Jason Brennan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jason Brennan has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Lisa Hill
University of Adelaide
4 shared publicationsChristopher Freiman
West Virginia University
3 shared publications- Christopher Freiman
Department of Philosophy, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, USA
3 shared publications - Christopher Freiman
West Virginia University
2 shared publications - Lisa Hill
Adelaide University
2 shared publications Peter Jaworski
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- p. 1-17
Against laissez-faire democracy
This paper argues that the standard rationale for regulating markets also applies to democracy. Economists and philosophers commonly defend government intervention in markets on the grounds that markets predictably suffer from failures such as public goods problems, information asymmetries, principal–agent dilemmas, lack of competition, irrationality, and externalities. Democratic politics exhibits the same failures – often more severely – yet is typically assumed to be exempt from regulation. We challenge this asymmetry by showing that the justificatory structure for market regulation straightforwardly extends to democratic processes. We sketch a range of equality-preserving interventions – such as participation incentives, disclosure and promise-tracking mechanisms, transparent ballot design, and safeguards against catastrophic risks – that regulate democracy without abolishing it. Just as regulating markets is not the same as abolishing them, regulating democratic processes is not undemocratic. Recognizing this parity reframes debates about institutional design and opens a new research agenda in democratic theory.
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- p. 1-17
Open AccessAgainst laissez-faire democracy
This paper argues that the standard rationale for regulating markets also applies to democracy. Economists and philosophers commonly defend government intervention in markets on the grounds that markets predictably suffer from failures such as public goods problems, information asymmetries, principal–agent dilemmas, lack of competition, irrationality, and externalities. Democratic politics exhibits the same failures – often more severely – yet is typically assumed to be exempt from regulation. We challenge this asymmetry by showing that the justificatory structure for market regulation straightforwardly extends to democratic processes. We sketch a range of equality-preserving interventions – such as participation incentives, disclosure and promise-tracking mechanisms, transparent ballot design, and safeguards against catastrophic risks – that regulate democracy without abolishing it. Just as regulating markets is not the same as abolishing them, regulating democratic processes is not undemocratic. Recognizing this parity reframes debates about institutional design and opens a new research agenda in democratic theory.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (11) , 3499-3517
More representative or smarter, but not both: the democratic dilemma in lottocracy
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (11) , 3499-3517
More representative or smarter, but not both: the democratic dilemma in lottocracy
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review
- p. 1-16
Hand-Waving the New Democratic Skeptics
Almost all social scientists agree that, broadly speaking, democracies outperform the other major forms of government. Almost everyone also agrees that real-world democracies have systematic flaws,...
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review
- p. 1-16
Hand-Waving the New Democratic Skeptics
Almost all social scientists agree that, broadly speaking, democracies outperform the other major forms of government. Almost everyone also agrees that real-world democracies have systematic flaws,...
- Open Access
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Social Philosophy and Policy
- Vol. 42 (1) , 16-36
Beneficence Beyond Charity: Earning as Giving
Duties of beneficence are general, impersonal obligations to promote the welfare and meet the needs of strangers. Many laypeople and philosophers presume that duties of beneficence are primarily met through volunteering or donating to various causes. More recently, some business ethicists and activists in the effective altruist camp have argued that social enterprise can be a way to exercise beneficence. This essay argues that most of us exercise beneficence, and discharge many or perhaps all of our duties of beneficence, by holding normal jobs and doing normal productive work.
