Ana Hidalgo-Cabrillana
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ana Hidalgo-Cabrillana has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cristina Lopez-Mayan
Universitat de Barcelona; AQR-IREA Research Group
2 shared publications Amparo Castelló-Climent
1 shared publication- Andrés Erosa
§University of Toronto, 150 St. George St., Toronto, ON, M5S 3G7 Canada. g.kambourov{at}utoronto.ca
1 shared publication - Beatriz de Blas
Autonomous University of Madrid
1 shared publication - Zoë Kuehn
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Education Review
- Vol. 67, 184-206
Teaching styles and achievement: Student and teacher perspectives
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Education Review
- Vol. 67, 184-206
Open AccessTeaching styles and achievement: Student and teacher perspectives
- Open Access
- 23 September 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 8 (4) , 373-399
Development accounting using PIAAC data
- 23 September 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 8 (4) , 373-399
Open AccessDevelopment accounting using PIAAC data
- 1 August 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Education Review
- Vol. 31 (4) , 391-409
The role of educational quality and quantity in the process of economic development
- 1 August 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Education Review
- Vol. 31 (4) , 391-409
The role of educational quality and quantity in the process of economic development
- 1 May 2012
- Published by Asociación Cuadernos de Economía in Cuadernos de Economía
- Vol. 35 (98) , 55-67
Portfolio choice and private information: A note
- 1 May 2012
- Published by Asociación Cuadernos de Economía in Cuadernos de Economía
- Vol. 35 (98) , 55-67
Portfolio choice and private information: A note
- Open Access
- 3 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 4 (1) , 113-136
Endogenous governance transparency and product market competition
- 3 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 4 (1) , 113-136
Open AccessEndogenous governance transparency and product market competition
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 90 (2) , 285-298
Endogenous capital market imperfections, human capital, and intergenerational mobility
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 90 (2) , 285-298
Endogenous capital market imperfections, human capital, and intergenerational mobility
- 6 May 2008
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 49 (2) , 437-473
ON FINANCE AS A THEORY OF TFP, CROSS‐INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES, AND ECONOMIC RENTS*
We develop a theory of capital‐market imperfections to study how the ability to enforce contracts affects resource allocation across entrepreneurs of different productivities, and across industries with different needs for external financing. The theory implies that countries with a poor ability to enforce contracts are characterized by the use of inefficient technologies, low aggregate TFP, large differences in labor productivity across industries, and large employment shares in industries with low productivity. These implications are supported by the empirical evidence. The theory also suggests that entrepreneurs have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement.
- 6 May 2008
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 49 (2) , 437-473
ON FINANCE AS A THEORY OF TFP, CROSS‐INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES, AND ECONOMIC RENTS*
We develop a theory of capital‐market imperfections to study how the ability to enforce contracts affects resource allocation across entrepreneurs of different productivities, and across industries with different needs for external financing. The theory implies that countries with a poor ability to enforce contracts are characterized by the use of inefficient technologies, low aggregate TFP, large differences in labor productivity across industries, and large employment shares in industries with low productivity. These implications are supported by the empirical evidence. The theory also suggests that entrepreneurs have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement.