Russell Golman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Russell Golman has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andras Molnar
Department of Psychology University of Michigan Ann Arbor Michigan USA
3 shared publications George Loewenstein
Department of Social and Decision Sciences
3 shared publications- George Loewenstein
Carnegie Mellon University
2 shared publications - Kara Kedrick
Carnegie Mellon University
2 shared publications Nikolos Gurney
Department of Social and Decision Sciences
2 shared publications- Shu Huang
Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Social & Decis Sci, 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Explanation Generation: Questions Direct Exploration in Semantic Space
In everyday reasoning and scientific inquiry, explanations help people make sense of their experiences and observations. We investigate how people generate new possible explanations. Specifically, we study how the phrasing of “why” questions shapes exploration of the space of possible explanations. We hypothesized that rephrasing a question comparing two keywords to make one or the other more focal would guide people toward explanations that are more closely related to the focal word. Using a pre-trained machine learning model, we measured how closely each explanation aligned with the comparison words. In Study 1, we manipulated the order of the two keywords and found that explanations aligned more strongly with the earlier words. However, this design did not distinguish whether the effect was driven by the primacy of the words or the pragmatics of the question. In Study 2, we then independently manipulated which word appeared first and which word served as the grammatical subject, and found that participants were more likely to generate explanations related to the subject. These findings highlight how the phrasing of a question can shape explanation generation, demonstrating that pragmatic understanding influences how people explore a conceptual space.
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessExplanation Generation: Questions Direct Exploration in Semantic Space
In everyday reasoning and scientific inquiry, explanations help people make sense of their experiences and observations. We investigate how people generate new possible explanations. Specifically, we study how the phrasing of “why” questions shapes exploration of the space of possible explanations. We hypothesized that rephrasing a question comparing two keywords to make one or the other more focal would guide people toward explanations that are more closely related to the focal word. Using a pre-trained machine learning model, we measured how closely each explanation aligned with the comparison words. In Study 1, we manipulated the order of the two keywords and found that explanations aligned more strongly with the earlier words. However, this design did not distinguish whether the effect was driven by the primacy of the words or the pragmatics of the question. In Study 2, we then independently manipulated which word appeared first and which word served as the grammatical subject, and found that participants were more likely to generate explanations related to the subject. These findings highlight how the phrasing of a question can shape explanation generation, demonstrating that pragmatic understanding influences how people explore a conceptual space.
- Open Access
- 30 August 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Willful Inattention
This article introduces the concept of willful inattention and argues that it accounts for many behaviors that have previously been attributed to willful ignorance. Willful inattention arises when an individual avoids paying attention to something because they expect that focusing their attention on it will evoke negative emotions or diminish positive ones. Willful ignorance, in contrast, is motivated by a desire to remain uninformed so as to avoid an unwanted change in beliefs. We show that willful inattention plays a key role in a number of important policy problems, and we discuss strategies for mitigating its negative effects.
- 30 August 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessWillful Inattention
This article introduces the concept of willful inattention and argues that it accounts for many behaviors that have previously been attributed to willful ignorance. Willful inattention arises when an individual avoids paying attention to something because they expect that focusing their attention on it will evoke negative emotions or diminish positive ones. Willful ignorance, in contrast, is motivated by a desire to remain uninformed so as to avoid an unwanted change in beliefs. We show that willful inattention plays a key role in a number of important policy problems, and we discuss strategies for mitigating its negative effects.
- Open Access
- 11 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 222
Strategic information avoidance, belief manipulation and the effectiveness of green nudges
- 11 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 222
Open AccessStrategic information avoidance, belief manipulation and the effectiveness of green nudges
- Open Access
- 12 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 341-356
The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory
We apply an algorithm from the wisdom-of-crowds literature to optimally combine behavioral game theory models to more accurately predict strategic choice in one-shot, simultaneous-move games. We find that the optimal weighted average of seven behavioral game theory models predicts out-of-sample choice behavior significantly better than any of the individual models. The crowd of behavioral game theory models is wiser than any single one of them. Different strategic choice models complement each other by capturing distinct patterns of behavior. The field of behavioral game theory is enriched by having this diversity of models.
- 12 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 341-356
Open AccessThe collective wisdom of behavioral game theory
We apply an algorithm from the wisdom-of-crowds literature to optimally combine behavioral game theory models to more accurately predict strategic choice in one-shot, simultaneous-move games. We find that the optimal weighted average of seven behavioral game theory models predicts out-of-sample choice behavior significantly better than any of the individual models. The crowd of behavioral game theory models is wiser than any single one of them. Different strategic choice models complement each other by capturing distinct patterns of behavior. The field of behavioral game theory is enriched by having this diversity of models.
