Christian Fong
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Christian Fong has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ayse Eldes
Princeton University
1 shared publication- Joshua McCrain
Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA
1 shared publication Kenneth Lowande
University of Michigan
1 shared publication- Matthew Tyler
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science Rice University Houston Texas USA
1 shared publication - Neil Malhotra
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
1 shared publication Yotam Margalit
Tel Aviv University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 May 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
Voter Fraud, Voter ID, and Legitimacy
Empirical research on voter fraud finds that it is rare and does not appear to influence the outcomes of elections. However, voter fraud may still have deleterious effects even if it does not affect who wins the election. I offer two survey experiments to assess how fraud affects the legitimacy of the winner. I find that fraud undermines legitimacy, even when it occurs on such a small scale that it could not plausibly have changed the outcome of the election. I also find some evidence that voter ID laws significantly increase the winner’s legitimacy and that the effect is larger than the effect of a post-election audit.
- 2 May 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
Voter Fraud, Voter ID, and Legitimacy
Empirical research on voter fraud finds that it is rare and does not appear to influence the outcomes of elections. However, voter fraud may still have deleterious effects even if it does not affect who wins the election. I offer two survey experiments to assess how fraud affects the legitimacy of the winner. I find that fraud undermines legitimacy, even when it occurs on such a small scale that it could not plausibly have changed the outcome of the election. I also find some evidence that voter ID laws significantly increase the winner’s legitimacy and that the effect is larger than the effect of a post-election audit.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Congress & the Presidency
- Vol. 53 (2) , 1-2
The Money Signal: How Fundraising Matters in American Politics
Imagine that a candidate for Congress chances upon a magic lamp. She rubs the lamp three times and out comes a genie. He offers not three wishes, but something more precious to a candidate: $1,000,...
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Congress & the Presidency
- Vol. 53 (2) , 1-2
The Money Signal: How Fundraising Matters in American Politics
Imagine that a candidate for Congress chances upon a magic lamp. She rubs the lamp three times and out comes a genie. He offers not three wishes, but something more precious to a candidate: $1,000,...
- 17 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 202 (1-2) , 193-215
A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership
- 17 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 202 (1-2) , 193-215
A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
- Vol. 4 (4) , 617-639
Entrenched Leviathans
Legislative Leviathan argues that leaders internalize the welfare of the parties they lead and are therefore faithful agents of their parties. This assumption has had a large and productive influence on research on party leaders, but it also makes it hard to understand why the parties sometimes take rights and resources away from their leaders. Amending Legislative Leviathan to assume that leaders vary in quality, want to stay in office, and can use their resources to entrench themselves resolves this puzzle. An empirical test that uses state legislatures uncovers patterns consistent with the theory’s novel predictions. The amended theory offers insight into underexplored aspects of how parties design their leadership offices and suggests new questions for research on party leaders.
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
- Vol. 4 (4) , 617-639
Entrenched Leviathans
Legislative Leviathan argues that leaders internalize the welfare of the parties they lead and are therefore faithful agents of their parties. This assumption has had a large and productive influence on research on party leaders, but it also makes it hard to understand why the parties sometimes take rights and resources away from their leaders. Amending Legislative Leviathan to assume that leaders vary in quality, want to stay in office, and can use their resources to entrench themselves resolves this puzzle. An empirical test that uses state legislatures uncovers patterns consistent with the theory’s novel predictions. The amended theory offers insight into underexplored aspects of how parties design their leadership offices and suggests new questions for research on party leaders.
- Open Access
- 5 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 49 (2) , 227-256
Information and Confrontation in Legislative Oversight
Committees can use oversight hearings to collect and communicate the information Congress needs to oversee the bureaucracy, but many worry that members instead focus on scoring political points by lambasting witnesses. We leverage the collective judgment of congressional staff to measure how exchanges between legislators and witnesses vary on two separable dimensions: information and confrontation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that confrontation crowds out information, we show that members of the president's party engage in less confrontational oversight and reveal no more or less information than their peers.
