Mario Ghossoub
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mario Ghossoub has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tim J. Boonen
The University of Hong Kong
11 shared publications Michael B. Zhu
Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science The University of Hong Kong Pokfulam Hong Kong
5 shared publications- David Saunders
Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science University of Waterloo ON N2L 3G1 Waterloo Canada
4 shared publications Massimiliano Amarante
University of Montreal
4 shared publicationsBenxuan Shi
University of Waterloo
3 shared publicationsBin Li
University of Waterloo
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in ASTIN Bulletin
- Vol. 56 (3) , 1-26
Stackelberg equilibria in monopoly insurance markets with probability weighting
We study Stackelberg equilibria (Bowley optima) in a monopolistic centralized sequential-move insurance market, with a profit-maximizing insurer who sets premia using a distortion premium principle, and a single policyholder who seeks to minimize a distortion risk measure. We show that equilibria are characterized as follows: In equilibrium, the optimal indemnity function exhibits a layer-type structure, providing full insurance over any loss layer on which the policyholder is more pessimistic than the insurer’s pricing functional about tail losses; and no insurance coverage over loss layers on which the policyholder is less pessimistic than the insurer’s pricing functional about tail losses. In equilibrium, the optimal pricing distortion function is determined by the policyholder’s degree of risk aversion, whereby prices never exceed the policyholder’s marginal willingness to insure tail losses. Moreover, we show that both the insurance coverage and the insurer’s expected profit increase with the policyholder’s degree of risk aversion. Additionally, and echoing recent work in the literature, we show that equilibrium contracts are Pareto efficient, but they do not induce a welfare gain to the policyholder. Conversely, any Pareto-optimal contract that leaves no welfare gain to the policyholder can be obtained as an equilibrium contract. Finally, we consider a few examples of interest that recover some existing results in the literature as special cases of our analysis.
- 16 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in ASTIN Bulletin
- Vol. 56 (3) , 1-26
Open AccessStackelberg equilibria in monopoly insurance markets with probability weighting
We study Stackelberg equilibria (Bowley optima) in a monopolistic centralized sequential-move insurance market, with a profit-maximizing insurer who sets premia using a distortion premium principle, and a single policyholder who seeks to minimize a distortion risk measure. We show that equilibria are characterized as follows: In equilibrium, the optimal indemnity function exhibits a layer-type structure, providing full insurance over any loss layer on which the policyholder is more pessimistic than the insurer’s pricing functional about tail losses; and no insurance coverage over loss layers on which the policyholder is less pessimistic than the insurer’s pricing functional about tail losses. In equilibrium, the optimal pricing distortion function is determined by the policyholder’s degree of risk aversion, whereby prices never exceed the policyholder’s marginal willingness to insure tail losses. Moreover, we show that both the insurance coverage and the insurer’s expected profit increase with the policyholder’s degree of risk aversion. Additionally, and echoing recent work in the literature, we show that equilibrium contracts are Pareto efficient, but they do not induce a welfare gain to the policyholder. Conversely, any Pareto-optimal contract that leaves no welfare gain to the policyholder can be obtained as an equilibrium contract. Finally, we consider a few examples of interest that recover some existing results in the literature as special cases of our analysis.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Dynamic Pareto Optima in Multi-Period Pure-Exchange Economies
We study a problem of optimal allocation in a discrete-time multi-period pure-exchange economy, where agents have preferences over stochastic endowment processes that are represented by strongly time-consistent dynamic risk measures. We introduce the notion of dynamic Pareto-optimal allocation processes and show that such processes can be constructed recursively starting with the allocation at the terminal time. We further derive a comonotone improvement theorem for allocation processes, and we provide a recursive approach to constructing comonotone dynamic Pareto optima when the agents' preferences are coherent and satisfy a property that we call equidistribution-preserving. In the special case where each agent's dynamic risk measure is of the distortion type, we provide a closed-form characterization of comonotone dynamic Pareto optima. We illustrate our results in a two-period setting.
