Soroush Safarzadeh
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Soroush Safarzadeh has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Morteza Rasti-Barzoki
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan 84156-83111, Iran
7 shared publications - Hamed Jafari
Industrial Engineering Group, Golpayegan College of Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Golpayegan, Iran
4 shared publications Morteza Rasti-Barzoki
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran
4 shared publicationsSeyed Reza Hejazi
3 shared publicationsEmad Zamiri-Noghreh
2 shared publicationsHamed Jafari
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 30 October 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization
Strategic Government Support Policies in the Wheat Supply Chain: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Achieving wheat self-sufficiency requires effective government support mechanisms that appropriately align farmer production incentives with national food security objectives. This study analyzes the strategic interaction between government support policies and farmer production decisions within the wheat supply chain using a game-theoretic framework. We model the sequential interaction between the government and farmers to evaluate the equilibrium outcomes of financial instruments, specifically subsidies and loans. We propose a novel hybrid support policy and derive the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium to determine the optimal production quantities and associated costs. Such policies by the government include ‘subsidy’ payments as well as providing ‘loans’ for the farmers. Additionally, this study proposes a policy on wheat production by farmers that could be quite influential on the production rate. Theoretical results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism strictly dominates traditional subsidy schemes by optimizing the incentive structure, leading to higher equilibrium production rates. These findings contribute to the industrial organization of agricultural markets by quantifying the impact of strategic policy design on supply chain performance.
- 30 October 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization
Strategic Government Support Policies in the Wheat Supply Chain: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Achieving wheat self-sufficiency requires effective government support mechanisms that appropriately align farmer production incentives with national food security objectives. This study analyzes the strategic interaction between government support policies and farmer production decisions within the wheat supply chain using a game-theoretic framework. We model the sequential interaction between the government and farmers to evaluate the equilibrium outcomes of financial instruments, specifically subsidies and loans. We propose a novel hybrid support policy and derive the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium to determine the optimal production quantities and associated costs. Such policies by the government include ‘subsidy’ payments as well as providing ‘loans’ for the farmers. Additionally, this study proposes a policy on wheat production by farmers that could be quite influential on the production rate. Theoretical results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism strictly dominates traditional subsidy schemes by optimizing the incentive structure, leading to higher equilibrium production rates. These findings contribute to the industrial organization of agricultural markets by quantifying the impact of strategic policy design on supply chain performance.
- 10 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
- Vol. 99
A game theoretic framework for analyzing milk supply chain safety and quality
- 10 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
- Vol. 99
A game theoretic framework for analyzing milk supply chain safety and quality
- Open Access
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 26 (11) , 29643-29676
A game theoretic approach for tradable white certificates regarding energy rebound and government intervention
In recent decades, many government administrations have tracked energy efficiency programs (EEPs) against environmental concerns. This was done so that it could potentially be useful as a supportive mechanism for smart technologies applied under the smart city concept. To facilitate this, tradable white certificates (TWCs) have been implemented as popular financial instruments used by energy-intensive sectors to boost cleaner production. In this study, we address an industrial EEP development with a TWC instrument as a multi-agent problem. We study this problem for the first time in the context of a supply chain that includes a manufacturer, an energy producer, and household energy consumers. Furthermore, we explore a new monopolistic pricing model for energy services and energy-efficient products, regarding the rebound effect, energy consumption, and social welfare. Additionally, we discuss two revenue-cost-sharing contracts and compare them as contracts using a comprehensive parametric and experimental analysis. The results show that the second proposed contract has some advantages over the first one. However, the second contract leads to less production than the first one does, while at the same time leading to less social welfare. Also, the findings suggest that the second investigated contract is a more appropriate instrument for the obligated parties than the first one when the aim is to improve the performance of TWC schemes. These findings can provide better circumstances for governance to optimize the critical parameters’ level on TWC schemes with the lowest analytical cost. Graphical abstract
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 26 (11) , 29643-29676
Open AccessA game theoretic approach for tradable white certificates regarding energy rebound and government intervention
In recent decades, many government administrations have tracked energy efficiency programs (EEPs) against environmental concerns. This was done so that it could potentially be useful as a supportive mechanism for smart technologies applied under the smart city concept. To facilitate this, tradable white certificates (TWCs) have been implemented as popular financial instruments used by energy-intensive sectors to boost cleaner production. In this study, we address an industrial EEP development with a TWC instrument as a multi-agent problem. We study this problem for the first time in the context of a supply chain that includes a manufacturer, an energy producer, and household energy consumers. Furthermore, we explore a new monopolistic pricing model for energy services and energy-efficient products, regarding the rebound effect, energy consumption, and social welfare. Additionally, we discuss two revenue-cost-sharing contracts and compare them as contracts using a comprehensive parametric and experimental analysis. The results show that the second proposed contract has some advantages over the first one. However, the second contract leads to less production than the first one does, while at the same time leading to less social welfare. Also, the findings suggest that the second investigated contract is a more appropriate instrument for the obligated parties than the first one when the aim is to improve the performance of TWC schemes. These findings can provide better circumstances for governance to optimize the critical parameters’ level on TWC schemes with the lowest analytical cost. Graphical abstract
- 27 May 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Waste Management & Research: The Journal for a Sustainable Circular Economy
- Vol. 43 (1) , 62-74
Effects of governmental supportive policies on waste management for two substitutable products made of virgin and waste materials: A game-theoretic approach
In recent years, the concept of sustainability has attracted a great amount of attention, due to increasing energy resources scarceness. Waste recycling is known as an efficient approach to improve sustainability and save energy. In this view, a sustainable supply chain is established in the current study to investigate the effects of waste recycling on sustainable development. The considered supply chain consists of the government, two manufacturers, a supplier, a waste depot, and a recycler. Under this structure, two substitutable products are made of the virgin and recyclable waste materials. The supplier provides the virgin materials for the first product. The waste depot collects the non-recycled waste, whereas the recycler recycles it and supplies the recycled waste for the second product. Also, the government supports the second product to provide an incentive for its members to collect and recycle more waste. Then, the game theory is applied to make decisions under the considered structure. Finally, the results are revealed and some managerial insights are provided. It is derived that the governmental supportive policies play a significant role in resources conservation and energy storage. Moreover, increasing the quality of the product made of the recyclable waste improves the government’s utility.
- 27 May 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Waste Management & Research: The Journal for a Sustainable Circular Economy
- Vol. 43 (1) , 62-74
Effects of governmental supportive policies on waste management for two substitutable products made of virgin and waste materials: A game-theoretic approach
In recent years, the concept of sustainability has attracted a great amount of attention, due to increasing energy resources scarceness. Waste recycling is known as an efficient approach to improve sustainability and save energy. In this view, a sustainable supply chain is established in the current study to investigate the effects of waste recycling on sustainable development. The considered supply chain consists of the government, two manufacturers, a supplier, a waste depot, and a recycler. Under this structure, two substitutable products are made of the virgin and recyclable waste materials. The supplier provides the virgin materials for the first product. The waste depot collects the non-recycled waste, whereas the recycler recycles it and supplies the recycled waste for the second product. Also, the government supports the second product to provide an incentive for its members to collect and recycle more waste. Then, the game theory is applied to make decisions under the considered structure. Finally, the results are revealed and some managerial insights are provided. It is derived that the governmental supportive policies play a significant role in resources conservation and energy storage. Moreover, increasing the quality of the product made of the recyclable waste improves the government’s utility.