Georg von Wangenheim
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Georg von Wangenheim has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Emanuela Carbonara
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
2 shared publications- Emanuela Carbonara
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
2 shared publications Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota, Law School, Minneapolis, MN, USA
2 shared publications- Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA
2 shared publications - Maria Vittoria Levati
University of Verona
2 shared publications Werner Güth
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Mohr Siebeck
Die Evolution von Recht
Die Evolution von Recht. Ursachen und Wirkungen häufigkeitsabhängigen Verhaltens in der Rechtsfortbildung
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Mohr Siebeck
Die Evolution von Recht
Die Evolution von Recht. Ursachen und Wirkungen häufigkeitsabhängigen Verhaltens in der Rechtsfortbildung
- Open Access
- 16 February 2021
- Published by IDEA PUBLISHERS in Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)
- Vol. 5 (1) , 228-244
Access to justice: an evaluation of the informal justice systems
The judicial system of any state can be divided into formal and informal, where the formal is under the state (official) and informal may or may not be under the domain of the state (informal justice system). Since both systems provide access to justice, the informal system is viewed as a threat to the formal justice system. In this context, we need to understand better the role played by the informal justice systems. We have focused on three fundamental issues, first to evaluate the role of the alternate and informal justice system in improving access to justice. Second, we listed weaknesses in informal justice systems that give us an insight into our third goal of suggesting a framework for engaging the informal justice system and improving its shortcomings which can help support or reduce the burden on the formal system. Because of the absence of relevant literature, we resorted to empirical reports and case studies on other developing countries to present our arguments. We showed that the informal system plays a positive role in society, and the systems need to be reformed, especially for its negative traits, e.g., human rights.
- 16 February 2021
- Published by IDEA PUBLISHERS in Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)
- Vol. 5 (1) , 228-244
Open AccessAccess to justice: an evaluation of the informal justice systems
The judicial system of any state can be divided into formal and informal, where the formal is under the state (official) and informal may or may not be under the domain of the state (informal justice system). Since both systems provide access to justice, the informal system is viewed as a threat to the formal justice system. In this context, we need to understand better the role played by the informal justice systems. We have focused on three fundamental issues, first to evaluate the role of the alternate and informal justice system in improving access to justice. Second, we listed weaknesses in informal justice systems that give us an insight into our third goal of suggesting a framework for engaging the informal justice system and improving its shortcomings which can help support or reduce the burden on the formal system. Because of the absence of relevant literature, we resorted to empirical reports and case studies on other developing countries to present our arguments. We showed that the informal system plays a positive role in society, and the systems need to be reformed, especially for its negative traits, e.g., human rights.
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-122
Blockchain-Based Land Registers: A Law-and-Economics Perspective
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-122
Blockchain-Based Land Registers: A Law-and-Economics Perspective
- 13 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 11-22
Certification as Solution to the Asymmetric Information Problem?
- 13 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 11-22
Certification as Solution to the Asymmetric Information Problem?
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 313-324
Chaining Property to Blocks – On the Economic Efficiency of Blockchain-Based Property Enforcement
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 313-324
Chaining Property to Blocks – On the Economic Efficiency of Blockchain-Based Property Enforcement
- 27 October 2017
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Production of legal rules by agencies and bureaucracies
- 27 October 2017
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Production of legal rules by agencies and bureaucracies
- 22 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Vol. 27 (4) , 663-690
The impact of market innovations on the dissemination of social norms: the sustainability case
- 22 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Vol. 27 (4) , 663-690
The impact of market innovations on the dissemination of social norms: the sustainability case
- 10 May 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Evolutionary Law and Economics
This article examines the use of evolutionary theories in law and economics. It begins with a discussion of the concept of evolution. It then explains the central ideas of three central evolutionary approaches in law and economics: the neo-institutional approach, microeconomic models, and the idea of competing jurisdictions. Neo-institutionalist approaches provide a bouquet of arguments which may be used to explain the evolution of law. Microeconomic approaches driven by demand for, and supply of legal rules as well as their interactions with social norms and technological evolution may provide such models, but, since these models are based on Markov processes and thus on stochasticity, they may only describe and predict expected values of legal change. As a consequence, explanations of specific legal variations cannot be traced back to specific elements of these evolutionary theories in law and economics. This caveat persists even if one would extend the models to allow for co-evolution of jurisdictions partly driven by comparative lawyers' research. Nevertheless, the said microeconomic approaches may still be useful for normative evaluations of differences in the law: If the frameworks of legal evolution in jurisdictions differ, the theory may offer arguments for why the evolution in one or the other will tend towards a more desirable outcome (for example efficiency). One should however always be aware that these theories can only make statements on tendencies of evolution, not on specific legal changes. The same caveats apply in an even stronger way to the use of (evolutionary) theories of inter-jurisdictional competition.
