Brian G. M. Main
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Brian G. M. Main has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alistair C. Bruce
Nottingham University Business School, Nottingham, UK
3 shared publications Barry Reilly
School of Social Sciences , University of Sussex , UK
3 shared publicationsDavid Raffe
Centre for Educational Sociology, the University of Edinburgh
3 shared publications- Wenxuan Hou
University of Edinburgh
3 shared publications Andrew Park
University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, UK
2 shared publications- Charles A. O'REilly
Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 23 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 61
The cultural legacy of historical ethnic violence: The impact on access to finance and innovation
- 23 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 61
The cultural legacy of historical ethnic violence: The impact on access to finance and innovation
- 26 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 222, 144-176
Military experience and subsequent effectiveness as a director
- 26 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 222, 144-176
Military experience and subsequent effectiveness as a director
- Open Access
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Management
- Vol. 35 (1) , 228-242
The Symbolic Management of Women on Company Boards: Evidence Using the UK Davies Review
This paper tests for the presence of the symbolic management of women board directors. The data are based on companies in the UK FTSE All‐Share Index between 1996 and 2017. Our sample experiences a sharp increase in the number of women board directors after a major reform in 2011, known as the Davies Review. While the Davies Review has triggered a rise in the number of women in non‐executive director positions, these women continue to experience a disproportionate exit rate around 9 years of tenure. This is a symbolically significant moment because at 9 years directors are no longer considered ‘independent’ under the UK Governance Code. Notwithstanding the progress made following the Davies Review, the evidence presented here supports the view that women often serve on company boards for symbolic rather than substantive motives.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Management
- Vol. 35 (1) , 228-242
Open AccessThe Symbolic Management of Women on Company Boards: Evidence Using the UK Davies Review
This paper tests for the presence of the symbolic management of women board directors. The data are based on companies in the UK FTSE All‐Share Index between 1996 and 2017. Our sample experiences a sharp increase in the number of women board directors after a major reform in 2011, known as the Davies Review. While the Davies Review has triggered a rise in the number of women in non‐executive director positions, these women continue to experience a disproportionate exit rate around 9 years of tenure. This is a symbolically significant moment because at 9 years directors are no longer considered ‘independent’ under the UK Governance Code. Notwithstanding the progress made following the Davies Review, the evidence presented here supports the view that women often serve on company boards for symbolic rather than substantive motives.
- Open Access
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Carbon Neutrality
- Vol. 1 (1) , 1-19
The impact of ESG on financial performance: a revisit with a regression discontinuity approach
This study revisits the question of “whether firms are doing well by doing good?”. We examine shareholders-sponsored corporate socially responsible (CSR) proposals related to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) that are voted to pass or fail by a small margin. The adoption of those “close call” proposals is regarded as equivalent to a random assignment of CSR policies and, therefore, provides a quasi-experimental setting to capture the causal influence of CSR on firm performance. We apply the regression discontinuity design (RDD) and find that CSR proposals’ passage leads to a significant positive abnormal return on the voting day. The results are robust with both parametric and nonparametric approaches of RDD and different polynomial orders. However, we fail to identify a significant change in financial performance in the long-term. One possible reason is that passing a CSR proposal could be symbolic, rather than substantial.
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Carbon Neutrality
- Vol. 1 (1) , 1-19
Open AccessThe impact of ESG on financial performance: a revisit with a regression discontinuity approach
This study revisits the question of “whether firms are doing well by doing good?”. We examine shareholders-sponsored corporate socially responsible (CSR) proposals related to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) that are voted to pass or fail by a small margin. The adoption of those “close call” proposals is regarded as equivalent to a random assignment of CSR policies and, therefore, provides a quasi-experimental setting to capture the causal influence of CSR on firm performance. We apply the regression discontinuity design (RDD) and find that CSR proposals’ passage leads to a significant positive abnormal return on the voting day. The results are robust with both parametric and nonparametric approaches of RDD and different polynomial orders. However, we fail to identify a significant change in financial performance in the long-term. One possible reason is that passing a CSR proposal could be symbolic, rather than substantial.
- Open Access
- 21 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 43 (7) , 2817-2837
Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis
Literature on executive compensation has relatively neglected the impact of institutional governance contexts. Regarding filling this gap, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms on excess executive compensation comparing a set of listed UK and Spanish firms on an 8‐year panel data. Findings indicate that Spanish firms are characterized by higher excess executive compensation than UK firms because of the less effectiveness of ownership structure and board of directors. Differences in concentration and structure of ownership as well as in composition and size of boards result in more aligned executive compensation design in the UK firms.
- 21 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 43 (7) , 2817-2837
Open AccessExcess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis
Literature on executive compensation has relatively neglected the impact of institutional governance contexts. Regarding filling this gap, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms on excess executive compensation comparing a set of listed UK and Spanish firms on an 8‐year panel data. Findings indicate that Spanish firms are characterized by higher excess executive compensation than UK firms because of the less effectiveness of ownership structure and board of directors. Differences in concentration and structure of ownership as well as in composition and size of boards result in more aligned executive compensation design in the UK firms.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Management
- Vol. 29 (1) , 136-155
Symbolic Management and the Glass Cliff: Evidence from the Boardroom Careers of Female and Male Directors
This paper uses archival board data to demonstrate that women who take positions as directors of UK companies have shorter tenures than their male counterparts. The authors show that female directors face a much higher risk of dismissal as they approach nine years of service on the board, when their long service deprives them of the all‐important classification as ‘independent’. At this point, their position on the board becomes precarious. Male directors do not suffer the same increase in boardroom exit. This gender‐specific difference is clearly shown to be linked to the independence status. It is argued that these observations are consistent with the notion that female directors are being used in the symbolic management of corporate governance and that, at nine years, when the cloak of independence disappears, women directors are then exposed to the biases that arise from role congruity issues.
