Barrie R. Nault
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Barrie R. Nault has a total of 74 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Albert S. Dexter
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business
7 shared publicationsXueqi (David) Wei
School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
4 shared publications- Zhuo (June) Cheng
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
4 shared publications Kunsoo Han
Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1G5, Canada
3 shared publicationsNeeraj Mittal
Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi-110001, India
3 shared publicationsRobert J. Kauffman
W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 37 (2) , 1304-1322
Content Moderation with Shadowbanning
Social media platforms face increasing pressure to moderate harmful content while preserving user engagement and free expression. We examine shadowbanning—a strategy that hides content without notifying the user—and compare it to traditional content removal. Our results show that if users only moderately believe that shadowbanning occurs, the platform benefits from a larger user base and higher profit, which also leads to greater social welfare than with content removal or no moderation. Shadowbanning allows the platform to reduce users’ exposure to extreme content without deterring content creators, enabling more participation of users across the extremeness spectrum. However, outcomes depend on user beliefs and the accuracy of moderation technology. When users are highly suspicious of shadowbanning or when moderation tools are significantly imperfect, the platform’s incentives—and the societal benefits—decline. These findings offer practical insights for platform designers and regulators: shadowbanning can be effective, but its benefits hinge on how transparently and accurately it is implemented. Policymakers should account for user perceptions and technological capabilities when evaluating or regulating opaque moderation strategies.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 37 (2) , 1304-1322
Content Moderation with Shadowbanning
Social media platforms face increasing pressure to moderate harmful content while preserving user engagement and free expression. We examine shadowbanning—a strategy that hides content without notifying the user—and compare it to traditional content removal. Our results show that if users only moderately believe that shadowbanning occurs, the platform benefits from a larger user base and higher profit, which also leads to greater social welfare than with content removal or no moderation. Shadowbanning allows the platform to reduce users’ exposure to extreme content without deterring content creators, enabling more participation of users across the extremeness spectrum. However, outcomes depend on user beliefs and the accuracy of moderation technology. When users are highly suspicious of shadowbanning or when moderation tools are significantly imperfect, the platform’s incentives—and the societal benefits—decline. These findings offer practical insights for platform designers and regulators: shadowbanning can be effective, but its benefits hinge on how transparently and accurately it is implemented. Policymakers should account for user perceptions and technological capabilities when evaluating or regulating opaque moderation strategies.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (5) , 3761-3779
Consequences of Resorting to Fines and Investments to Regulate Data Portability
Many jurisdictions have implemented data portability regulation (DPR) that requires that Data Controllers (DCs) enable users to download their personal data so that they can port their data to competing DCs. The intention of DPR is to return partial control of data to users, improve user choice of DCs, increase DC participation in the market, and reduce industry concentration. To achieve this, if nonmonetary corrective measures (e.g., warnings, orders to comply) to obtain portability compliance fail, then DPR allows policy-makers to impose fixed or variable (based on revenue) fines on DCs that do not comply. Additionally, policy-makers may invest to decrease compliance costs for DCs. We model this interaction as a two-stage game where in the first stage the policy-maker sets fines and makes investments. In the second stage DCs decide whether to participate in the market, and if so whether to comply with DPR. Contrary to the current regulatory objectives, we find that with partial compliance both fines and investments decrease DC participation and increase industry concentration. Comparing the use of fines and investment to achieve a predetermined level of compliance, the use of fixed fines has a smaller (larger) collateral effect on concentration (participation) than either variable fines or investment. Once all DCs that participate comply—full compliance—then additional investment increases participation. Moreover, full compliance and full participation can occur only if there is a DPR-induced demand expansion, such as from multihoming, and investment is the only instrument that can attain this outcome. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada [Grant RGPIN/06571-2015]; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2022-0460]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08404 .
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (5) , 3761-3779
Consequences of Resorting to Fines and Investments to Regulate Data Portability
Many jurisdictions have implemented data portability regulation (DPR) that requires that Data Controllers (DCs) enable users to download their personal data so that they can port their data to competing DCs. The intention of DPR is to return partial control of data to users, improve user choice of DCs, increase DC participation in the market, and reduce industry concentration. To achieve this, if nonmonetary corrective measures (e.g., warnings, orders to comply) to obtain portability compliance fail, then DPR allows policy-makers to impose fixed or variable (based on revenue) fines on DCs that do not comply. Additionally, policy-makers may invest to decrease compliance costs for DCs. We model this interaction as a two-stage game where in the first stage the policy-maker sets fines and makes investments. In the second stage DCs decide whether to participate in the market, and if so whether to comply with DPR. Contrary to the current regulatory objectives, we find that with partial compliance both fines and investments decrease DC participation and increase industry concentration. Comparing the use of fines and investment to achieve a predetermined level of compliance, the use of fixed fines has a smaller (larger) collateral effect on concentration (participation) than either variable fines or investment. Once all DCs that participate comply—full compliance—then additional investment increases participation. Moreover, full compliance and full participation can occur only if there is a DPR-induced demand expansion, such as from multihoming, and investment is the only instrument that can attain this outcome. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada [Grant RGPIN/06571-2015]; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2022-0460]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08404 .
- Open Access
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems
- Vol. 16 (3) , 1-37
IT Service Disruptions and Provider Choice
Digital supply chains are increasingly interconnected and vulnerable to disruption, causing service interruptions impacting many firms and their customers. Combating threats to the digital supply chain is the top challenge for leaders in most supply chain industries, demonstrated by the tacit approval of nation-states for cyber-attacks on corporate supply chains to disrupt downstream firms. Disruptions to digital supply chains are not new. In April 2019, hundreds of flights in the United States were delayed when a critical service provider, AeroData, had a computer systems failure. AeroData delivers flight planning services to many airlines, including Southwest, United, American, and Delta. All flight operations for AeroData’s more than 100 clients simultaneously ceased, and thousands of customers were stranded at airports across the country. In an increasingly connected business environment, competitors may be simultaneously disrupted due to a common service provider, impacting all affected firms’ demand. The synchronization of disruptions for firms that use a common service provider has implications for service provider choice and investment. We use a two-stage game to model how a firm’s customer demand is impacted by disruptions at a service provider, and how this subsequently affects the firms’ choices in managing service provider risk. Considering downstream demand effects from upstream service disruptions, the contribution of this article is the examination of how risk synchronization impacts provider choice decisions and profits. In addition, we illustrate how these choices impact upstream industry concentration.
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems
- Vol. 16 (3) , 1-37
Open AccessIT Service Disruptions and Provider Choice
Digital supply chains are increasingly interconnected and vulnerable to disruption, causing service interruptions impacting many firms and their customers. Combating threats to the digital supply chain is the top challenge for leaders in most supply chain industries, demonstrated by the tacit approval of nation-states for cyber-attacks on corporate supply chains to disrupt downstream firms. Disruptions to digital supply chains are not new. In April 2019, hundreds of flights in the United States were delayed when a critical service provider, AeroData, had a computer systems failure. AeroData delivers flight planning services to many airlines, including Southwest, United, American, and Delta. All flight operations for AeroData’s more than 100 clients simultaneously ceased, and thousands of customers were stranded at airports across the country. In an increasingly connected business environment, competitors may be simultaneously disrupted due to a common service provider, impacting all affected firms’ demand. The synchronization of disruptions for firms that use a common service provider has implications for service provider choice and investment. We use a two-stage game to model how a firm’s customer demand is impacted by disruptions at a service provider, and how this subsequently affects the firms’ choices in managing service provider risk. Considering downstream demand effects from upstream service disruptions, the contribution of this article is the examination of how risk synchronization impacts provider choice decisions and profits. In addition, we illustrate how these choices impact upstream industry concentration.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Using Subsidies, Fines, and Restitution with Budget Balance to Combat Digital Piracy
Despite utilizing technical prevention methods and enacting copyright protection legislation, digital piracy has remained a persistent problem. We examine policy remedies to digital piracy whereby the policymaker has to balance its budget between fines on detected pirates, subsidies for legal purchases, and restitution to the firm. In our model, users choose whether to subscribe, copy, or not use the good, a firm decides on subscription fee and quality, and a policymaker determines subsidies, fines, and restitution. We find that the firm’s subscription fee is always increasing in subsidies, fines, and restitution under a budget balance constraint. The impact of these policy instruments on the firm’s investment in quality depends on how user marginal utility is influenced by the quality of the good and how the policymaker redistributes fines back to society, if at all. Using two specific functional forms with additive and multiplicative utility, we explain how these factors come into play. With additive utility, fines increase the firm’s investment in quality. However, with multiplicative utility the firm’s investment in quality decreases with fines if fines are used alone or alongside subsidies. In contrast to prior research, findings of our general framework illustrate that imposing fines on detected pirates “can” be socially optimal when accounting for the policymaker’s budget balance. Our specific functional forms also serve as two instances where imposing fines is always welfare maximizing. Finally, we find that although the policymaker’s optimal intervention improves social welfare and mitigates digital piracy, it leads to a reduction in consumer surplus. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2016-0431]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03463 .
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Using Subsidies, Fines, and Restitution with Budget Balance to Combat Digital Piracy
Despite utilizing technical prevention methods and enacting copyright protection legislation, digital piracy has remained a persistent problem. We examine policy remedies to digital piracy whereby the policymaker has to balance its budget between fines on detected pirates, subsidies for legal purchases, and restitution to the firm. In our model, users choose whether to subscribe, copy, or not use the good, a firm decides on subscription fee and quality, and a policymaker determines subsidies, fines, and restitution. We find that the firm’s subscription fee is always increasing in subsidies, fines, and restitution under a budget balance constraint. The impact of these policy instruments on the firm’s investment in quality depends on how user marginal utility is influenced by the quality of the good and how the policymaker redistributes fines back to society, if at all. Using two specific functional forms with additive and multiplicative utility, we explain how these factors come into play. With additive utility, fines increase the firm’s investment in quality. However, with multiplicative utility the firm’s investment in quality decreases with fines if fines are used alone or alongside subsidies. In contrast to prior research, findings of our general framework illustrate that imposing fines on detected pirates “can” be socially optimal when accounting for the policymaker’s budget balance. Our specific functional forms also serve as two instances where imposing fines is always welfare maximizing. Finally, we find that although the policymaker’s optimal intervention improves social welfare and mitigates digital piracy, it leads to a reduction in consumer surplus. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2016-0431]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03463 .
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1344-1362
Join Up or Stay Away? Coalition Formation for Critical IT Infrastructure
PRACTICE AND POLICY ABSTRACT We consider the formation of a coalition when districts invest in critical IT infrastructure that, if disrupted, can cause significant damage to security, the economy, public health, or safety. The benefits from these investments can spill over to other districts. Districts choose whether to participate in a coalition, and the coalition subsequently makes IT infrastructure investment decisions for those districts that join the coalition. These inside districts have superior interoperability in their spillovers relative to outside districts. We find that inside districts’ resource levels decrease with the size of the coalition, and this size depends on the coalition’s economies of scale and relative interoperability. Depending on these factors, any size coalition can be an equilibrium or socially optimal. In most cases, the socially optimal coalition size is larger than the equilibrium coalition. A subsidy or tax can incentivize the equilibrium coalition size and district investment levels to be socially optimal, providing a general solution to the provisioning of critical IT infrastructure. We use the European Union’s Digital COVID Certificate program providing vaccine status information and the U.S. Government’s Direct Project that supports the establishment of nationwide health information exchanges to illustrate elements of our model.
