Helena Lopes
Research Subjects
Helena Lopes has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Teresa Calapez
ISCTE, University Institute of Lisbon, Portugal
8 shared publications Christophe Clerc
2 shared publications- José Castro Caldas
Employment and Social Protection (CoLABOR)
2 shared publications Sérgio Lagoa
2 shared publications- Sérgio Lagoa
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), DINВMIA’CET-IUL, Lisboa, Portugal
2 shared publications - Ana Cordeiro Santos
Universidade de Coimbra
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management
- Vol. 48 (4) , 1-19
Precarity and dualism in higher education diagnosing their consequences and assessing Portuguese and Spanish policies
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management
- Vol. 48 (4) , 1-19
Precarity and dualism in higher education diagnosing their consequences and assessing Portuguese and Spanish policies
- 4 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 52-67
The firm considered from the work standpoint – why do workers cooperate?
The chapter presents the theoretical building blocks of the authority-based conception of the firm. Understanding the functioning of firms entails understanding why workers cooperate and obey managerial authority. This requires a conception of work and of human behaviour. The way humans experience work must be considered when firms are defined in substantive – that is, productive, not contractual – terms. The first reason workers cooperate derives from the characteristics of work activity, which entails cognitive and affective involvement with work. The second is due to the cooperative and compliance-with-authority norms that emerge from the social interactions in which workers engage while working. To understand firms, we must go beyond calculative rationality and contemplate humans’ emotional and moral abilities – the concern for a job well done, the ability and disposition to jointly develop cooperative norms. These norms stem from the fact that production in firms is a collective venture, an economic venture organised through political means – managerial authority. The political nature of the firm is discussed and the issue of the legitimacy of managerial authority, raised in Chapter 2, is further addressed.
- 4 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 52-67
The firm considered from the work standpoint – why do workers cooperate?
The chapter presents the theoretical building blocks of the authority-based conception of the firm. Understanding the functioning of firms entails understanding why workers cooperate and obey managerial authority. This requires a conception of work and of human behaviour. The way humans experience work must be considered when firms are defined in substantive – that is, productive, not contractual – terms. The first reason workers cooperate derives from the characteristics of work activity, which entails cognitive and affective involvement with work. The second is due to the cooperative and compliance-with-authority norms that emerge from the social interactions in which workers engage while working. To understand firms, we must go beyond calculative rationality and contemplate humans’ emotional and moral abilities – the concern for a job well done, the ability and disposition to jointly develop cooperative norms. These norms stem from the fact that production in firms is a collective venture, an economic venture organised through political means – managerial authority. The political nature of the firm is discussed and the issue of the legitimacy of managerial authority, raised in Chapter 2, is further addressed.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 14-32
The agency theory of the firm – discarding authority and the collective
The chapter provides a critical analysis of the agency theory of the firm and its influence on corporate governance. It begins by highlighting that agency theory emerged in the context of the debates on corporate law in the USA in the 1960s–1970s to supply academic support to those striving against corporate regulation. It then examines the theoretical building blocks of agency theory, namely its conception of human behaviour and the notions of agency costs and principal-agent relationships. Agency theory defines firms as nexus of contracts. It denies that firms have a collective dimension, which means denying the need for, and exercise of, power within firms. The specificity of the employment contract as enshrined in labour law, namely unequal power and an authority relationship, is expressly discarded. In the agency literature, “authority” is meant to refer to scope of discretion. The authority and subordination phenomena are entirely overlooked. The chapter ends by illustrating the extent to which agency theory and its simplistic theoretical claims succeeded in influencing corporate law and corporate governance practices, with severely detrimental consequences.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 14-32
The agency theory of the firm – discarding authority and the collective
The chapter provides a critical analysis of the agency theory of the firm and its influence on corporate governance. It begins by highlighting that agency theory emerged in the context of the debates on corporate law in the USA in the 1960s–1970s to supply academic support to those striving against corporate regulation. It then examines the theoretical building blocks of agency theory, namely its conception of human behaviour and the notions of agency costs and principal-agent relationships. Agency theory defines firms as nexus of contracts. It denies that firms have a collective dimension, which means denying the need for, and exercise of, power within firms. The specificity of the employment contract as enshrined in labour law, namely unequal power and an authority relationship, is expressly discarded. In the agency literature, “authority” is meant to refer to scope of discretion. The authority and subordination phenomena are entirely overlooked. The chapter ends by illustrating the extent to which agency theory and its simplistic theoretical claims succeeded in influencing corporate law and corporate governance practices, with severely detrimental consequences.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Political Economy of the Firm
An alternative theory of the firm is needed that helps better understand the nature and actual functioning of firms as well as the challenges raised by digital platform firms. In defining firms as economic collective ventures organised by political means, this book offers a “political economy” vision of firms. Specifically, the book provides an authority-based conception of the firm that supplies a theoretical grounding for democratic governance. It is argued that workers must be viewed as actors of the firm, not passive subjects of capital, given that authority is a non-coercive form of power. The book examines authority and subordination from the workers’ perspective and argues that when workers accept authority, it is because they see it as facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation between people with divergent interests. As managerial authority is based on its acceptance by workers, it calls for legitimacy. Neither ownership nor the function that authority performs makes it legitimate. The book shows that legitimacy entails the democratisation of corporate governance, within the framework of “pluralistic companies”, and thus joins the many voices that increasingly question shareholder primacy. The book will be of great interest to researchers and students in economics and law as well as labour professionals, employers, unions, policymakers and anybody interested in economic democracy.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Political Economy of the Firm
An alternative theory of the firm is needed that helps better understand the nature and actual functioning of firms as well as the challenges raised by digital platform firms. In defining firms as economic collective ventures organised by political means, this book offers a “political economy” vision of firms. Specifically, the book provides an authority-based conception of the firm that supplies a theoretical grounding for democratic governance. It is argued that workers must be viewed as actors of the firm, not passive subjects of capital, given that authority is a non-coercive form of power. The book examines authority and subordination from the workers’ perspective and argues that when workers accept authority, it is because they see it as facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation between people with divergent interests. As managerial authority is based on its acceptance by workers, it calls for legitimacy. Neither ownership nor the function that authority performs makes it legitimate. The book shows that legitimacy entails the democratisation of corporate governance, within the framework of “pluralistic companies”, and thus joins the many voices that increasingly question shareholder primacy. The book will be of great interest to researchers and students in economics and law as well as labour professionals, employers, unions, policymakers and anybody interested in economic democracy.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-13
Introduction
This introductory chapter presents the major arguments and contributions of the political economy conception of the firm developed in the book. It specifies that firms are examined from the standpoint of labour, not capital, and that authority differs from authoritarianism in that it is a non-coercive form of power. The innovative features of the authority-based conception of the firm derive from the non-coercive character of authority, which implies seeing workers as actors rather than passive subjects of the firm, and consequently involving them in decision-making processes. Managerial authority calls for legitimacy, and this entails advocating democratic models of corporate governance. One of the major aims of the book is to contribute to a theoretical grounding for the democratic governance of firms.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-13
Introduction
This introductory chapter presents the major arguments and contributions of the political economy conception of the firm developed in the book. It specifies that firms are examined from the standpoint of labour, not capital, and that authority differs from authoritarianism in that it is a non-coercive form of power. The innovative features of the authority-based conception of the firm derive from the non-coercive character of authority, which implies seeing workers as actors rather than passive subjects of the firm, and consequently involving them in decision-making processes. Managerial authority calls for legitimacy, and this entails advocating democratic models of corporate governance. One of the major aims of the book is to contribute to a theoretical grounding for the democratic governance of firms.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 33-51
Authority in work organisations – definitions and challenges
The chapter develops an authority-based conception of the firm. It begins by examining the function of authority as a solution to collective action problems, and exploring the major challenge of authority, namely its alleged incompatibility with autonomy. Departing from the accounts that relate authority with a passive submission of subordinates, it defines authority as a non-coercive form of power and focusses on the reasons why workers obey. Building on Joseph Raz’s “service conception of authority”, it argues that workers accept authority because they see it as facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation between people with divergent interests. Managerial authority is justified in that it embodies the social and productive interdependence that characterises collective productive ventures. However, the function performed by authority does not make it legitimate, nor does ownership of productive assets legitimate its exercise. The chapter then addresses the question: “what conditions must managerial authority meet for workers to have a duty to subject their will to those of authority?”. The answer is that if managerial authority is to be legitimate, it must (also) serve the workers’ interests. This calls for a democratic type of firm governance, with workers participating in decision-making instances.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 33-51
Authority in work organisations – definitions and challenges
The chapter develops an authority-based conception of the firm. It begins by examining the function of authority as a solution to collective action problems, and exploring the major challenge of authority, namely its alleged incompatibility with autonomy. Departing from the accounts that relate authority with a passive submission of subordinates, it defines authority as a non-coercive form of power and focusses on the reasons why workers obey. Building on Joseph Raz’s “service conception of authority”, it argues that workers accept authority because they see it as facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation between people with divergent interests. Managerial authority is justified in that it embodies the social and productive interdependence that characterises collective productive ventures. However, the function performed by authority does not make it legitimate, nor does ownership of productive assets legitimate its exercise. The chapter then addresses the question: “what conditions must managerial authority meet for workers to have a duty to subject their will to those of authority?”. The answer is that if managerial authority is to be legitimate, it must (also) serve the workers’ interests. This calls for a democratic type of firm governance, with workers participating in decision-making instances.
- 5 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in European Management Review
- Vol. 19 (4) , 598-607
The deontic basis of the firm—Implications for corporate governance
- 5 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in European Management Review
- Vol. 19 (4) , 598-607
The deontic basis of the firm—Implications for corporate governance
- 20 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of Political Economy
- Vol. 35 (2) , 494-509
The Centrality of Work: A Foundation for Political Economy
Building on Alfred Marshall's claim that political economy should be a science of activities rather than a science of wants, the paper proposes to ground political economy on the centrality of work. Work is central in three different senses: (i) factual — work plays a central role in human lives and societies; (ii) epistemic — giving work center stage has constitutive theoretical effects; (iii) political — work is a primary tool of and for the transformation of society. Grounding political economy on work entails prioritizing economic agents as workers/producers over economic agents as consumers and acknowledging that changes in the world of work are major drivers of history. This contrasts with mainstream economics, which has always overlooked the activity of work, giving priority to consumer sovereignty and treating work as if it were a commodity. We propose a concept of work, based on Dejours’ approach, that highlights the key role of work organization in making work a source of fulfillment versus suffering. The arguments and concepts proposed lead to advocating the participation of workers in firm governance.
- 20 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of Political Economy
- Vol. 35 (2) , 494-509
The Centrality of Work: A Foundation for Political Economy
Building on Alfred Marshall's claim that political economy should be a science of activities rather than a science of wants, the paper proposes to ground political economy on the centrality of work. Work is central in three different senses: (i) factual — work plays a central role in human lives and societies; (ii) epistemic — giving work center stage has constitutive theoretical effects; (iii) political — work is a primary tool of and for the transformation of society. Grounding political economy on work entails prioritizing economic agents as workers/producers over economic agents as consumers and acknowledging that changes in the world of work are major drivers of history. This contrasts with mainstream economics, which has always overlooked the activity of work, giving priority to consumer sovereignty and treating work as if it were a commodity. We propose a concept of work, based on Dejours’ approach, that highlights the key role of work organization in making work a source of fulfillment versus suffering. The arguments and concepts proposed lead to advocating the participation of workers in firm governance.
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Issues
- Vol. 54 (3) , 613-627
Taking Authority Seriously—Institutional Implications
: This article argues that the notion of authority involves key theoretical and institutional issues. Drawing on McMahon, I define authority as a collective and normative device whose justification is to facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation among people with divergent aims. I then show that agency theory, the economic theory of the firm that normatively influenced the shareholder governance model, denies that authority is a core attribute of firms. By contrast, an authority-based theory of the firm normatively demands that firms are governed by reflexive authority, a kind of workplace democracy in which the authoritative directives guiding workers’ behavior are collectively determined. I end by suggesting co-determination as a possible form of reflexive authority.
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Issues
- Vol. 54 (3) , 613-627
Taking Authority Seriously—Institutional Implications
: This article argues that the notion of authority involves key theoretical and institutional issues. Drawing on McMahon, I define authority as a collective and normative device whose justification is to facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation among people with divergent aims. I then show that agency theory, the economic theory of the firm that normatively influenced the shareholder governance model, denies that authority is a core attribute of firms. By contrast, an authority-based theory of the firm normatively demands that firms are governed by reflexive authority, a kind of workplace democracy in which the authoritative directives guiding workers’ behavior are collectively determined. I end by suggesting co-determination as a possible form of reflexive authority.
- 23 October 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in ILR Review
- Vol. 71 (3) , 760-788
Asymmetric Labor Market Reforms: Effects on Wage Growth and Conversion Probability of Fixed-Term Contracts
The authors investigate the impact of a change in employment protection laws in Portugal that increased the maximum legal duration of fixed-term contracts. They find that this reform led to a reduction in the probability that a worker on a fixed-term contract would be converted to a permanent contract. In addition, those workers who had their contracts converted experienced a significantly higher hourly wage growth at the time of conversion and faced a lower reduction in wage growth during the years in which the changed legislation was in force. Consequently, the implementation of this law led to a 27% increase in the wage-growth differential between the two contracts. The findings are based on an endogenous regime-switching model using rich administrative linked employer–employee data.
- 23 October 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in ILR Review
- Vol. 71 (3) , 760-788
Asymmetric Labor Market Reforms: Effects on Wage Growth and Conversion Probability of Fixed-Term Contracts
The authors investigate the impact of a change in employment protection laws in Portugal that increased the maximum legal duration of fixed-term contracts. They find that this reform led to a reduction in the probability that a worker on a fixed-term contract would be converted to a permanent contract. In addition, those workers who had their contracts converted experienced a significantly higher hourly wage growth at the time of conversion and faced a lower reduction in wage growth during the years in which the changed legislation was in force. Consequently, the implementation of this law led to a 27% increase in the wage-growth differential between the two contracts. The findings are based on an endogenous regime-switching model using rich administrative linked employer–employee data.