- 5 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 49 (2) , 227-256
Open AccessInformation and Confrontation in Legislative Oversight
Committees can use oversight hearings to collect and communicate the information Congress needs to oversee the bureaucracy, but many worry that members instead focus on scoring political points by lambasting witnesses. We leverage the collective judgment of congressional staff to measure how exchanges between legislators and witnesses vary on two separable dimensions: information and confrontation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that confrontation crowds out information, we show that members of the president's party engage in less confrontational oversight and reveal no more or less information than their peers.
- Open Access
- 11 July 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Forum
- Vol. 21 (4) , 505-527
Anticipating the Consequences of Filibuster Reforms
Reformers have offered many proposals for changing the Senate filibuster, ranging from modest adjustments to outright abolition. I draw on formal models of obstruction in legislatures to analyze the consequences of three such proposals: creating an opportunity to close debate with a simple majority vote after a sufficiently long floor debate, making it more onerous for the minority to sustain filibusters, and outright abolishing the filibuster. In each of these cases, the models offer a more complete understanding of the effects of these proposals.
- 11 July 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Forum
- Vol. 21 (4) , 505-527
Open AccessAnticipating the Consequences of Filibuster Reforms
Reformers have offered many proposals for changing the Senate filibuster, ranging from modest adjustments to outright abolition. I draw on formal models of obstruction in legislatures to analyze the consequences of three such proposals: creating an opportunity to close debate with a simple majority vote after a sufficiently long floor debate, making it more onerous for the minority to sustain filibusters, and outright abolishing the filibuster. In each of these cases, the models offer a more complete understanding of the effects of these proposals.
- 27 February 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 41 (1) , 1-35
The Congressional Leadership Dilemma
Previous theories assume that congressional party leaders internalize the welfare of the parties they lead. Accordingly, existing work deemphasizes the role of agency problems in explaining the conditions under which parties grant more political resources to their leaders. To show how agency problems can still arise even when the party leader wants only to maximize collective goods and stay in office, I offer a model that borrows two ideas from models of political accountability: leaders vary in quality and giving the leader more resources makes it more difficult to remove her. The model implies that the party faces a tradeoff between maximizing the leader’s capacity to produce collective goods and preserving its ability to remove low-quality leaders from office. This theory offers novel predictions, integrates existing results as implications of a single theory, and explains why the leader’s resources sometimes change even as the political context remains the same (JEL D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).
- 27 February 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 41 (1) , 1-35
The Congressional Leadership Dilemma
Previous theories assume that congressional party leaders internalize the welfare of the parties they lead. Accordingly, existing work deemphasizes the role of agency problems in explaining the conditions under which parties grant more political resources to their leaders. To show how agency problems can still arise even when the party leader wants only to maximize collective goods and stay in office, I offer a model that borrows two ideas from models of political accountability: leaders vary in quality and giving the leader more resources makes it more difficult to remove her. The model implies that the party faces a tradeoff between maximizing the leader’s capacity to produce collective goods and preserving its ability to remove low-quality leaders from office. This theory offers novel predictions, integrates existing results as implications of a single theory, and explains why the leader’s resources sometimes change even as the political context remains the same (JEL D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).
- 9 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 47 (4) , 959-989
Rules and the Containment of Conflict in Congress
Congressional rules can be violated by majority vote, but the application of those rules often leads to different outcomes than would prevail under direct majority rule. Why does Congress enact rules in the first place, and why would not a majority violate those rules whenever it disliked the outcomes they produced? Drawing from work in psychology, I argue legislators become angry and engage in socially costly retaliation when unfavorable outcomes are produced by discretionary authority but not when they are produced by the application of fixed rules. Consequently, rules sometimes inefficiently allocate congressional resources, but they also reduce costly conflict within the institution. I present a model that provides conditions under which the legislature prefers to enact and defer to rules and derive its empirical implications.