- 10 May 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Evolutionary Law and Economics
This article examines the use of evolutionary theories in law and economics. It begins with a discussion of the concept of evolution. It then explains the central ideas of three central evolutionary approaches in law and economics: the neo-institutional approach, microeconomic models, and the idea of competing jurisdictions. Neo-institutionalist approaches provide a bouquet of arguments which may be used to explain the evolution of law. Microeconomic approaches driven by demand for, and supply of legal rules as well as their interactions with social norms and technological evolution may provide such models, but, since these models are based on Markov processes and thus on stochasticity, they may only describe and predict expected values of legal change. As a consequence, explanations of specific legal variations cannot be traced back to specific elements of these evolutionary theories in law and economics. This caveat persists even if one would extend the models to allow for co-evolution of jurisdictions partly driven by comparative lawyers' research. Nevertheless, the said microeconomic approaches may still be useful for normative evaluations of differences in the law: If the frameworks of legal evolution in jurisdictions differ, the theory may offer arguments for why the evolution in one or the other will tend towards a more desirable outcome (for example efficiency). One should however always be aware that these theories can only make statements on tendencies of evolution, not on specific legal changes. The same caveats apply in an even stronger way to the use of (evolutionary) theories of inter-jurisdictional competition.
- 18 May 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Wirtschaftsdienst
- Vol. 96 (5) , 326-332
Das Bestellerprinzip — Entlastung für den Mieter oder Augenwischerei?
Zusammenfassung Mit der Implementierung des Bestellerprinzips — wer den Makler beauftragt, mußs ihn auch bezahlen — hat der Gesetzgeber einen Wechsel der Zahllast für die Courtage vom Mieter zum Vermieter vorgenommen. Ob die intendierte Entlastung der Mieter gelingt, hängt maßgeblich vom Grad der Überwälzung auf die Miete ab. Auf der Verliererseite werden die Makler sein, da sie mit einer geringeren Nachfrage sowie einer Erosion der Courtage rechnen müssen.
- 18 May 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Wirtschaftsdienst
- Vol. 96 (5) , 326-332
Das Bestellerprinzip — Entlastung für den Mieter oder Augenwischerei?
Zusammenfassung Mit der Implementierung des Bestellerprinzips — wer den Makler beauftragt, mußs ihn auch bezahlen — hat der Gesetzgeber einen Wechsel der Zahllast für die Courtage vom Mieter zum Vermieter vorgenommen. Ob die intendierte Entlastung der Mieter gelingt, hängt maßgeblich vom Grad der Überwälzung auf die Miete ab. Auf der Verliererseite werden die Makler sein, da sie mit einer geringeren Nachfrage sowie einer Erosion der Courtage rechnen müssen.
- 20 May 2015
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
- Vol. 11 (2) , 113-148
Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of Limited Fee Shifting
In the past couple of decades, scholars have predominantly employed rent-seeking models to analyze litigation problems. In this paper, we build on the existing literature to show how alternative fee-shifting arrangements (e.g., the American rule and English rule with limited fee-shifting) affect parties’ litigation expenditures and their decisions to litigate. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, we discover that, when fee shifting is limited, the English rule presents some interrelated advantages over the American rule, including the reduction of litigation rates and the possible reduction of expected litigation expenditures. Our results unveil a hidden virtue of limited fee shifting, showing that an increase in such limit may lead to a desirable sorting of socially valuable litigation.
- 20 May 2015
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Law & Economics
- Vol. 11 (2) , 113-148
Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of Limited Fee Shifting
In the past couple of decades, scholars have predominantly employed rent-seeking models to analyze litigation problems. In this paper, we build on the existing literature to show how alternative fee-shifting arrangements (e.g., the American rule and English rule with limited fee-shifting) affect parties’ litigation expenditures and their decisions to litigate. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, we discover that, when fee shifting is limited, the English rule presents some interrelated advantages over the American rule, including the reduction of litigation rates and the possible reduction of expected litigation expenditures. Our results unveil a hidden virtue of limited fee shifting, showing that an increase in such limit may lead to a desirable sorting of socially valuable litigation.