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Social Philosophy and Policy
- Vol. 42 (1) , 16-36
Open AccessBeneficence Beyond Charity: Earning as Giving
Duties of beneficence are general, impersonal obligations to promote the welfare and meet the needs of strangers. Many laypeople and philosophers presume that duties of beneficence are primarily met through volunteering or donating to various causes. More recently, some business ethicists and activists in the effective altruist camp have argued that social enterprise can be a way to exercise beneficence. This essay argues that most of us exercise beneficence, and discharge many or perhaps all of our duties of beneficence, by holding normal jobs and doing normal productive work.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 527-536
There Is No Institutional Duty to Vote
Arguments for a duty to vote face the particularity problem—that is, they must show that voting in particular is the only way for citizens to achieve the relevant moral goal (e.g., promote the common good or avoid complicity in injustice), such that the goal cannot be achieved by activities other than voting. Kevin Elliott attempts to overcome the particularity problem by defending a universal duty to vote on the grounds that universal voter turnout is needed to ensure that democratic institutions function properly. We argue that Elliott’s attempt is unsuccessful. It is unable to explain why citizens may not promote turnout without voting; moreover, it does not establish that democratic institutions are morally special, such that citizens are obligated to contribute to them but not to other valuable institutions.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 527-536
Open AccessThere Is No Institutional Duty to Vote
Arguments for a duty to vote face the particularity problem—that is, they must show that voting in particular is the only way for citizens to achieve the relevant moral goal (e.g., promote the common good or avoid complicity in injustice), such that the goal cannot be achieved by activities other than voting. Kevin Elliott attempts to overcome the particularity problem by defending a universal duty to vote on the grounds that universal voter turnout is needed to ensure that democratic institutions function properly. We argue that Elliott’s attempt is unsuccessful. It is unable to explain why citizens may not promote turnout without voting; moreover, it does not establish that democratic institutions are morally special, such that citizens are obligated to contribute to them but not to other valuable institutions.
- 10 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy of Management
- Vol. 24 (1) , 37-53
Bad Judges: Why Companies Should Not Police Employees’ Extramural Speech
- 10 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy of Management
- Vol. 24 (1) , 37-53
Bad Judges: Why Companies Should Not Police Employees’ Extramural Speech
- 6 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 173-184
Vote buying and campaign finance
This chapter examines the most substantial objection to commodifying votes, which holds that the commodification of votes would corrupt democracy by preventing democracies from implementing policies which best serve citizens’ interests, or which best reflect their preferences. This chapter challenges such arguments by showing, first, that paying people to vote is morally superior to compulsory voting, second, that certain forms of vote commodification do not run afoul of this objection, and third, that the objections to vote commodification turn out to apply also to many uncommodified votes.
- 6 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 173-184
Vote buying and campaign finance
This chapter examines the most substantial objection to commodifying votes, which holds that the commodification of votes would corrupt democracy by preventing democracies from implementing policies which best serve citizens’ interests, or which best reflect their preferences. This chapter challenges such arguments by showing, first, that paying people to vote is morally superior to compulsory voting, second, that certain forms of vote commodification do not run afoul of this objection, and third, that the objections to vote commodification turn out to apply also to many uncommodified votes.
- Open Access
- 14 February 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 98 (2) , 191-214
Friendship and Blackballing for Bad Beliefs
Many people believe that we should not be friends with others if they have bad enough moral and political beliefs. For instance, they think that we should not befriend KKK members or Nazis. However, not all errors in moral and political belief disqualify people from friendship. If so, then there is some line to be drawn somewhere which indicates when a person's beliefs are bad enough that we should not befriend them. This paper considers many candidate proposals for how and why to draw the line, including that beliefs might be extreme, be held irrationally, dehumanize others, are unreasonable, and more. However, upon inspection, each candidate proposal fails. They either provide the wrong kind of reason to reject people as friends, or they fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’ beliefs. There are various arguments in favour of rejecting people from friendship on the basis of their bad beliefs, but these arguments also fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’. Thus, this paper concludes there is a genuine puzzle: we should indeed blackball some people from friendship when their beliefs are bad enough, but we do not have even a rough specification of what counts as bad enough.