- 28 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 68 (1) , 77-105
Menu-dependent risk attitudes: Theory and evidence
- 28 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 68 (1) , 77-105
Menu-dependent risk attitudes: Theory and evidence
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Decision
- Vol. 11 (1) , 7-34
A hypothesis test algorithm for determining when weighting individual judgments reliably improves collective accuracy or just adds noise.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Decision
- Vol. 11 (1) , 7-34
A hypothesis test algorithm for determining when weighting individual judgments reliably improves collective accuracy or just adds noise.
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 160
Acceptable discourse: Social norms of beliefs and opinions
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 160
Acceptable discourse: Social norms of beliefs and opinions
- Open Access
- 16 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Headline Curiosity
We analyze how curiosity drives news consumption. We apply NLP methods and test predictions of the information-gap theory of curiosity in the context of news consumption on WeChat. As predicted, we find that people are more likely to consume news when: 1) the headline raises a salient question; 2) it appears more important, e.g., because the headline is displayed in a higher position on the webpage; 3) the topics mentioned in the headline are more surprising, as measured by the KL-divergence of the distribution over topics referenced in the headline; and 4) the headline has lower valence.
- 16 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHeadline Curiosity
We analyze how curiosity drives news consumption. We apply NLP methods and test predictions of the information-gap theory of curiosity in the context of news consumption on WeChat. As predicted, we find that people are more likely to consume news when: 1) the headline raises a salient question; 2) it appears more important, e.g., because the headline is displayed in a higher position on the webpage; 3) the topics mentioned in the headline are more surprising, as measured by the KL-divergence of the distribution over topics referenced in the headline; and 4) the headline has lower valence.
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (9) , 6454-6476
The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information
Management scientists recognize that decision making depends on the information people have but lack a unified behavioral theory of the demand for (and avoidance of) information. Drawing on an existing theoretical framework in which utility depends on beliefs and the attention paid to them, we develop and test a theory of the demand for information encompassing instrumental considerations, curiosity, and desire to direct attention to beliefs one feels good about. We decompose an individual’s demand for information into the desire to refine beliefs, holding attention constant, and the desire to focus attention on anticipated beliefs, holding these beliefs constant. Because the utility of resolving uncertainty (i.e., refining beliefs) depends on the attention paid to it and more important or salient questions capture more attention, demand for information depends on the importance and salience of the question(s) it addresses. In addition, because getting new information focuses attention on one’s beliefs and people want to savor good news and ignore bad news, the desire to obtain or avoid information depends on the valence (i.e., goodness or badness) of anticipated beliefs. Five experiments (n = 2,361) test and find support for these hypotheses, looking at neutrally valenced as well as ego-relevant information. People are indeed more inclined to acquire information (a) when it feels more important, even if it cannot aid decision making (Experiments 1A and 2A); (b) when a question is more salient, manipulated through time lag (Experiments 1B and 2B); and (c) when anticipated beliefs have higher valence (Experiment 2C). This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (9) , 6454-6476
The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information
Management scientists recognize that decision making depends on the information people have but lack a unified behavioral theory of the demand for (and avoidance of) information. Drawing on an existing theoretical framework in which utility depends on beliefs and the attention paid to them, we develop and test a theory of the demand for information encompassing instrumental considerations, curiosity, and desire to direct attention to beliefs one feels good about. We decompose an individual’s demand for information into the desire to refine beliefs, holding attention constant, and the desire to focus attention on anticipated beliefs, holding these beliefs constant. Because the utility of resolving uncertainty (i.e., refining beliefs) depends on the attention paid to it and more important or salient questions capture more attention, demand for information depends on the importance and salience of the question(s) it addresses. In addition, because getting new information focuses attention on one’s beliefs and people want to savor good news and ignore bad news, the desire to obtain or avoid information depends on the valence (i.e., goodness or badness) of anticipated beliefs. Five experiments (n = 2,361) test and find support for these hypotheses, looking at neutrally valenced as well as ego-relevant information. People are indeed more inclined to acquire information (a) when it feels more important, even if it cannot aid decision making (Experiments 1A and 2A); (b) when a question is more salient, manipulated through time lag (Experiments 1B and 2B); and (c) when anticipated beliefs have higher valence (Experiment 2C). This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.