Thomas Poulsen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Thomas Poulsen has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Steen Thomsen
Department of International Economics and Management, Center for Corporate Governance Copenhagen Business School Porcelaenshaven 24 Frederiksberg 2000 Denmark
2 shared publications- Aleksandra Gregorič
Copenhagen Business School
1 shared publication - Christa Børsting
Department of International Economics and Management, Center for Corporate Governance Copenhagen Business School Porcelaenshaven 24 Frederiksberg 2000 Denmark
1 shared publication - Gudrun Erla Jonsdottir
University of Iceland, Gimli, Reykjavík, Iceland
1 shared publication Johan Kuhn
Department of International Economics and Management, Center for Corporate Governance Copenhagen Business School Porcelaenshaven 24 Frederiksberg 2000 Denmark
1 shared publication- Juyeong Jeong1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership
- Vol. 9 (3) , 258-288
Financial feasibility of employee ownership under the Danish succession model
Purpose: We examine the feasibility of employee-financed succession under Denmark's new framework, which lets owners transfer ownership to employees through a cooperative holding structure with deferred capital gains tax. Design/methodology/approach: We develop a cash-flow model yielding closed-form feasibility conditions that incorporate the statutory dividend threshold and tax deferral, with simulations and a stochastic extension quantifying liquidity risk. Findings: Feasibility turns on short-run liquidity rather than profitability. Because dividends are pro rata, funding a stake of any size requires the operating company to distribute its entire equity value; this “dividend leakage” to non-participating owners is the root of the constraint. The maximum sustainable multiple rises with payout and falls with leverage, leaving high-valuation firms unreachable; a smaller stake does not help, as feasibility is independent of the ownership share. Feasibility therefore hinges on concessions outside the dividend channel: tax-exempt seller gifts or employee contributions. Research limitations/implications: The baseline abstracts from bargaining and from heterogeneity beyond payout and leverage; an appendix shows earnings risk tightens the feasible set. Practical implications: The results clarify why employee buyouts are viable in some firm contexts but not others and inform the statutory review due after three years. They indicate that using differentiated cash-flow rights, so the employee entity captures more of a given distribution, would widen reach at no cost to either party. Social implications: The selection mechanism favors mature, stable firms. Reaching high-growth sectors requires instruments beyond the current framework. Originality/value: To the best of our knowledge. This is the first formal feasibility analysis of the Danish model, connecting institutional tax design to economic viability.
- 5 November 2026
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership
- Vol. 9 (3) , 258-288
Open AccessFinancial feasibility of employee ownership under the Danish succession model
Purpose: We examine the feasibility of employee-financed succession under Denmark's new framework, which lets owners transfer ownership to employees through a cooperative holding structure with deferred capital gains tax. Design/methodology/approach: We develop a cash-flow model yielding closed-form feasibility conditions that incorporate the statutory dividend threshold and tax deferral, with simulations and a stochastic extension quantifying liquidity risk. Findings: Feasibility turns on short-run liquidity rather than profitability. Because dividends are pro rata, funding a stake of any size requires the operating company to distribute its entire equity value; this “dividend leakage” to non-participating owners is the root of the constraint. The maximum sustainable multiple rises with payout and falls with leverage, leaving high-valuation firms unreachable; a smaller stake does not help, as feasibility is independent of the ownership share. Feasibility therefore hinges on concessions outside the dividend channel: tax-exempt seller gifts or employee contributions. Research limitations/implications: The baseline abstracts from bargaining and from heterogeneity beyond payout and leverage; an appendix shows earnings risk tightens the feasible set. Practical implications: The results clarify why employee buyouts are viable in some firm contexts but not others and inform the statutory review due after three years. They indicate that using differentiated cash-flow rights, so the employee entity captures more of a given distribution, would widen reach at no cost to either party. Social implications: The selection mechanism favors mature, stable firms. Reaching high-growth sectors requires instruments beyond the current framework. Originality/value: To the best of our knowledge. This is the first formal feasibility analysis of the Danish model, connecting institutional tax design to economic viability.
