Matthew Neil Williams
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Matthew Neil Williams has a total of 84 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stephen Robert Hill
Massey University Palmerston North New Zealand
13 shared publications - John Richard Kerr
Department of Public Health University of Otago Wellington New Zealand
7 shared publications - Mathew Dacosta Marques
School of Psychology and Public Health La Trobe University Melbourne Victoria Australia
7 shared publications - Mathew Ling
Deakin University
7 shared publications - Edward John Roy Clarke
Philipps‐Universität Marburg Marburg Germany
5 shared publications - Liesje Donkin
Auckland University of Technology
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
Searching for the Core of Conspiracy Belief Systems: The Relationship Between Specific Beliefs and Generic Mentality
Conspiracism is commonly measured through specific conspiracy beliefs and generalized conspiracy mentality, a broad tendency to suspect conspiracies behind events. Researchers often assume that these measures are psychometrically distinct and that mentality accounts for correlations among beliefs. We evaluate the cross‐sectional statistical implications of these assumptions using psychological network analysis in three comparative studies spanning nearly 30,000 respondents, 17 country samples and multiple validated scales. Mentality and beliefs are generally distinguishable, but their structural relationship varies across measurement strategies. With a comparative cross‐national belief battery, Study 1 falsifies the mentality‐centred account in seven of eight countries; the belief‐centred account is supported in France and falsified nowhere. Study 2, using salient US‐specific beliefs, points towards the mentality‐centred account, although both tests are inconclusive. With country‐specific beliefs, Study 3 falsifies the mentality‐centred account in six countries and the belief‐centred account in all eight. These findings challenge the view that conspiracy mentality consistently organizes beliefs and underscore the importance of how both constructs are measured.
- 27 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
Open AccessSearching for the Core of Conspiracy Belief Systems: The Relationship Between Specific Beliefs and Generic Mentality
Conspiracism is commonly measured through specific conspiracy beliefs and generalized conspiracy mentality, a broad tendency to suspect conspiracies behind events. Researchers often assume that these measures are psychometrically distinct and that mentality accounts for correlations among beliefs. We evaluate the cross‐sectional statistical implications of these assumptions using psychological network analysis in three comparative studies spanning nearly 30,000 respondents, 17 country samples and multiple validated scales. Mentality and beliefs are generally distinguishable, but their structural relationship varies across measurement strategies. With a comparative cross‐national belief battery, Study 1 falsifies the mentality‐centred account in seven of eight countries; the belief‐centred account is supported in France and falsified nowhere. Study 2, using salient US‐specific beliefs, points towards the mentality‐centred account, although both tests are inconclusive. With country‐specific beliefs, Study 3 falsifies the mentality‐centred account in six countries and the belief‐centred account in all eight. These findings challenge the view that conspiracy mentality consistently organizes beliefs and underscore the importance of how both constructs are measured.
- Open Access
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Social Psychology
- Vol. 4, 1892137
How does belief in conspiracy theories affect loneliness and connectedness? A longitudinal investigation
Introduction: Conspiracy theories are contentious, and conversations about conspiracy theories can generate conflict. It is therefore possible that developing beliefs in conspiracy theories may isolate a believer from friends and family, resulting in loneliness and reduced connectedness to others. However, evidence of such effects remains equivocal. We therefore report a preregistered longitudinal analysis testing for effects of belief in specific conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality on loneliness and connectedness (and vice versa). Method: We conducted a longitudinal panel study ( N = 839) using 12 waves collected over 11 months. We analyzed data using random intercept cross-lagged panel models (RI-CLPMs) along with several alternative statistical models for cross-lagged data. Results: We found no evidence of an effect of belief in specific conspiracy theories on loneliness, nor of conspiracy mentality on either loneliness or connectedness. We did find evidence of a negative effect of belief in specific conspiracy theories on connectedness in our preregistered analyses, but this finding was not robust to alternative specifications. We found no evidence of converse effects (i.e., of connectedness and loneliness on belief in conspiracy theories or conspiracy mentality). Discussion: Our findings suggest that average within-person effects on loneliness and connectedness (over a 1-month lag period) were small and not robust across plausible model specifications. Nevertheless, our study was subject to several limitations, including modest power, vulnerability to time-varying confounds, and a sample with low mean levels of belief in conspiracy theories. Effects that are smaller than we had adequate power to detect, unfold over different time lags, or that are concentrated within subgroups (such as highly committed “believers”) remain possible, but would require further research to establish.
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Social Psychology
- Vol. 4, 1892137
Open AccessHow does belief in conspiracy theories affect loneliness and connectedness? A longitudinal investigation
Introduction: Conspiracy theories are contentious, and conversations about conspiracy theories can generate conflict. It is therefore possible that developing beliefs in conspiracy theories may isolate a believer from friends and family, resulting in loneliness and reduced connectedness to others. However, evidence of such effects remains equivocal. We therefore report a preregistered longitudinal analysis testing for effects of belief in specific conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality on loneliness and connectedness (and vice versa). Method: We conducted a longitudinal panel study ( N = 839) using 12 waves collected over 11 months. We analyzed data using random intercept cross-lagged panel models (RI-CLPMs) along with several alternative statistical models for cross-lagged data. Results: We found no evidence of an effect of belief in specific conspiracy theories on loneliness, nor of conspiracy mentality on either loneliness or connectedness. We did find evidence of a negative effect of belief in specific conspiracy theories on connectedness in our preregistered analyses, but this finding was not robust to alternative specifications. We found no evidence of converse effects (i.e., of connectedness and loneliness on belief in conspiracy theories or conspiracy mentality). Discussion: Our findings suggest that average within-person effects on loneliness and connectedness (over a 1-month lag period) were small and not robust across plausible model specifications. Nevertheless, our study was subject to several limitations, including modest power, vulnerability to time-varying confounds, and a sample with low mean levels of belief in conspiracy theories. Effects that are smaller than we had adequate power to detect, unfold over different time lags, or that are concentrated within subgroups (such as highly committed “believers”) remain possible, but would require further research to establish.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 6 May 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 13 (5)
Do you really believe that? Examining the prevalence and predictors of belief in conspiracy theories when accounting for insincerity
Recent research suggests that some survey respondents who endorse conspiracy theories are responding insincerely. However, it is unclear to what extent this problem may distort important empirical findings with respect to conspiracy theories. In this registered report, we recruited a demographically representative quota sample of the New Zealand population (n = 810), and probed sincerity by two methods: presenting a farcically bizarre conspiracy theory and explicitly asking respondents if they had been insincere in any of their responses. We found that respondents classified as insincere according to either of these methods displayed substantially higher levels of conspiracy theory endorsement. Respondents who displayed signs of insincerity were also much more likely to endorse contradictory conspiracy theories. Furthermore, we found that the relationships between endorsement of conspiracy theories and well-established predictors (paranoia, belief in a dangerous world, cognitive reflection, and trust, but not anxiety) had significant interactions with insincerity. While some uncertainty remains about the validity of the methods that we used to detect insincerity, our findings suggest that insincere responses may distort empirical findings relating to belief in conspiracy theories. Researchers should not assume that every survey respondent who endorses a conspiracy theory believes that theory.
- 6 May 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 13 (5)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDo you really believe that? Examining the prevalence and predictors of belief in conspiracy theories when accounting for insincerity
Recent research suggests that some survey respondents who endorse conspiracy theories are responding insincerely. However, it is unclear to what extent this problem may distort important empirical findings with respect to conspiracy theories. In this registered report, we recruited a demographically representative quota sample of the New Zealand population (n = 810), and probed sincerity by two methods: presenting a farcically bizarre conspiracy theory and explicitly asking respondents if they had been insincere in any of their responses. We found that respondents classified as insincere according to either of these methods displayed substantially higher levels of conspiracy theory endorsement. Respondents who displayed signs of insincerity were also much more likely to endorse contradictory conspiracy theories. Furthermore, we found that the relationships between endorsement of conspiracy theories and well-established predictors (paranoia, belief in a dangerous world, cognitive reflection, and trust, but not anxiety) had significant interactions with insincerity. While some uncertainty remains about the validity of the methods that we used to detect insincerity, our findings suggest that insincere responses may distort empirical findings relating to belief in conspiracy theories. Researchers should not assume that every survey respondent who endorses a conspiracy theory believes that theory.
- Open Access
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Leibniz Institute for Psychology (ZPID) in Europe’s Journal of Psychology
- Vol. 22 (1) , 21-45
Does conflictual dialogue improve a story?
According to creative writing experts, adding conflict to dialogue improves story quality and audience reaction to that story. This idea draws from the widely held theory that conflict is vital for dramatic stories. Yet despite conflict’s seeming centrality, experimental research into its effects is limited. We take a small step in addressing this shortfall, by examining whether one type of conflict — adversarial dialogue — improves story quality, and audience response. In a pilot, and two similar studies, we manipulated stories to create different levels of conflictual dialogue, in repeated measures experiments. Forty-seven participants in the first study and 194 in the second, read stories with different levels of conflict, and then rated them on a series of measures (the Perceived Quality Index in the first experiment, the Audience Response Scale, with supplementary questions on boredom and story quality in the second). While the conflict manipulation was successful, it produced no significant difference in these outcome measures in the two experiments. These results do not support the study hypothesis that manipulating isolated adversarial dialogue has a positive effect on stories but would be compatible with alternative theories of conflict in stories.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Leibniz Institute for Psychology (ZPID) in Europe’s Journal of Psychology
- Vol. 22 (1) , 21-45
Open AccessDoes conflictual dialogue improve a story?
According to creative writing experts, adding conflict to dialogue improves story quality and audience reaction to that story. This idea draws from the widely held theory that conflict is vital for dramatic stories. Yet despite conflict’s seeming centrality, experimental research into its effects is limited. We take a small step in addressing this shortfall, by examining whether one type of conflict — adversarial dialogue — improves story quality, and audience response. In a pilot, and two similar studies, we manipulated stories to create different levels of conflictual dialogue, in repeated measures experiments. Forty-seven participants in the first study and 194 in the second, read stories with different levels of conflict, and then rated them on a series of measures (the Perceived Quality Index in the first experiment, the Audience Response Scale, with supplementary questions on boredom and story quality in the second). While the conflict manipulation was successful, it produced no significant difference in these outcome measures in the two experiments. These results do not support the study hypothesis that manipulating isolated adversarial dialogue has a positive effect on stories but would be compatible with alternative theories of conflict in stories.
- 29 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 65 (1) , e70037
Testing the socio‐functional model: Does precarity cause conspiracy belief?
Research seeking to explain why people believe conspiracies has largely focused on intrapsychic factors, but there is growing research examining structural‐level elements of disadvantage. The socio‐functional model of conspiracy belief (Adam‐Troian et al., 2023, British Journal of Social Psychology , 62 , 136) posits that subjective feelings of permanent insecurity arising from objective material strain (i.e., precarity) cause conspiracy belief directly or indirectly through institutional distrust. Across three preregistered studies using observational longitudinal designs over 3 ( n = 637) and 11 months ( n = 832), and a between‐group experimental design ( n = 285), we use various methods to estimate causal effects for this proposition during the current cost‐of‐living crisis. In Studies 1 and 2 using random intercept cross‐lagged panel models, we find no evidence that increases in precarity temporally precede increases in conspiracy belief (or vice versa) but find stable between‐persons effects over time. In Study 3, despite successfully manipulating precarity using a self‐imagine paradigm, we find no direct or indirect effect on conspiracy belief through decreased government trust. We discuss the importance of using methods that permit credible causal inferences and key directions for future studies investigating the socio‐functional model.
- 29 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 65 (1) , e70037
Testing the socio‐functional model: Does precarity cause conspiracy belief?
Research seeking to explain why people believe conspiracies has largely focused on intrapsychic factors, but there is growing research examining structural‐level elements of disadvantage. The socio‐functional model of conspiracy belief (Adam‐Troian et al., 2023, British Journal of Social Psychology , 62 , 136) posits that subjective feelings of permanent insecurity arising from objective material strain (i.e., precarity) cause conspiracy belief directly or indirectly through institutional distrust. Across three preregistered studies using observational longitudinal designs over 3 ( n = 637) and 11 months ( n = 832), and a between‐group experimental design ( n = 285), we use various methods to estimate causal effects for this proposition during the current cost‐of‐living crisis. In Studies 1 and 2 using random intercept cross‐lagged panel models, we find no evidence that increases in precarity temporally precede increases in conspiracy belief (or vice versa) but find stable between‐persons effects over time. In Study 3, despite successfully manipulating precarity using a self‐imagine paradigm, we find no direct or indirect effect on conspiracy belief through decreased government trust. We discuss the importance of using methods that permit credible causal inferences and key directions for future studies investigating the socio‐functional model.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in International Review of Social Psychology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 15
Political Polarization and Wellbeing: Investigating Potential Intrapersonal Harm From Affective Polarization
