Liangliang Jiang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 31 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
- Vol. 58 (3)
The spillover effect of natural disaster on analyst forecast inaccuracy: Evidence from shared analyst coverage
- 31 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
- Vol. 58 (3)
The spillover effect of natural disaster on analyst forecast inaccuracy: Evidence from shared analyst coverage
- 8 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 20 (2)
Lending corruption and bank loan contracting: Cross-Country evidence
- 8 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 20 (2)
Lending corruption and bank loan contracting: Cross-Country evidence
- 5 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 51 (7-8) , 1762-1788
Risk management committee and bank performance: Evidence from the adoption of the Dodd–Frank Act
We test the effect of the establishment of a risk management committee on bank risk, bank loan performance and bank profitability. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 provides us with quasi‐experimental variation on risk management committee establishment that facilitates identification. We identify the risk management committee effect using an instrumental variable model based on the difference‐in‐differences design. We find that the establishment of a risk committee has effectively reduced bank risks. In addition, risk committee member independence, more risk committee meetings and more risk committee members are all instrumental to bank risk reduction. We also find evidence that the risk reduction effect from the risk management committee is more pronounced among asset‐diversified banks. Finally, the establishment of a risk committee helps with loan quality improvement and firm profitability increment, which sheds light on the bright side of stringent bank regulation.
- 5 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 51 (7-8) , 1762-1788
Risk management committee and bank performance: Evidence from the adoption of the Dodd–Frank Act
We test the effect of the establishment of a risk management committee on bank risk, bank loan performance and bank profitability. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 provides us with quasi‐experimental variation on risk management committee establishment that facilitates identification. We identify the risk management committee effect using an instrumental variable model based on the difference‐in‐differences design. We find that the establishment of a risk committee has effectively reduced bank risks. In addition, risk committee member independence, more risk committee meetings and more risk committee members are all instrumental to bank risk reduction. We also find evidence that the risk reduction effect from the risk management committee is more pronounced among asset‐diversified banks. Finally, the establishment of a risk committee helps with loan quality improvement and firm profitability increment, which sheds light on the bright side of stringent bank regulation.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (5) , 3834-3855
Deposit Supply and Bank Transparency
Does a bank’s dependence on different external funding sources shape its voluntary disclosure of information? We evaluate whether economic shocks that increase the supply of bank deposits alter the cost–benefit calculations of bank managers concerning voluntary information disclosure. We measure information disclosure using 10-K filings, 8-K filings, and earnings guidance. As for the funding shock, we use unanticipated technological innovations that triggered shale development and booms in bank deposits. Further analyses suggest that greater exposure to shale development reduced information disclosure by relaxing the incentives for managers to disclose information to attract funds from external capital markets. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (5) , 3834-3855
Deposit Supply and Bank Transparency
Does a bank’s dependence on different external funding sources shape its voluntary disclosure of information? We evaluate whether economic shocks that increase the supply of bank deposits alter the cost–benefit calculations of bank managers concerning voluntary information disclosure. We measure information disclosure using 10-K filings, 8-K filings, and earnings guidance. As for the funding shock, we use unanticipated technological innovations that triggered shale development and booms in bank deposits. Further analyses suggest that greater exposure to shale development reduced information disclosure by relaxing the incentives for managers to disclose information to attract funds from external capital markets. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.
- 22 November 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 36 (4) , 113-131
Policy Uncertainty and Textual Disclosure
SYNOPSIS: We study how policy uncertainty influences textual disclosure in the U.S. from 1996 to 2015. Consistent with incentives for voluntary disclosure, we find that policy uncertainty increases textual disclosure quantity, as evident in disclosure length, but lowers textual readability and increases the tone of uncertainty and negativity. We also document that the negative impact on readability subsides when firms are subject to tough external monitoring. Finally, we provide evidence implying that investors perceive such disclosure to be valuable, as evident in cheaper equity financing costs under economic policy uncertainty. JEL Classifications: D72; G14; G18; G34.
- 22 November 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 36 (4) , 113-131
Policy Uncertainty and Textual Disclosure
SYNOPSIS: We study how policy uncertainty influences textual disclosure in the U.S. from 1996 to 2015. Consistent with incentives for voluntary disclosure, we find that policy uncertainty increases textual disclosure quantity, as evident in disclosure length, but lowers textual readability and increases the tone of uncertainty and negativity. We also document that the negative impact on readability subsides when firms are subject to tough external monitoring. Finally, we provide evidence implying that investors perceive such disclosure to be valuable, as evident in cheaper equity financing costs under economic policy uncertainty. JEL Classifications: D72; G14; G18; G34.
- 14 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 54 (2) , 513-538
Competition and Bank Liquidity Creation
We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases the provision of a key banking service: liquidity creation. Although theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on liquidity creation, we find that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation. Consistent with a subset of models emphasizing that banks pushed toward insolvency reduce risk-taking activities, we discover that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation more among banks with less risk-absorbing capacity (e.g., less profitable banks).
- 14 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 54 (2) , 513-538
Competition and Bank Liquidity Creation
We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases the provision of a key banking service: liquidity creation. Although theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on liquidity creation, we find that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation. Consistent with a subset of models emphasizing that banks pushed toward insolvency reduce risk-taking activities, we discover that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation more among banks with less risk-absorbing capacity (e.g., less profitable banks).
- 19 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (1) , 469-501
The role of audit verification in debt contracting: evidence from covenant violations
- 19 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (1) , 469-501
The role of audit verification in debt contracting: evidence from covenant violations
- Top Cited Papers
- 14 April 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 29 (7) , 1911-1942
Competition and Bank Opacity
Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public? By integrating the gravity model of investment with the state-specific process of bank deregulation that occurred in the United States from the 1980s through the 1990s, we develop a bank-specific, time-varying measure of deregulation-induced competition. We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks. Received July 7, 2015; accepted February 4, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.
- 14 April 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 29 (7) , 1911-1942
Top Cited PapersCompetition and Bank Opacity
Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public? By integrating the gravity model of investment with the state-specific process of bank deregulation that occurred in the United States from the 1980s through the 1990s, we develop a bank-specific, time-varying measure of deregulation-induced competition. We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks. Received July 7, 2015; accepted February 4, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Competition and Bank Liquidity Creation
Although liquidity creation is a key banking function, little is known about its determinants. We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases liquidity creation. Consistent with the predictions of some theoretical models, we find that regulatory-induced competition has a negative effect on bank liquidity creation and these liquidity-reducing effects are smaller among more profitable banks and larger among smaller banks.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Competition and Bank Liquidity Creation
Although liquidity creation is a key banking function, little is known about its determinants. We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases liquidity creation. Consistent with the predictions of some theoretical models, we find that regulatory-induced competition has a negative effect on bank liquidity creation and these liquidity-reducing effects are smaller among more profitable banks and larger among smaller banks.