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 101
Foundation ownership and parental leave uptake: Evidence from a Danish reform
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 101
Open AccessFoundation ownership and parental leave uptake: Evidence from a Danish reform
- 17 November 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership
- Vol. 4 (2) , 136-173
Employee ownership – pros and cons – a review
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview of the research on employee ownership. What does the scientific literature reveal about advantages and disadvantages? What can be learned from different models used in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US with many employee-owned firms in contrast to Denmark.Design/methodology/approach: A structured review of the literature on employee. The paper identifies different mechanisms leading to effects on productivity, job stability, distribution, investment etc., and reviews the empirical evidence. The main barriers and drivers are identified and different models for employee ownership in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US are reviewed to identify potential models for a country like Denmark with few employee-owned firms.Findings: The article gives an overview over the theoretical predictions and the main empirical evidence of the effects of employee ownership. The pros are greater employee identification with the firm and increased productivity reinforced by increased participation. Employee-owned firms have more equal distribution of wages and more stable employment, and they have greater mutual control between employees and fewer middle managers. The motivation effects may be smaller for large firms and lack of capital may lead to lower levels of investments and capital per employee.Originality/value: Comprehensive and updated literature review on the effects and successful formats of employee ownership to identify models for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.
- 17 November 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership
- Vol. 4 (2) , 136-173
Employee ownership – pros and cons – a review
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview of the research on employee ownership. What does the scientific literature reveal about advantages and disadvantages? What can be learned from different models used in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US with many employee-owned firms in contrast to Denmark.Design/methodology/approach: A structured review of the literature on employee. The paper identifies different mechanisms leading to effects on productivity, job stability, distribution, investment etc., and reviews the empirical evidence. The main barriers and drivers are identified and different models for employee ownership in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US are reviewed to identify potential models for a country like Denmark with few employee-owned firms.Findings: The article gives an overview over the theoretical predictions and the main empirical evidence of the effects of employee ownership. The pros are greater employee identification with the firm and increased productivity reinforced by increased participation. Employee-owned firms have more equal distribution of wages and more stable employment, and they have greater mutual control between employees and fewer middle managers. The motivation effects may be smaller for large firms and lack of capital may lead to lower levels of investments and capital per employee.Originality/value: Comprehensive and updated literature review on the effects and successful formats of employee ownership to identify models for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.
- Open Access
- 5 March 2020
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 17 (3) , 34-45
Ownership strategy: A governance mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Abstract A new strand of corporate governance literature on
- 5 March 2020
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 17 (3) , 34-45
Open AccessOwnership strategy: A governance mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Abstract A new strand of corporate governance literature on
- 20 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Industrial Relations
- Vol. 58 (2) , 241-272
When Do Employees Choose to Be Represented on the Board of Directors? Empirical Analysis of Board‐Level Employee Representation in Denmark
Drawing on transaction costs economics and longitudinal data on Danish corporations, we analyse the distribution of board‐level employee representation (BLER) and the characteristics of employee directors in a context where workers have the possibility (but not also an obligation) to nominate representatives to the board of directors. We show that BLER is less likely instituted in firms with CEO or family‐related members on the board, but more likely observed in larger, older firms and in those with high firm‐specific human capital and union density. Firm‐specific human capital, qualifications and union membership also determine individual worker's probability to become a board member.
- 20 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Industrial Relations
- Vol. 58 (2) , 241-272
When Do Employees Choose to Be Represented on the Board of Directors? Empirical Analysis of Board‐Level Employee Representation in Denmark
Drawing on transaction costs economics and longitudinal data on Danish corporations, we analyse the distribution of board‐level employee representation (BLER) and the characteristics of employee directors in a context where workers have the possibility (but not also an obligation) to nominate representatives to the board of directors. We show that BLER is less likely instituted in firms with CEO or family‐related members on the board, but more likely observed in larger, older firms and in those with high firm‐specific human capital and union density. Firm‐specific human capital, qualifications and union membership also determine individual worker's probability to become a board member.
- Open Access
- 23 March 2018
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 26 (3) , 180-196
Industrial foundations as long‐term owners
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Does foundation ownership lead to long‐term corporate governance and business behavior in foundation‐owned companies?Research Findings/Insights: Short‐termism has become a serious concern for corporate governance, and this has inspired a search for institutional arrangements to promote long‐term decision‐making. In this paper, we call attention to long‐term ownership by industrial foundations, which is common in Northern Europe but little known in the rest of the world. We use a unique Danish data set to document that industrial foundations are long‐term owners that practice long‐term governance. We show that foundation ownership is highly stable compared to other ownership structures. Foundation‐owned companies replace managers less frequently. They have conservative capital structures with low financial leverage. They score higher on an index of long‐termism in finance, investment, and employment. They survive longer. Overall, our paper supports the hypothesis that corporate time horizons are influenced by ownership structures, and particularly that industrial foundations possess characteristics that promote long‐termism. Policymakers, business owners, and managers interested in promoting long‐term governance models should therefore reconsider the role of ownership structure.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper supports the hypothesis that time horizons are influenced by ownership commitment and particularly that industrial foundations promote long‐termism. We contribute to the corporate governance literature by further developing the concept of long‐termism as a multi‐faceted corporate governance concept associated with ownership commitment. We also show that foundation ownership is associated with long‐termism.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Policymakers interested in promoting long‐termism should encourage long‐term ownership, for example by industrial foundations. Practitioners should consider the importance of ownership commitment in ensuring long‐term corporate governance.
