indridason

    Foxworth et al. (2022) examine the influence of partisanship, along with socio-economic factors, on the spread of COVID-19 among Native American tribes and conclude that tribes in states with Republican governors and where Trump received more votes in the 2016 election fared worse. While their argument and findings sound plausible, the study is flawed methodologically. The most significant issue is that the analysis focuses on the count of cases while not accounting adequately for vast differences in the population of the tribes. Re-analyze the data, I demonstrate that partisanship does appear to be correlated with the spread of COVID-19, but the magnitude of the effect is an order of magnitude smaller than that implied by Foxworth et al.’s (2022) analysis. However, the large proportion of tribes that register no COVID cases casts doubts on those findings, as it is unclear whether these represent the actual absence of COVID or issues with the data collection.

  • Open Access

    Private members’ bills & parliamentary motions: Who bothers?

    by Eunseong Oh, Indridi H. Indridason

    While the role of legislators in parliamentary systems may sometimes seem to involve little more than to support the government of the day, legislators in many parliaments regularly take advantage of their, often limited, opportunities to introduce members’ bills and parliamentary motions. The success of these efforts is typically limited, which raises the question of why legislators bother. We argue that the legislators’ behavior is in part driven by the incentives their parties present them with. Government and opposition MPs behave in a different manner because government and opposition parties value legislative activity and types of legislative activity differently. Government MPs are expected to stay out of the way of the government’s agenda or focus their attention on less salient issues. In contrast, opposition MPs are expected to do the opposite and to present their parties as viable government alternatives. Examining members’ bills and parliamentary motions in Iceland over a thirty-year period, we observe patterns consistent with the importance of parties in shaping legislative behavior, while also finding some evidence of MPs’ career concerns affecting their behavior.

  • Open Access

    No hard feelings? The effects of competition on vote transfers in two-round elections

    by Nicholas T. Willis, Indridi H. Indridason

    Runoff elections are a useful method for solving coordination problems in majoritarian electoral systems based on single-member districts in that they provide a formal mechanism for ideologically similar parties to coordinate on a single candidate. The mechanism is, however, not free of problems as it places ideological neighbors in competition with one another on the first ballot. The temptation to campaign against the members of one’s own bloc carries risk, as it may reduce the willingness of the supporters of the losing party on the first ballot to cast their vote for the party that will represent its ideological bloc on the second ballot. We revisit and extend Tsebelis’ (Br J Polit Sci 18(2):145–70, 1988a) work on the conditions under which parties are able to curb their incentives to engage in intra-bloc campaigning by deriving additional testable hypotheses and expanding the analysis temporally to include elections from 1958 to 2012.


  • Open Access

    Roll-call voting under random seating assignment

    by David Darmofal, Charles J. Finocchiaro, Indridi H. Indridason

    Social connections between individuals can profoundly impact their political behavior. A growing body of research on legislative politics examines how spatial proximity to fellow legislators affects voting behavior within the institution. However, studies that examine this question often suffer from a fundamental identification problem in which proximity effects may reflect actual behavioral diffusion between members or, instead, homophily, in which legislators of a similar political feather flock together. We overcome this observational equivalence by exploiting a unique random seating lottery for seating assignments in the world's oldest existing parliament, Iceland's national legislature, Alþingi. Utilizing this naturally occurring randomization, we employ spatial analyses of more than 20,000 estimates of spatial dependence and find little evidence that seating proximity leads to similar voting behavior by members in this legislative context.


  • Open Access

    Pieces of the puzzle? Coalition formation and tangential preferences

    by Patrick Dumont, Albert Falcó-Gimeno, Indridi H. Indridason, Daniel Bischof


  • Iceland: Political Change and Coalition Politics

    by Indridi H. Indridason, Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson

    The chapter surveys coalition formation and coalition governance in Iceland since the 1990s. Coalition politics have been altered in a significant manner during this time period with many of the changes coinciding with the economic crash of 2008. Up to the crises, coalition governance followed a fairly predictable pattern but increased electoral volatility and decline in party cohesion complicated the formation of stable two-party coalitions. In response to these developments, governments have sought to improve coalitions management and coordination within the cabinet, which represents a shift from the ministerial model of government that has characterized Icelandic coalitions since the founding of the republic.


  • Coalition Policy Perceptions

    by Shaun Bowler, Thomas Gschwend, Indridi H. Indridason


  • Open Access

    Betting on the underdog: the influence of social networks on vote choice

    by Annika Fredén, Ludovic Rheault, Indridi H. Indridason

    People are commonly expected not to waste their vote on parties with small probabilities of being elected. Yet, many end up voting for underdogs. We argue that voters gauge the popular support for their preferred party from their social networks. When social networks function as echo chambers, a feature observed in real-life networks, voters overestimate underdogs’ chances of winning. We conduct voting experiments in which some treatment groups receive signals from a simulated network. We compare the effect of networks with a high degree of homogeneity against random networks. We find that homophilic networks increase the level of support for underdogs, which provides evidence to back up anecdotal claims that echo chambers foster the development of fringe parties.


  • Luck of the Draw? Private Members’ Bills and the Electoral Connection

    by Brian D. Williams, Indridi H. Indridason

    The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, members of parliament (MPs) do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.