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDynamic Pareto Optima in Multi-Period Pure-Exchange Economies
We study a problem of optimal allocation in a discrete-time multi-period pure-exchange economy, where agents have preferences over stochastic endowment processes that are represented by strongly time-consistent dynamic risk measures. We introduce the notion of dynamic Pareto-optimal allocation processes and show that such processes can be constructed recursively starting with the allocation at the terminal time. We further derive a comonotone improvement theorem for allocation processes, and we provide a recursive approach to constructing comonotone dynamic Pareto optima when the agents' preferences are coherent and satisfy a property that we call equidistribution-preserving. In the special case where each agent's dynamic risk measure is of the distortion type, we provide a closed-form characterization of comonotone dynamic Pareto optima. We illustrate our results in a two-period setting.
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 128
Counter-monotonic risk sharing with heterogeneous distortion risk measures
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 128
Counter-monotonic risk sharing with heterogeneous distortion risk measures
- Open Access
Stackelberg Equilibria in Monopoly Insurance Markets with Probability Weighting
We study Stackelberg Equilibria (Bowley optima) in a monopolistic centralized sequential-move insurance market, with a profit-maximizing insurer who sets premia using a distortion premium principle, and a single policyholder who seeks to minimize a distortion risk measure. We show that equilibria are characterized as follows: In equilibrium, the optimal indemnity function exhibits a layer-type structure, providing full insurance over any loss layer on which the policyholder is more pessimistic than the insurer's pricing functional about tail losses; and no insurance coverage over loss layers on which the policyholder is less pessimistic than the insurer's pricing functional about tail losses. In equilibrium, the optimal pricing distortion function is determined by the policyholder's degree of risk aversion, whereby prices never exceed the policyholder's marginal willingness to insure tail losses. Moreover, we show that both the insurance coverage and the insurer's expected profit increase with the policyholder's degree of risk aversion. Additionally, and echoing recent work in the literature, we show that equilibrium contracts are Pareto efficient, but they do not induce a welfare gain to the policyholder. Conversely, any Pareto-optimal contract that leaves no welfare gain to the policyholder can be obtained as an equilibrium contract. Finally, we consider a few examples of interest that recover some existing results in the literature as special cases of our analysis.
Open AccessStackelberg Equilibria in Monopoly Insurance Markets with Probability Weighting
We study Stackelberg Equilibria (Bowley optima) in a monopolistic centralized sequential-move insurance market, with a profit-maximizing insurer who sets premia using a distortion premium principle, and a single policyholder who seeks to minimize a distortion risk measure. We show that equilibria are characterized as follows: In equilibrium, the optimal indemnity function exhibits a layer-type structure, providing full insurance over any loss layer on which the policyholder is more pessimistic than the insurer's pricing functional about tail losses; and no insurance coverage over loss layers on which the policyholder is less pessimistic than the insurer's pricing functional about tail losses. In equilibrium, the optimal pricing distortion function is determined by the policyholder's degree of risk aversion, whereby prices never exceed the policyholder's marginal willingness to insure tail losses. Moreover, we show that both the insurance coverage and the insurer's expected profit increase with the policyholder's degree of risk aversion. Additionally, and echoing recent work in the literature, we show that equilibrium contracts are Pareto efficient, but they do not induce a welfare gain to the policyholder. Conversely, any Pareto-optimal contract that leaves no welfare gain to the policyholder can be obtained as an equilibrium contract. Finally, we consider a few examples of interest that recover some existing results in the literature as special cases of our analysis.
