YWYulan Wang

Yulan Wang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years

Recognitions

Top Cited Scholar (2025,2026)

Yulan Wang has a total of 77 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Farsighted Stability in Service Platform Competition

    by Hongqiao Chen, Pengfei Guo, Qingying Li, Yulan Wang

    Problem definition: In the platform economy, platforms often engage in both demand and supply competition. We consider two platforms competing through service prices and wages. Instead of exploring myopic stability, that is, Nash equilibrium, which focuses on the immediate payoff change from a one-step deviation, the two competing platforms are farsighted and can anticipate their rivals’ reactions. They consider the chains of reactions following their initial deviation as well as the long-term consequences of their actions. Methodology/results: We model the competing platforms by a queueing system where customers and workers strategically decide whether to join and which platform to join. We first determine the equilibrium of the worker-customer subgame and then analyze the platforms’ service pricing decisions. To derive farsighted stability, we apply the concept of the von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (vNM FSS), which requires both internal and external stabilities. To find the vNM FSS, we first prove that any vNM FSS for the service platform competition is a singleton and then show that a strategy profile being Pareto efficient is a sufficient and necessary condition to form a singleton vNM FSS. In this way, we identify all the vNM FSSs by determining the Pareto-efficient strategy profiles. Managerial implications: We show that whereas myopically stable outcomes leave both platforms zero profit, platforms can coexist in the market and earn positive profits at the farsightedly stable outcomes. Farsightedness enhances the profitability of the platforms by fully extracting surplus from both the demand and supply sides. However, it cannot achieve the efficiency of a merged system where two platforms are operated by a single entity. We further show that the advantage of farsightedness over myopia is independent of the platform’s structure (whether one-sided or two-sided), whereas the efficiency of farsightedness does depend on the platform’s structure. Funding: H. Chen is funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72671131, 72394363/72394360, 72201124] and the Youth Project of the Humanities and Social Science Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China [Grant 22YJC630006]. P. Guo acknowledges the financial support from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [Grant CityU 11507124]. Q. Li is funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72371068 and 71871052] and Donghua University 2026 Discipline & Research Enhancement Project. Y. Wang acknowledges the support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72542003] and the Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University [Grant P0064051]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0730 .

  • Driving growth in competing supply chains: Leveraging upstream demand expansion and downstream information sharing

    by Ruina Yang, Yingdan Zhang, Zelong Yi, Yulan Wang, Yu Pan

    This article explores the interaction between demand expansion and information sharing in competing supply chains, where each supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. Retailers compete on quantity and decide whether to share their private demand information with their manufacturers, who then engage in demand expansion across the market. We show that retailers become more inclined to share information as manufacturers’ expansion efficiency improves (i.e., the cost coefficient of expansion decreases). In particular, a prisoner’s dilemma can occur when the expansion efficiency is intermediate: neither retailer shares their information but they would become better off if both do so. Moreover, a retailer is more likely to share information if her manufacturer exhibits higher expansion effectiveness (i.e., this expansion more effectively boosts demand growth). Interestingly, highly efficient expansion may harm manufacturers due to free-riding by competitors. Demand expansion benefits manufacturers and retailers when it is either very inefficient or significantly less effective than that of rivals, leading to a win-win outcome. Information sharing can further enlarge this win-win region, suggesting its role in promoting demand expansion. We check the robustness of our results with a few model extensions.

  • On the Value of Coalition Loyalty Programs

    by Yan Liu, Jingmai Wang, Yulan Wang, Dan Zhang

    This paper examines how coalition loyalty programs enhance firms’ ability to price discriminate and shows why the optimal program size depends on market composition.