- 23 March 2018
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 26 (3) , 180-196
Open AccessIndustrial foundations as long‐term owners
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Does foundation ownership lead to long‐term corporate governance and business behavior in foundation‐owned companies?Research Findings/Insights: Short‐termism has become a serious concern for corporate governance, and this has inspired a search for institutional arrangements to promote long‐term decision‐making. In this paper, we call attention to long‐term ownership by industrial foundations, which is common in Northern Europe but little known in the rest of the world. We use a unique Danish data set to document that industrial foundations are long‐term owners that practice long‐term governance. We show that foundation ownership is highly stable compared to other ownership structures. Foundation‐owned companies replace managers less frequently. They have conservative capital structures with low financial leverage. They score higher on an index of long‐termism in finance, investment, and employment. They survive longer. Overall, our paper supports the hypothesis that corporate time horizons are influenced by ownership structures, and particularly that industrial foundations possess characteristics that promote long‐termism. Policymakers, business owners, and managers interested in promoting long‐term governance models should therefore reconsider the role of ownership structure.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper supports the hypothesis that time horizons are influenced by ownership commitment and particularly that industrial foundations promote long‐termism. We contribute to the corporate governance literature by further developing the concept of long‐termism as a multi‐faceted corporate governance concept associated with ownership commitment. We also show that foundation ownership is associated with long‐termism.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Policymakers interested in promoting long‐termism should encourage long‐term ownership, for example by industrial foundations. Practitioners should consider the importance of ownership commitment in ensuring long‐term corporate governance.
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 117 (3) , 743-745
Disentangling disproportionality
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 117 (3) , 743-745
Disentangling disproportionality
- 13 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Management and Governance
- Vol. 17 (1) , 131-155
Corporate control and underinvestment
- 13 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Management and Governance
- Vol. 17 (1) , 131-155
Corporate control and underinvestment
- 31 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 20 (1) , 52-58
Private benefits in corporate control transactions
- 31 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 20 (1) , 52-58
Private benefits in corporate control transactions
- 20 July 2010
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 329-343
Voting Power and Shareholder Activism: A Study of Swedish Shareholder Meetings
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper analyses the impact of voting power on shareholder activism using unique data on activism at Swedish shareholder meetings. We hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest shareholder's sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders.Research Findings/Insights: We find that firms' amenability to small shareholder influence leads to more proposals by the nomination committee, but fewer proposals by other shareholders and fewer proposals voted against. We interpret this as evidence that the shareholder elected nomination committees effectively channel shareholder concerns and preempt other kinds of activism. In addition, we find more shareholder activity in large firms and less activity in leveraged firms.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper offers a new voting power approach to the study of shareholder activism. We show the empirical implications of this approach, but also the importance of local institutions such as nomination committees in shaping the nature of shareholder activism.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Politicians and companies that desire active shareholders could improve the amenability of firms to shareholder influence by ownership transparency, shareholder committees, contacts with shareholder associations and other vehicles for collective action.
- 20 July 2010
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 329-343
Voting Power and Shareholder Activism: A Study of Swedish Shareholder Meetings
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper analyses the impact of voting power on shareholder activism using unique data on activism at Swedish shareholder meetings. We hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest shareholder's sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders.Research Findings/Insights: We find that firms' amenability to small shareholder influence leads to more proposals by the nomination committee, but fewer proposals by other shareholders and fewer proposals voted against. We interpret this as evidence that the shareholder elected nomination committees effectively channel shareholder concerns and preempt other kinds of activism. In addition, we find more shareholder activity in large firms and less activity in leveraged firms.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper offers a new voting power approach to the study of shareholder activism. We show the empirical implications of this approach, but also the importance of local institutions such as nomination committees in shaping the nature of shareholder activism.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Politicians and companies that desire active shareholders could improve the amenability of firms to shareholder influence by ownership transparency, shareholder committees, contacts with shareholder associations and other vehicles for collective action.