- Open Access
Incentive Pareto Efficiency in Monopoly Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection
We study a monopolistic insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type $θ$ is private information that is unobservable to the insurer, and it is drawn from a continuum of types. The hidden type affects both the loss distribution and the risk attitude of the agent. Within this framework, we show that a menu of contracts is incentive efficient if and only if it maximizes social welfare, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. This equivalence holds for general concave utility functionals. In the special case of Yaari Dual Utility, we provide a semi-explicit characterization of optimal incentive-efficient menus of contracts. We do this under two different settings: (i) the first assumes that types are ordered in a way such that larger values of $θ$ correspond to more risk-averse types who face stochastically larger losses; whereas (ii) the second assumes that larger values of $θ$ correspond to less risk-averse types who face stochastically larger losses. In both settings, the structure of optimal incentive-efficient menus of contracts depends on the level of the social welfare weight. Moreover, at the optimum, higher types receive greater coverage in exchange for higher premia. Additionally, optimal menus leave the lowest type indifferent, with the insurer absorbing all surplus from the lowest type; and they exhibit efficiency at the top, that is, the highest type receives full coverage.Open AccessIncentive Pareto Efficiency in Monopoly Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection
We study a monopolistic insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type $θ$ is private information that is unobservable to the insurer, and it is drawn from a continuum of types. The hidden type affects both the loss distribution and the risk attitude of the agent. Within this framework, we show that a menu of contracts is incentive efficient if and only if it maximizes social welfare, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. This equivalence holds for general concave utility functionals. In the special case of Yaari Dual Utility, we provide a semi-explicit characterization of optimal incentive-efficient menus of contracts. We do this under two different settings: (i) the first assumes that types are ordered in a way such that larger values of $θ$ correspond to more risk-averse types who face stochastically larger losses; whereas (ii) the second assumes that larger values of $θ$ correspond to less risk-averse types who face stochastically larger losses. In both settings, the structure of optimal incentive-efficient menus of contracts depends on the level of the social welfare weight. Moreover, at the optimum, higher types receive greater coverage in exchange for higher premia. Additionally, optimal menus leave the lowest type indifferent, with the insurer absorbing all surplus from the lowest type; and they exhibit efficiency at the top, that is, the highest type receives full coverage. - Open Access
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 127
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria in large reinsurance markets
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 127
Open AccessSubgame perfect Nash equilibria in large reinsurance markets
- Open Access
Optimal allocations with distortion risk measures and mixed risk attitudes
We study Pareto-optimal risk sharing in economies with heterogeneous attitudes toward risk, where agents' preferences are modeled by distortion risk measures. Building on comonotonic and counter-monotonic improvement results, we show that agents with similar attitudes optimally share risks comonotonically (risk-averse) or counter-monotonically (risk-seeking). We show how the general $n$-agent problem can be reduced to a two-agent formulation between representative risk-averse and risk-seeking agents, characterized by the infimal convolution of their distortion risk measures. Within this two-agent framework, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal allocations, and we identify when the infimal convolution yields an unbounded value. When existence fails, we analyze the problem under nonnegative allocation constraints, and we characterize optima explicitly, under piecewise-linear distortion functions and Bernoulli-type risks. Our findings suggest that the optimal allocation structure is governed by the relative strength of risk aversion versus risk seeking behavior, as intuition would suggest.
Open AccessOptimal allocations with distortion risk measures and mixed risk attitudes
We study Pareto-optimal risk sharing in economies with heterogeneous attitudes toward risk, where agents' preferences are modeled by distortion risk measures. Building on comonotonic and counter-monotonic improvement results, we show that agents with similar attitudes optimally share risks comonotonically (risk-averse) or counter-monotonically (risk-seeking). We show how the general $n$-agent problem can be reduced to a two-agent formulation between representative risk-averse and risk-seeking agents, characterized by the infimal convolution of their distortion risk measures. Within this two-agent framework, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal allocations, and we identify when the infimal convolution yields an unbounded value. When existence fails, we analyze the problem under nonnegative allocation constraints, and we characterize optima explicitly, under piecewise-linear distortion functions and Bernoulli-type risks. Our findings suggest that the optimal allocation structure is governed by the relative strength of risk aversion versus risk seeking behavior, as intuition would suggest.
- Open Access
- 21 August 2025
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 36 (1) , 99-117
Efficiency in Pure‐Exchange Economies With Risk‐Averse Monetary Utilities
We study Pareto efficiency in a pure‐exchange economy where agents' preferences are represented by risk‐averse monetary utilities. These coincide with law‐invariant monetary utilities, and they can be shown to correspond to the class of monotone, (quasi‐)concave, Schur concave, and translation‐invariant utility functionals. This covers a large class of utility functionals, including a variety of law‐invariant robust utilities. Given that Pareto optima exist and are comonotone, we provide a crisp characterization thereof in the case of law‐invariant positively homogeneous monetary utilities. This characterization provides an easily implementable algorithm that fully determines the shape of Pareto‐optimal (PO) allocations. In the special case of law‐invariant comonotone‐additive monetary utility functionals (concave Yaari‐dual utilities), we provide a closed‐form characterization of Pareto optima. As an application, we examine risk‐sharing markets where all agents evaluate risk through law‐invariant coherent risk measures, a widely popular class of risk measures. In a numerical illustration, we characterize PO risk‐sharing for some special types of coherent risk measures.