Affective polarization—antipathy towards members of one’s political out-group—may pose challenges to social cohesion and personal wellbeing. Prior studies have suggested that one’s affective polarization may cause intrapersonal harm as well as interpersonal harm. It has been associated with reduced social support, increased stress, and worse physical health. This pre-registered study investigated the intrapersonal harm of affective polarization using a six-wave longitudinal survey (N = 470). Affective polarization, social support, perceived stress, and self-rated health were measured fortnightly for three months preceding the 2024 US presidential election. Random intercept cross-lagged panel models were employed to investigate the within-person effects of affective polarization on these indicators of wellbeing. Contrary to hypotheses, none of the hypothesized cross-lagged effects were significant, suggesting that changes in affective polarization did not predict changes in social support, stress, or health. However, cross-sectional analyses did reflect past findings, showing that higher levels of affective polarization were associated with lower social support, greater stress, and worse health. We additionally found evidence for perceived stress causing moderate increases in affective polarization. Stable differences by political orientation were also observed in our sample, with liberals reporting higher affective polarization and stress, lower social support, and worse health. Despite the lack of significant effects, potentially due to limitations such as sample size and measurement constraints, our findings underscore the importance of further investigations with appropriate robust designs to clarify the relationship between affective polarization and wellbeing. These results challenge the assumption that affective polarization directly drives declines in wellbeing.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in International Review of Social Psychology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 15
Open AccessPolitical Polarization and Wellbeing: Investigating Potential Intrapersonal Harm From Affective Polarization
Affective polarization—antipathy towards members of one’s political out-group—may pose challenges to social cohesion and personal wellbeing. Prior studies have suggested that one’s affective polarization may cause intrapersonal harm as well as interpersonal harm. It has been associated with reduced social support, increased stress, and worse physical health. This pre-registered study investigated the intrapersonal harm of affective polarization using a six-wave longitudinal survey (N = 470). Affective polarization, social support, perceived stress, and self-rated health were measured fortnightly for three months preceding the 2024 US presidential election. Random intercept cross-lagged panel models were employed to investigate the within-person effects of affective polarization on these indicators of wellbeing. Contrary to hypotheses, none of the hypothesized cross-lagged effects were significant, suggesting that changes in affective polarization did not predict changes in social support, stress, or health. However, cross-sectional analyses did reflect past findings, showing that higher levels of affective polarization were associated with lower social support, greater stress, and worse health. We additionally found evidence for perceived stress causing moderate increases in affective polarization. Stable differences by political orientation were also observed in our sample, with liberals reporting higher affective polarization and stress, lower social support, and worse health. Despite the lack of significant effects, potentially due to limitations such as sample size and measurement constraints, our findings underscore the importance of further investigations with appropriate robust designs to clarify the relationship between affective polarization and wellbeing. These results challenge the assumption that affective polarization directly drives declines in wellbeing.
- Open Access
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 47 (4)
Extremism at the center: Uncovering political diversity among midpoint responders on the left–right self‐placement item
The midpoint of the left‐right self‐placement item is the most populated of all response options. While genuinely‐centrist responders opt to self‐place there, it is also a convenient response option for those that cannot easily fit their politics to the left‐right spectrum. Those with populist attitudes may also see the midpoint as an appropriate self‐placement option, due to the thin‐centered nature of populist ideology. In support of this, midpoint responders score similarly to the extreme ends of the spectrum on variables related to political system attitudes, including conspiracy beliefs and institutional trust, resulting in W‐shaped relationships. Our research investigated the extent to which midpoint bumps exist across common political issues and political system attitudes, and whether subgroups of populist midpoint responders explain them. Using data from the Australian Election Study (N = 2179) and the American National Election Study (N = 8280), we found W‐ and M‐shaped polynomial relationships primarily on attitudes towards the political system and toward immigrants. We then conducted Latent Profile Analyses on midpoint responders, using these items, finding at least one profile in each sample that represented a response pattern indicative of populist belief strands.
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 47 (4)
Open AccessExtremism at the center: Uncovering political diversity among midpoint responders on the left–right self‐placement item
The midpoint of the left‐right self‐placement item is the most populated of all response options. While genuinely‐centrist responders opt to self‐place there, it is also a convenient response option for those that cannot easily fit their politics to the left‐right spectrum. Those with populist attitudes may also see the midpoint as an appropriate self‐placement option, due to the thin‐centered nature of populist ideology. In support of this, midpoint responders score similarly to the extreme ends of the spectrum on variables related to political system attitudes, including conspiracy beliefs and institutional trust, resulting in W‐shaped relationships. Our research investigated the extent to which midpoint bumps exist across common political issues and political system attitudes, and whether subgroups of populist midpoint responders explain them. Using data from the Australian Election Study (N = 2179) and the American National Election Study (N = 8280), we found W‐ and M‐shaped polynomial relationships primarily on attitudes towards the political system and toward immigrants. We then conducted Latent Profile Analyses on midpoint responders, using these items, finding at least one profile in each sample that represented a response pattern indicative of populist belief strands.