  • Top Cited Papers

    Platform Certification and Seller Disclosure in Online Selling

    by Xu Guan, Yuan Jiang, Yulan Wang

    Problem definition: Concern about product quality due to the inability to experience products physically has been a major factor that hinders consumers from purchasing online. To ease such concerns, online platforms and sellers have been engaged in various activities to reveal product quality information. Platform can provide certification to products sold via its marketplace, and sellers can voluntarily disclose their private quality information. Despite platform certification and seller disclosure being prevalent quality information revelation methods, the interaction between them has been seldom examined. In this study, we develop a game-theoretical model to analytically explore the implications of platform certification and seller disclosure in an online selling context. Methodology/results: We consider a continuum of sellers offering new products to end consumers through an online platform under one of two pricing schemes: (1) pay-per-transaction (commission fees) or (2) pay-per-listing (listing fees). Consumers hold prior beliefs about product quality and update them based on the observed platform certification and seller disclosure behavior. Our analysis shows that under the commission fee scheme, platform certification serves an informational role by influencing sellers’ disclosure strategies and enhancing consumers’ ability to infer quality. Platform certification always benefits the platform but may either benefit or hurt sellers, depending on their quality levels. Under the listing fee scheme, platform certification instead serves an enrollment role: the platform sets a certification standard to enhance consumers’ quality expectation toward nondisclosure sellers, thereby encouraging more sellers to participate in online selling. In this case, platform certification continues to benefit the platform but does not affect sellers’ disclosure behavior or profitability. We further demonstrate that our main findings remain robust across various alternative model specifications. Managerial implications: Our analysis reveals that the interplay between platform certification and seller disclosure generates nontrivial effects for both platforms and sellers. Platforms should carefully design its certification strategies in alignment with pricing structures, and sellers should adjust their disclosure strategies in response to platform certification decisions. Funding: This work was supported by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (RGC Reference Number: 15503022), the National Natural Science Foundation of China [72588101, 72325005, 72401197, 72531007, 71971184], and the Joint Supervision Scheme of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (Project ID: P0039360). Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1291 .


  • Improving Health Outcomes With Less Cost? Provision of Mobile Clinic in Developing Economies

    by Fang Liu, Pengfei Guo, Yulan Wang, Yuejuan Xi

    Consider a public healthcare system consisting of a hospital, a mobile clinic (MC), and a population of potential patients. The government is concerned about the system’s healthcare spending and the population’s health outcomes. It decides the frequency and capacity of the MC service to maximize the social welfare that consists of two terms: the system’s long-run average healthcare cost and the population’s average quality-adjusted life year (QALY). We characterize the population’s natural disease progression using a Markov cohort model and derive the average healthcare cost incurred for the system and the average QALY in closed form for a given MC service. We show that the government is more likely to provide the MC service when (i) it puts more weight on the population’s average QALY, (ii) the MC treatment becomes more efficient, or (iii) the hospital treatment cost is much higher relative to the MC treatment cost. We further show that when conditions (ii) and (iii) are met or the disease progresses faster, the provision of the MC service is more likely to result in a win–win outcome, leading to both healthcare cost reduction and QALY improvement. The optimal MC delivery policy highly hinges on the disease’s progressive speed. Specifically, when the MC service is designated to serve a specific target population, once the MC service is provided, it shall be provided either every period or every other period if the disease is fast-progressive. If the disease is slow-progressive, the long-run average healthcare cost exhibits a zigzag pattern with the MC delivery cycle when the relative treatment cost-saving per person induced by the provision of the MC service is positive. Last, we conducted a real case study. Our analysis reveals that the optimal implementation of the MC program results in a 119.5% improvement in QALY and a 5% reduction in healthcare costs. The results are robust in probabilistic sensitivity analysis with a relative performance gap within 11.5% when factoring in the uncertainty of the parameters.


  • Social and Cultural Issues

    by Chung Lai Johnny Wan, Yulan Wang

  • Distribution Strategy, Capability Investment, and Government Regulation

    by Mao Yuan, Fernando Bernstein, Xu Guan, Yulan Wang

    This paper investigates how a manufacturer’s internal sourcing capability and government regulation influence the supplier’s distribution strategy and the manufacturer’s sourcing and capability investment decisions. We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier that produces a critical component, an independent manufacturer that also has the capability to produce the component in-house, and a dependent manufacturer without such capability. We first consider a scenario in which the supplier chooses its distribution strategy—either offering its component to both manufacturers or establishing an exclusive selling agreement with a single manufacturer. We explore how the supplier’s optimal distribution strategy (dual or exclusive selling) depends on the terms and process of the contract and on the independent manufacturer’s ability to produce a high-quality component in-house. We also show that, in equilibrium, the independent manufacturer may invest in a high capability level (leading to a high-quality component) as a strategic deterrent against the supplier’s decision to engage in an exclusive selling agreement with the dependent manufacturer. We further consider a setting with mandatory exclusion, imposed by government regulation, that affects free trade among parties. We show that mandatory exclusion can exacerbate or mitigate the independent manufacturer’s incentive to invest in internal sourcing capability, relative to a setting in which the supplier determines its distribution strategy in the absence of such government regulations. Moreover, we show that mandatory exclusion always hurts the supplier, but it can benefit or hurt the manufacturers as well as the consumers, depending on the independent manufacturer’s investment cost and the conditions leading to an exclusionary contract under free trade.