- 21 August 2025
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 36 (1) , 99-117
Open AccessEfficiency in Pure‐Exchange Economies With Risk‐Averse Monetary Utilities
We study Pareto efficiency in a pure‐exchange economy where agents' preferences are represented by risk‐averse monetary utilities. These coincide with law‐invariant monetary utilities, and they can be shown to correspond to the class of monotone, (quasi‐)concave, Schur concave, and translation‐invariant utility functionals. This covers a large class of utility functionals, including a variety of law‐invariant robust utilities. Given that Pareto optima exist and are comonotone, we provide a crisp characterization thereof in the case of law‐invariant positively homogeneous monetary utilities. This characterization provides an easily implementable algorithm that fully determines the shape of Pareto‐optimal (PO) allocations. In the special case of law‐invariant comonotone‐additive monetary utility functionals (concave Yaari‐dual utilities), we provide a closed‐form characterization of Pareto optima. As an application, we examine risk‐sharing markets where all agents evaluate risk through law‐invariant coherent risk measures, a widely popular class of risk measures. In a numerical illustration, we characterize PO risk‐sharing for some special types of coherent risk measures.
- Open Access
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Large Reinsurance Markets
We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and equilibria in reinsurance markets. Each insurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can purchase coverage from any or all reinsurers. Each reinsurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can provide coverage to any or all insurers. Pricing in this market is done via a nonlinear pricing rule given by a Choquet integral. We model the market as a sequential game in which the reinsurers have the first-move advantage. We characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in this market in some cases of interest, and we examine their Pareto efficiency. In addition, we consider two special cases of our model that correspond to existing models in the related literature, and we show how our findings extend these previous results. Finally, we illustrate our results in a numerical example.
Open AccessSubgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Large Reinsurance Markets
We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and equilibria in reinsurance markets. Each insurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can purchase coverage from any or all reinsurers. Each reinsurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can provide coverage to any or all insurers. Pricing in this market is done via a nonlinear pricing rule given by a Choquet integral. We model the market as a sequential game in which the reinsurers have the first-move advantage. We characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in this market in some cases of interest, and we examine their Pareto efficiency. In addition, we consider two special cases of our model that correspond to existing models in the related literature, and we show how our findings extend these previous results. Finally, we illustrate our results in a numerical example.
- Open Access
- 11 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in ASTIN Bulletin
- Vol. 55 (3) , 537-563
Pareto-optimal peer-to-peer risk sharing with robust distortion risk measures
We study Pareto optimality in a decentralized peer-to-peer risk-sharing market where agents’ preferences are represented by robust distortion risk measures that are not necessarily convex. We obtain a characterization of Pareto-optimal allocations of the aggregate risk in the market, and we show that the shape of the allocations depends primarily on each agent’s assessment of the tail of the aggregate risk. We quantify the latter via an index of probabilistic risk aversion, and we illustrate our results using concrete examples of popular families of distortion functions. As an application of our results, we revisit the market for flood risk insurance in the United States. We present the decentralized risk sharing arrangement as an alternative to the current centralized market structure, and we characterize the optimal allocations in a numerical study with historical flood data. We conclude with an in-depth discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a decentralized insurance scheme in this setting.
- 11 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in ASTIN Bulletin
- Vol. 55 (3) , 537-563
Open AccessPareto-optimal peer-to-peer risk sharing with robust distortion risk measures
We study Pareto optimality in a decentralized peer-to-peer risk-sharing market where agents’ preferences are represented by robust distortion risk measures that are not necessarily convex. We obtain a characterization of Pareto-optimal allocations of the aggregate risk in the market, and we show that the shape of the allocations depends primarily on each agent’s assessment of the tail of the aggregate risk. We quantify the latter via an index of probabilistic risk aversion, and we illustrate our results using concrete examples of popular families of distortion functions. As an application of our results, we revisit the market for flood risk insurance in the United States. We present the decentralized risk sharing arrangement as an alternative to the current centralized market structure, and we characterize the optimal allocations in a numerical study with historical flood data. We conclude with an in-depth discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a decentralized insurance scheme in this setting.