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1344-1362
Join Up or Stay Away? Coalition Formation for Critical IT Infrastructure
PRACTICE AND POLICY ABSTRACT We consider the formation of a coalition when districts invest in critical IT infrastructure that, if disrupted, can cause significant damage to security, the economy, public health, or safety. The benefits from these investments can spill over to other districts. Districts choose whether to participate in a coalition, and the coalition subsequently makes IT infrastructure investment decisions for those districts that join the coalition. These inside districts have superior interoperability in their spillovers relative to outside districts. We find that inside districts’ resource levels decrease with the size of the coalition, and this size depends on the coalition’s economies of scale and relative interoperability. Depending on these factors, any size coalition can be an equilibrium or socially optimal. In most cases, the socially optimal coalition size is larger than the equilibrium coalition. A subsidy or tax can incentivize the equilibrium coalition size and district investment levels to be socially optimal, providing a general solution to the provisioning of critical IT infrastructure. We use the European Union’s Digital COVID Certificate program providing vaccine status information and the U.S. Government’s Direct Project that supports the establishment of nationwide health information exchanges to illustrate elements of our model.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (7) , 4184-4199
Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate?
We consider the role of personalized pricing (PP) on product differentiation when PP is costly to implement. Using a stylized yet commonly used formulation, we find that when firms decide on positioning before deciding on PP implementation, PP implementation cost affects not only the amount of differentiation firms choose in their positioning, firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare, but also whether firms implement PP. When PP implementation cost is low, firms cannot help but to implement PP and engage in direct price competition. Moreover, firms implementing PP reduce their differentiation, further intensifying price competition, and are worse off. When PP implementation cost is moderate, firms position to reduce their differentiation to commit to not implementing PP, again aggravating price competition. In contrast, when PP implementation cost is higher, firms increase their differentiation due to the threat of PP but do not implement PP. As a result, the availability of PP improves firm profits, even though firms do not implement PP. However, if differentiation is restricted, then PP availability cannot improve firm profits. If an information seller sets the PP implementation cost, then it sets the cost low. Consequently, firms implement PP and are worse off. We also find that when firms decide whether to implement PP before deciding on positioning, they never implement PP. This is the case when PP implementation is complex, and differentiation can be affected by short-run advertising and promotion. Finally, we show that banning PP can benefit consumers when accounting for changes in firm positioning. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grant 21500920]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02740 .
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (7) , 4184-4199
Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate?
We consider the role of personalized pricing (PP) on product differentiation when PP is costly to implement. Using a stylized yet commonly used formulation, we find that when firms decide on positioning before deciding on PP implementation, PP implementation cost affects not only the amount of differentiation firms choose in their positioning, firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare, but also whether firms implement PP. When PP implementation cost is low, firms cannot help but to implement PP and engage in direct price competition. Moreover, firms implementing PP reduce their differentiation, further intensifying price competition, and are worse off. When PP implementation cost is moderate, firms position to reduce their differentiation to commit to not implementing PP, again aggravating price competition. In contrast, when PP implementation cost is higher, firms increase their differentiation due to the threat of PP but do not implement PP. As a result, the availability of PP improves firm profits, even though firms do not implement PP. However, if differentiation is restricted, then PP availability cannot improve firm profits. If an information seller sets the PP implementation cost, then it sets the cost low. Consequently, firms implement PP and are worse off. We also find that when firms decide whether to implement PP before deciding on positioning, they never implement PP. This is the case when PP implementation is complex, and differentiation can be affected by short-run advertising and promotion. Finally, we show that banning PP can benefit consumers when accounting for changes in firm positioning. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grant 21500920]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02740 .
- 25 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Information Technology and Management
- Vol. 25 (2) , 113-123
Trading volume and open interest from options markets as measures of the effect of IT announcements
- 25 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Information Technology and Management
- Vol. 25 (2) , 113-123
Trading volume and open interest from options markets as measures of the effect of IT announcements
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Decision Support Systems
- Vol. 177
Upstream information sharing in platform-based e-commerce with retail plan adjustment
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Decision Support Systems
- Vol. 177
Upstream information sharing in platform-based e-commerce with retail plan adjustment
- 25 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 264
Customer segmentation, pricing, and lead time decisions: A stochastic-user-equilibrium perspective
- 25 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 264
Customer segmentation, pricing, and lead time decisions: A stochastic-user-equilibrium perspective
- 28 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 308 (1) , 97-112
Information sharing in an MTO supply chain with upstream adjustments
- 28 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 308 (1) , 97-112
Information sharing in an MTO supply chain with upstream adjustments