- 9 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 47 (4) , 959-989
Rules and the Containment of Conflict in Congress
Congressional rules can be violated by majority vote, but the application of those rules often leads to different outcomes than would prevail under direct majority rule. Why does Congress enact rules in the first place, and why would not a majority violate those rules whenever it disliked the outcomes they produced? Drawing from work in psychology, I argue legislators become angry and engage in socially costly retaliation when unfavorable outcomes are produced by discretionary authority but not when they are produced by the application of fixed rules. Consequently, rules sometimes inefficiently allocate congressional resources, but they also reduce costly conflict within the institution. I present a model that provides conditions under which the legislature prefers to enact and defer to rules and derive its empirical implications.
- 11 November 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 29 (4) , 467-484
Machine Learning Predictions as Regression Covariates
In text, images, merged surveys, voter files, and elsewhere, data sets are often missing important covariates, either because they are latent features of observations (such as sentiment in text) or because they are not collected (such as race in voter files). One promising approach for coping with this missing data is to find the true values of the missing covariates for a subset of the observations and then train a machine learning algorithm to predict the values of those covariates for the rest. However, plugging in these predictions without regard for prediction error renders regression analyses biased, inconsistent, and overconfident. We characterize the severity of the problem posed by prediction error, describe a procedure to avoid these inconsistencies under comparatively general assumptions, and demonstrate the performance of our estimators through simulations and a study of hostile political dialogue on the Internet. We provide software implementing our approach.
- 11 November 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 29 (4) , 467-484
Machine Learning Predictions as Regression Covariates
In text, images, merged surveys, voter files, and elsewhere, data sets are often missing important covariates, either because they are latent features of observations (such as sentiment in text) or because they are not collected (such as race in voter files). One promising approach for coping with this missing data is to find the true values of the missing covariates for a subset of the observations and then train a machine learning algorithm to predict the values of those covariates for the rest. However, plugging in these predictions without regard for prediction error renders regression analyses biased, inconsistent, and overconfident. We characterize the severity of the problem posed by prediction error, describe a procedure to avoid these inconsistencies under comparatively general assumptions, and demonstrate the performance of our estimators through simulations and a study of hostile political dialogue on the Internet. We provide software implementing our approach.
- 10 April 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 52 (03) , 451-456
Political Legacies: Understanding Their Significance to Contemporary Political Debates
Politicians bequeath an important legacy after they leave office: the public’s memories of their time in office. Indeed, the media often discuss legacy concerns as a key motivation of politicians. Yet, there has been little empirical analysis of how politicians’ legacies are interpreted and used by the mass public. Analyzing millions of comments from online discussion forums, we show that citizens frequently mobilize memories of past politicians in their discussions of current events. A randomized survey experiment rationalizes such invocations of past politicians: they bolster the persuasiveness of contemporary arguments—particularly bad ones—but only when made in the context of a policy domain specifically associated with a past politician. Our findings suggest that politicians have a strong interest in cultivating a positive, broad, and enduring legacy because memories of them influence policy debates long after they leave office.
- 10 April 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 52 (03) , 451-456
Political Legacies: Understanding Their Significance to Contemporary Political Debates
Politicians bequeath an important legacy after they leave office: the public’s memories of their time in office. Indeed, the media often discuss legacy concerns as a key motivation of politicians. Yet, there has been little empirical analysis of how politicians’ legacies are interpreted and used by the mass public. Analyzing millions of comments from online discussion forums, we show that citizens frequently mobilize memories of past politicians in their discussions of current events. A randomized survey experiment rationalizes such invocations of past politicians: they bolster the persuasiveness of contemporary arguments—particularly bad ones—but only when made in the context of a policy domain specifically associated with a past politician. Our findings suggest that politicians have a strong interest in cultivating a positive, broad, and enduring legacy because memories of them influence policy debates long after they leave office.