HFHenry L. Friedman

Henry L. Friedman

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Henry L. Friedman has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The effect of the mandatory disclosure of corporate tax returns on reporting bias

    by Eric J. Allen, Henry L. Friedman, Aydin Uysal

    How do investor reactions to the mandatory disclosure of firm tax information influence managers' reporting choices? To answer this question, we build a structural model of reporting bias, which we test with a unique data set of Turkish firms that have been mandated to publicly disclose their tax returns since 2009. We find that both book and tax income numbers are informative to investors. Structural estimates are consistent with disclosure of the tax report reducing both market incentives to manage book earnings and investor uncertainty about underlying firm value. Tax disclosure is associated with higher reported tax income, though the increase is not statistically significant. Counterfactual estimates suggest that book‐tax‐conformity could change financial and tax reporting biases, but lead to a lower quality information environment relative to the separate disclosure of book and tax reports.

  • Fixing the Proprietary Cost Assumption in Discretionary Disclosure Models

    by Henry L. Friedman

    I present a critique of the common assumption of fixed proprietary costs in discretionary disclosure models, which are frequently used to motivate and interpret empirical analyses of voluntary disclosures in capital market settings (e.g., management guidance, segment performance, and major customers). In a fairly general model, proprietary costs that are fixed (i.e., independent of the disclosed information) are contradictory to their proprietary nature. To sustain informational independence requires either that the party (e.g., competitor) imposing proprietary costs on the disclosing firm is indifferent to the information or that the disclosing firm is indifferent to what the competitor/counterparty will do with the information. Either of these is inconsistent with a plain interpretation of proprietary disclosure costs, which arise precisely because of responses to disclosed information. I suggest that researchers should explicitly consider how the disclosed information will be used rather than derive predictions or interpret results based on information-insensitive proprietary costs. JEL Classifications: D21; G32; M41.


  • Open Access

    Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition

    by Matthew J. Bloomfield, Henry L. Friedman, Hwa Young Kim

    The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-based pay as a plausible channel through which institutional investors might influence competition. Our model implies a negative effect of common ownership on firms’ use of revenue-based pay. Using both associative analyses and an event study difference-in-differences design based on plausibly exogenous institutional mergers, we find no evidence of a negative relation between common ownership and the use of revenue-based pay, except in an economically small subsample of extremely concentrated owners. Results involving relative performance incentives are similar. Collectively, our results provide no support for the notion that cross-owning blockholders in general influence compensation contracts in order to soften executives’ incentives to compete aggressively.Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.JEL Classifications: D43; G30; L13; M12; M40; M52.


  • Economic uncertainty and investor attention

    by Daniel Andrei, Henry Friedman, N. Bugra Ozel


  • A Rationale for Imperfect Reporting Standards

    by Henry L. Friedman, John S. Hughes, Beatrice Michaeli

    The aim of general purpose financial reporting is to provide information that is useful to investors, lenders, and other creditors. With this goal, regulators have tended to mandate increased disclosure. We show that increased mandatory disclosure can weaken a firm’s incentive to acquire and voluntarily disclose private information that is not amenable to inclusion in mandated reports. Specifically, we provide conditions under which a regulator, seeking to maximize the total amount of information provided to investors via both mandatory and voluntary disclosures, would mandate less informative and more conservative financial reports even in the absence of any direct costs of increasing informativeness. This result is robust to allowing the firm to make reports more informative and to imposing a nondisclosure cost or penalty on the firm. The results and comparative statics analysis contribute to our understanding of interactions between mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure and demonstrate a novel benefit to setting accounting standards that mandate imperfectly informative reports. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.


  • Open Access

    How Is the Audit Market Affected by Characteristics of the Nonaudit Services Market?

    by Henry L. Friedman, Lucas Mahieux

    How can features of the markets for audit and nonaudit services (NAS) affect an audit firm's incentives to invest in audit quality, average audit quality, and social welfare? We address these questions in a model focusing on competition in both audit and NAS markets. We show that, when audit and NAS demand are positively correlated, prohibiting auditors from providing NAS to audit clients leads to higher investments in audit quality, but can decrease average audit quality if marginal clients switch to lower quality auditors. The effect on social welfare can be positive or negative, depending on the distribution of clients' service demands. General bans on auditor provision of NAS can, via similar channels, increase or decrease audit quality and social welfare. Overall, our findings suggest a more nuanced view of how regulating an auditor's provision of NAS might affect audit quality and social welfare, and are driven by the effects of multimarket competition on the auditor's incentives to invest in audit quality, rather than previously identified auditor independence or knowledge spillover channels.


  • Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Institutions

    by Henry L. Friedman, Mirko S. Heinle

    We examine a setting in which agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other’s lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be nonmonotonic. Our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying. We discuss implications for the regulation of financial institutions. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.


  • Financial Reporting Quality and Noise in Stock Returns: Evidence from Chinese A-B Twin Shares

    by Liang Ma, Tao Ma, Henry L. Friedman

    We examine how financial reporting quality affects the degree of noise in stock returns using the setting of Chinese A-B twin shares, which are shares for the same firm, traded on the same exchange, but with separate investor clienteles (i.e., mainly domestic versus foreign). We measure return noise using the correlation between firm-specific returns of A-B twin shares and find that higher financial reporting quality leads to less return noise, both in panel regressions and using China's 2007 accounting standard reform as an exogenous shock to financial reporting quality. We also find that returns are less noisy around earnings announcements than during other trading days. Our results suggest that higher-quality financial reporting can reduce the degree of noise in returns and make returns more efficient. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; M41.


  • Investor Preference for Director Characteristics: Portfolio Choice with Gender Bias

    by Henry L. Friedman

    This study examines whether investor-level preferences for director characteristics influence portfolio choices, using data on the U.S. holdings of non-U.S. funds. Consistent with bias-based preferences influencing portfolio allocations, funds from countries with greater gender inequality invest less and hold smaller stakes in firms with more female directors. Since variation in funds' home country gender biases are plausibly unrelated to the selection and performance of female directors in U.S. firms, the empirical strategy mitigates endogeneity concerns arising from estimates based on associations between market performance and gender demographics. The study contributes by linking investments to measured gender biases and by providing evidence, through additional analysis, of potential channels through which gender bias may affect portfolio choice. JEL Classifications: G11; J16; M10.