- 14 February 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 98 (2) , 191-214
Open AccessFriendship and Blackballing for Bad Beliefs
Many people believe that we should not be friends with others if they have bad enough moral and political beliefs. For instance, they think that we should not befriend KKK members or Nazis. However, not all errors in moral and political belief disqualify people from friendship. If so, then there is some line to be drawn somewhere which indicates when a person's beliefs are bad enough that we should not befriend them. This paper considers many candidate proposals for how and why to draw the line, including that beliefs might be extreme, be held irrationally, dehumanize others, are unreasonable, and more. However, upon inspection, each candidate proposal fails. They either provide the wrong kind of reason to reject people as friends, or they fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’ beliefs. There are various arguments in favour of rejecting people from friendship on the basis of their bad beliefs, but these arguments also fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’. Thus, this paper concludes there is a genuine puzzle: we should indeed blackball some people from friendship when their beliefs are bad enough, but we do not have even a rough specification of what counts as bad enough.
- 26 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 187 (3) , 433-447
Diversity for Justice vs. Diversity for Performance: Philosophical and Empirical Tensions
- 26 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 187 (3) , 433-447
Diversity for Justice vs. Diversity for Performance: Philosophical and Empirical Tensions
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
MARKETS WITHOUT LIMITS
May you sell your spare kidney? May gay men pay surrogates to bear them children? Should we allow betting markets on terrorist attacks and natural disasters? May spouses pay each other to do the dishes, watch the kids, or have sex? Should we allow the rich to genetically engineer gifted, beautiful children? May you ever sell your vote? Most people—and many philosophers—shudder at these questions. To put some goods and services for sale offends human dignity. If everything is commodified, then nothing is sacred. The market corrodes our character. In this expanded second edition of Markets without Limits, Jason Brennan and Peter M. Jaworski say it is now past time to give markets a fair hearing. The market does not, the authors claim, introduce wrongness where there was not any previously. Thus, the question of what rightfully may be bought and sold has a simple answer: if you may do it for free, you may do it for money. Contrary to the conservative consensus, Brennan and Jaworski claim there are no inherent limits to what can be bought and sold, but only restrictions on how we buy and sell. Key Updates and Revisions to the Second Edition: Includes revised introductory chapters to further clarify what’s at stake in the commodification debate. Provides easier-to-follow chapters on semiotic objections, stronger analyses of these objections, and more evidence of these objections’ widespread pervasiveness. Offers cogent responses to several recent papers that have raised counterexamples to the authors’ thesis. Includes new empirical evidence on the ways markets sometimes crowd in virtue and altruism. Analyzes the topics of blackmail and "associative" objections to markets. Includes new material on issues surrounding exploitation and coercion, selling citizenship, residency rights, and arguments about "dignity" as objections to markets.
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
MARKETS WITHOUT LIMITS
May you sell your spare kidney? May gay men pay surrogates to bear them children? Should we allow betting markets on terrorist attacks and natural disasters? May spouses pay each other to do the dishes, watch the kids, or have sex? Should we allow the rich to genetically engineer gifted, beautiful children? May you ever sell your vote? Most people—and many philosophers—shudder at these questions. To put some goods and services for sale offends human dignity. If everything is commodified, then nothing is sacred. The market corrodes our character. In this expanded second edition of Markets without Limits, Jason Brennan and Peter M. Jaworski say it is now past time to give markets a fair hearing. The market does not, the authors claim, introduce wrongness where there was not any previously. Thus, the question of what rightfully may be bought and sold has a simple answer: if you may do it for free, you may do it for money. Contrary to the conservative consensus, Brennan and Jaworski claim there are no inherent limits to what can be bought and sold, but only restrictions on how we buy and sell. Key Updates and Revisions to the Second Edition: Includes revised introductory chapters to further clarify what’s at stake in the commodification debate. Provides easier-to-follow chapters on semiotic objections, stronger analyses of these objections, and more evidence of these objections’ widespread pervasiveness. Offers cogent responses to several recent papers that have raised counterexamples to the authors’ thesis. Includes new empirical evidence on the ways markets sometimes crowd in virtue and altruism. Analyzes the topics of blackmail and "associative" objections to markets. Includes new material on issues surrounding exploitation and coercion, selling citizenship, residency rights, and arguments about "dignity" as objections to markets.