- Open Access
- 29 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Clinical Psychological Science
- Vol. 14 (3) , 296-311
Do Stress, Depression, and Anxiety Lead to Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories?
Previous research has found positive correlations between manifestations of psychological distress, such as anxiety, depression, and stress, and belief in conspiracy theories. However, it remains unclear whether these relationships represent causal effects. We therefore tested whether anxiety, depression, and stress affect (and are affected by) belief in conspiracy theories in a preregistered longitudinal study. We sampled participants from Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom ( N = 970) in seven monthly waves (October 2022–March 2023). Using multiple-indicator random-intercept cross-lagged panel models, we found support for only one of 15 preregistered hypotheses: a small cross-lagged effect of anxiety on belief in conspiracy theories. We also found no evidence of belief in conspiracy theories itself provoking psychological distress. Our findings provide grounds for skepticism of the notion that beliefs in conspiracy theories are often motivated by psychological distress or feelings of “existential threat.”
- 29 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Clinical Psychological Science
- Vol. 14 (3) , 296-311
Open AccessDo Stress, Depression, and Anxiety Lead to Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories?
Previous research has found positive correlations between manifestations of psychological distress, such as anxiety, depression, and stress, and belief in conspiracy theories. However, it remains unclear whether these relationships represent causal effects. We therefore tested whether anxiety, depression, and stress affect (and are affected by) belief in conspiracy theories in a preregistered longitudinal study. We sampled participants from Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom ( N = 970) in seven monthly waves (October 2022–March 2023). Using multiple-indicator random-intercept cross-lagged panel models, we found support for only one of 15 preregistered hypotheses: a small cross-lagged effect of anxiety on belief in conspiracy theories. We also found no evidence of belief in conspiracy theories itself provoking psychological distress. Our findings provide grounds for skepticism of the notion that beliefs in conspiracy theories are often motivated by psychological distress or feelings of “existential threat.”
- Open Access
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
- Vol. 128
Communicating natural hazards science advice: Understanding scientists', decision-makers’, and the public's perceptions of the scientific process
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
- Vol. 128
Open AccessCommunicating natural hazards science advice: Understanding scientists', decision-makers’, and the public's perceptions of the scientific process
- Open Access
- 7 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (3)
Does Truth Pay? Investigating the Effectiveness of the Bayesian Truth Serum With an Interim Payment: A Registered Report
Self-report data are vital in psychological research, but biases such as careless responding and socially desirable responding can compromise their validity. Although various methods are employed to mitigate these biases, they have limitations. The Bayesian truth serum (BTS) offers a survey scoring method to incentivize truthfulness by leveraging correlations between personal and collective opinions and rewarding “surprisingly common” responses. In this study, we evaluated the effectiveness of the BTS in mitigating socially desirable responding to sensitive questions and tested whether an interim payment could enhance its efficacy by increasing trust. In a between-subjects experimental survey, 877 participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: BTS, BTS with interim payment, and regular incentive (RI). Contrary to the hypotheses, participants in the BTS conditions displayed lower agreement with socially undesirable statements compared with the RI condition. The interim payment did not significantly enhance the BTS’s effectiveness. Instead, response patterns diverged from the mechanism’s intended effects, raising concerns about its robustness. As the second registered report to challenge its efficacy, this study’s results cast serious doubt on the BTS as a reliable tool for mitigating socially desirable responding and improving the validity of self-report data in psychological research.
- 7 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (3)
Open AccessDoes Truth Pay? Investigating the Effectiveness of the Bayesian Truth Serum With an Interim Payment: A Registered Report
Self-report data are vital in psychological research, but biases such as careless responding and socially desirable responding can compromise their validity. Although various methods are employed to mitigate these biases, they have limitations. The Bayesian truth serum (BTS) offers a survey scoring method to incentivize truthfulness by leveraging correlations between personal and collective opinions and rewarding “surprisingly common” responses. In this study, we evaluated the effectiveness of the BTS in mitigating socially desirable responding to sensitive questions and tested whether an interim payment could enhance its efficacy by increasing trust. In a between-subjects experimental survey, 877 participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: BTS, BTS with interim payment, and regular incentive (RI). Contrary to the hypotheses, participants in the BTS conditions displayed lower agreement with socially undesirable statements compared with the RI condition. The interim payment did not significantly enhance the BTS’s effectiveness. Instead, response patterns diverged from the mechanism’s intended effects, raising concerns about its robustness. As the second registered report to challenge its efficacy, this study’s results cast serious doubt on the BTS as a reliable tool for mitigating socially desirable responding and improving the validity of self-report data in psychological research.