Kevin Vandergriff
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 85 (2) , 193-211
Re-evaluating the hiddenness argument from above
- 4 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 85 (2) , 193-211
Open AccessRe-evaluating the hiddenness argument from above
- 28 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 13 (9)
John Leslie's Platonic and non‐religious pantheism of infinitely many divine minds
I survey John Leslie's Platonic thesis that if something sufficiently good possibly exists, then it could be ethically required that it actually exists—along with the pantheistic world‐picture to which this thesis leads.
- 28 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 13 (9)
John Leslie's Platonic and non‐religious pantheism of infinitely many divine minds
I survey John Leslie's Platonic thesis that if something sufficiently good possibly exists, then it could be ethically required that it actually exists—along with the pantheistic world‐picture to which this thesis leads.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 54 (1) , 91-105
Naturalism, theism, and multiply realizable mental states
Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, if functionalism is true, then all conceivable minds are fundamentally functional entities identified by what they do, rather than by what they are made of.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 54 (1) , 91-105
Naturalism, theism, and multiply realizable mental states
Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, if functionalism is true, then all conceivable minds are fundamentally functional entities identified by what they do, rather than by what they are made of.
- 25 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 84 (1) , 3-29
Omnipotence and spatiotemporally restricted entities
- 25 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 84 (1) , 3-29
Omnipotence and spatiotemporally restricted entities
- Open Access
- 19 January 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Open Theology
- Vol. 2 (1) , 34-52
Natural Nonbelief as a Necessary Means to a Life of Choiceworthy Meaning
Many have thought that certain types and distributions of apparent nonresistant nonbelief in the world are among the best reasons to think naturalism is more probable than theism. Jason Marsh has argued that one specific type of nonresistant nonbelief, called natural nonbelief in early humans, supports naturalism over theism. However, I will argue that it is epistemically possible that God has a morallysufficient reason for permitting natural nonbelief in early humans. First, according to Axiarchism, God’s goal for physical reality is to intentionally structure it so that a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value will be realized. Second, since theism entails Axiarchism, and it is far from clear on our total available evidence that eliminating the possibility of natural nonbelief would have led to a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value being realized for early humans, the degree to which natural nonbelief supports naturalism over theism is softened.
- 19 January 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Open Theology
- Vol. 2 (1) , 34-52
Open AccessNatural Nonbelief as a Necessary Means to a Life of Choiceworthy Meaning
Many have thought that certain types and distributions of apparent nonresistant nonbelief in the world are among the best reasons to think naturalism is more probable than theism. Jason Marsh has argued that one specific type of nonresistant nonbelief, called natural nonbelief in early humans, supports naturalism over theism. However, I will argue that it is epistemically possible that God has a morallysufficient reason for permitting natural nonbelief in early humans. First, according to Axiarchism, God’s goal for physical reality is to intentionally structure it so that a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value will be realized. Second, since theism entails Axiarchism, and it is far from clear on our total available evidence that eliminating the possibility of natural nonbelief would have led to a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value being realized for early humans, the degree to which natural nonbelief supports naturalism over theism is softened.