- 13 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Management
- Vol. 29 (1) , 136-155
Open AccessSymbolic Management and the Glass Cliff: Evidence from the Boardroom Careers of Female and Male Directors
This paper uses archival board data to demonstrate that women who take positions as directors of UK companies have shorter tenures than their male counterparts. The authors show that female directors face a much higher risk of dismissal as they approach nine years of service on the board, when their long service deprives them of the all‐important classification as ‘independent’. At this point, their position on the board becomes precarious. Male directors do not suffer the same increase in boardroom exit. This gender‐specific difference is clearly shown to be linked to the independence status. It is argued that these observations are consistent with the notion that female directors are being used in the symbolic management of corporate governance and that, at nine years, when the cloak of independence disappears, women directors are then exposed to the biases that arise from role congruity issues.
- 1 July 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
Akerlof, George Arthur (Born 1940)
- Open Access
- 1 March 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Women in the Boardroom: Symbols or Substance?
The central argument for increasing the number of women on corporate boards of directors has been the so-called “business case for diversity” which proposes that women and minorities add valuable new perspectives that result in enhanced corporate performance. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence for this claim is mixed, leading some researchers to suggest that women outsiders are appointed for symbolic rather than substantive reasons. Using a sample of more than 2,000 firms over the period 2001-2005, we examine the effects of women outside directors on firm performance and CEO compensation. We find no evidence that adding women outsiders to the board enhances corporate performance. We do find some evidence that male CEOs with higher levels of compensation are more likely to appoint women outsiders and that boards with more women outside members are more generous in paying the CEO. We interpret these results as consistent with the appointment of women outsiders for normative rather than profit-enhancing reasons.
- 1 March 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWomen in the Boardroom: Symbols or Substance?
The central argument for increasing the number of women on corporate boards of directors has been the so-called “business case for diversity” which proposes that women and minorities add valuable new perspectives that result in enhanced corporate performance. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence for this claim is mixed, leading some researchers to suggest that women outsiders are appointed for symbolic rather than substantive reasons. Using a sample of more than 2,000 firms over the period 2001-2005, we examine the effects of women outside directors on firm performance and CEO compensation. We find no evidence that adding women outsiders to the board enhances corporate performance. We do find some evidence that male CEOs with higher levels of compensation are more likely to appoint women outsiders and that boards with more women outside members are more generous in paying the CEO. We interpret these results as consistent with the appointment of women outsiders for normative rather than profit-enhancing reasons.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Political Intervention, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation in Japan and Taiwan
This paper investigates the interaction of government and financial institutions in the operation of a company through the relationship of the main bank system and the system of amakudari (appointing retired bureaucrats to the boards of public companies). Consistent with resource dependency theory, the empirical results suggest that governments and financial institutions tend to appoint representatives to the board in order to help troubled companies. However, a negative relationship is established between the presence of such amakudari and subsequent firm performance. Thus, while the system of amakudari may use its influence in an attempt to save troubled companies, it is possible that, contrary to resource dependency theory but consistent with agency theory, the monitoring ability of the board may consequently be jeopardized to the detriment of overall firm performance.
- 1 September 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPolitical Intervention, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation in Japan and Taiwan
This paper investigates the interaction of government and financial institutions in the operation of a company through the relationship of the main bank system and the system of amakudari (appointing retired bureaucrats to the boards of public companies). Consistent with resource dependency theory, the empirical results suggest that governments and financial institutions tend to appoint representatives to the board in order to help troubled companies. However, a negative relationship is established between the presence of such amakudari and subsequent firm performance. Thus, while the system of amakudari may use its influence in an attempt to save troubled companies, it is possible that, contrary to resource dependency theory but consistent with agency theory, the monitoring ability of the board may consequently be jeopardized to the detriment of overall firm performance.
- 27 January 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 19 (3) , 675-712
Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesis
To many, the principal–agent model is the obvious lens through which executive pay should be viewed. Such a sentiment sits uncomfortably with a large number of empirical studies suggesting that the process of determining executive pay seems to be more readily explained by recourse to arguments of managerial power and influence. This article investigates the micro-underpinnings of boardroom behavior in order to explain this departure from principal–agency theory’s argument that executive compensation serves to align interests between the owners of the company and its senior managers. We find that there are strong interaction effects among social influence variables and the social setting of boardroom activity. Generous pay awards, bearing only a weak connection to corporate performance, are explained in the context of the social psychology of the boardroom. These results and a review of the empirical research, suggest the need for a more comprehensive model of executive compensation that incorporates both economic and psychological determinants.
- 27 January 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 19 (3) , 675-712
Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesis
To many, the principal–agent model is the obvious lens through which executive pay should be viewed. Such a sentiment sits uncomfortably with a large number of empirical studies suggesting that the process of determining executive pay seems to be more readily explained by recourse to arguments of managerial power and influence. This article investigates the micro-underpinnings of boardroom behavior in order to explain this departure from principal–agency theory’s argument that executive compensation serves to align interests between the owners of the company and its senior managers. We find that there are strong interaction effects among social influence variables and the social setting of boardroom activity. Generous pay awards, bearing only a weak connection to corporate performance, are explained in the context of the social psychology of the boardroom. These results and a review of the empirical research, suggest the need for a more comprehensive model of executive compensation that incorporates both economic and psychological determinants.