MCMargaret S. Clark

Margaret S. Clark

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Margaret S. Clark has a total of 57 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Concluding that romantic relationships matter more to men than to women is too simple

    by Hannah S. Elizabeth, Margaret S. Clark

    Wahring et al. do an impressive job of documenting existing evidence for concluding that romantic relationships matter more to men than to women. Yet, their conclusion seems too simple to us. A consideration of more motivations for forming romantic relationships, use of more operational indices of mattering, and consideration of additional populations of people will paint a more complex picture of how, why, and for whom romantic relationships matter.

  • Variability in how people seek significance and fall in love

    by Margaret S. Clark, Mujtaba K. Chughtai

    We agree that people seek social significance and that falling in love can be a means to attaining significance. However, we suggest there are differences between people in how they construe and seek significance and how they fall in love.

  • Impartial Beneficence Predicts Greater and More Uniform Concern for Others Across Social Relationships

    by Brian D. Earp, Killian L. McLoughlin, Mina Caraccio, Rachel Calcott, Joshua Rottman, Margaret S. Clark, M. J. Crockett

    The principle of impartial beneficence (IB) holds that we should strive to maximize others’ well-being regardless of their relationship to us. But does endorsement of IB in principle translate to more uniform concern for others irrespective of relationship type? Three pre-registered studies in online samples of U.S. participants (total N =1,716) found IB endorsement predicts greater and more uniform concern for others across social relationships varying in social distance: in care prescriptions (Study 1), as well as blame judgments (Study 2) and guilt expressions (Study 3) when care norms are violated or care is not provided. Heightened concern for others in socially distant relationships was not “offset” by less concern for those in close ones. IB was not associated with a motive to be generally admired, but was linked to a motive to form communal relationships. Across different types of moral judgments, a commitment to IB thus entails caring much more than average about the well-being of socially distant others, while maintaining a high level of concern for socially close ones.


  • Whether Emotions are Engaging or Disengaging Depends on Relationship Functions

    by Mujtaba K. Chughtai, Maria Gendron, Margaret S. Clark

    Researchers have categorized certain emotions as socially engaging (interdependence-affirming) and others as disengaging (independence-affirming), and have shown that these emotions pattern differently across cultures differing in dominant self-construals. However, the social functions different relationships serve and the associated nature of interdependence that characterizes relationships also differ within cultures. Across four samples, we examined how frequently Americans report experiencing, expressing, and perceiving eight emotions in the context of normatively communal and transactional relationships. We also examined how engaging and functional these emotions were reported to be. In studies 1 (N = 393) and 2 (N = 394), participants reported experiencing, expressing, and perceiving both putatively engaging (respect, guilt) and disengaging (pride, anger) emotions more frequently in communal relationships, and each emotion was reported as more engaging in communal than in transactional relationships. In studies 3 (N = 353) and 4 (N = 330), we examined the patterning of additional emotions that past work indicates are particularly tied to communal relationships (empathic joy, empathic sadness, hurt, love) across the same types of relationships as examined in studies 1 and 2. All of these emotions were more likely to be perceived and expressed in communal (versus transactional) relationships, and they were all judged to be more engaging and functional in communal than in transactional relationships. Additionally, participants believed expressing these emotions within transactional relationships would be disconnecting, relationship-undermining, and distancing (i.e., disengaging). In sum, whether emotions are “engaging” or “disengaging” appears to depend on how they fulfill the social functions of distinct relationships.

  • Open Access

    Author Correction: How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

    by Brian D. Earp, Killian L. McLoughlin, Joshua T. Monrad, Margaret S. Clark, Molly J. Crockett


  • The adaptiveness of fear (and other emotions) considered more broadly: Missed literature on the nature of emotions and its functions

    by Margaret S. Clark, Chance Adkins, Jennifer Hirsch, Hannah S. Elizabeth, Noah T. Reed

    We agree with Grossmann that fear often builds cooperative relationships. Yet he neglects much extant literature. Prior researchers have discussed how fear (and other emotions) build cooperative relationships, have questioned whether fear per se evolved to serve this purpose, and have emphasized that human cooperation takes many forms. Grossmann's theory would benefit from a wider consideration of this work.

  • Open Access

    Author Correction: How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

    by Brian D. Earp, Killian L. McLoughlin, Joshua T. Monrad, Margaret S. Clark, Molly J. Crockett

  • Open Access

    How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

    by Brian D. Earp, Killian L. McLoughlin, Joshua T. Monrad, Margaret S. Clark, Molly J. Crockett

    Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this ‘relational norms’ model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.


  • Can I tell you how I feel? Perceived partner responsiveness encourages emotional expression.

    by Yan Ruan, Harry T. Reis, Margaret S. Clark, Jennifer L. Hirsch, Brian D. Bink

    When do people express their emotions to other people and when do they choose not to do so? Emotional experience-positive or negative-often leads people to reveal their feelings to others, especially to close relationship partners. Although emotional expression has been incorporated into recent dyadic models of emotion regulation, little research has examined the specific interpersonal processes responsible for facilitating or inhibiting emotional expression. This article reports results from a pair of methodologically distinct studies examining the impact of perceived partner responsiveness (PPR) on emotional expression. The results of Study 1, a 2-week daily diary study, demonstrated that within-person variations in the perceived responsiveness of a close partner were associated with corresponding day-to-day variations in emotional expression to that partner. In Study 2, in the context of a stressful situation, we manipulated perceptions of a romantic partner's responsiveness and then measured emotion expression toward that partner. Higher levels of experimentally induced PPR causally led to greater expression of anxiety. Together, these studies identify PPR as an important interpersonal mechanism underlying emotional expression. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).