Silvana Tarlea
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Silvana Tarlea has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Stefanie Bailer
Department of Social Sciences University of Basel Basel Switzerland
3 shared publicationsFabio Wasserfallen
Institute of Political Science University of Bern Bern Switzerland
2 shared publicationsJonas Tallberg
Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
2 shared publications- Lisa Dellmuth
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
2 shared publications - Carola Klöck
Center for International Studies, Sciences Po, Paris, France
1 shared publication Dirk Leuffen
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
Climate agreement-making across negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: how states participate in the UN climate negotiations
Participation in multilateral negotiations such as those on climate change is key to understanding negotiation processes and outcomes. Despite its importance, participation – what negotiators actually do – remains understudied and ill understood. We address this gap by examining participation in UN climate negotiations. Specifically, we collect data across all 198 Parties and 58 negotiation sessions (subsidiary body meetings, SBs, and Conferences of the Parties, COPs) since 1995 on a total of six activities across both negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: oral interventions, written submissions, and services as chairs for negotiation activities; and press conferences, side events, and exhibits for non-negotiation spaces. Our analysis shows that participation spans different spaces, even if negotiations dominate. Nevertheless, non-negotiation spaces are growing in importance, with COP15 serving as a turning point. Non-negotiation spaces complement negotiations: Parties active in negotiations also tend to pursue non-negotiation spaces. Finally, Parties differ strongly in the extent to which they engage, with many Parties remaining relatively passive, sometimes despite a continuous presence at negotiation sessions. These observations already help to understand UN climate negotiations better, but invite further work, including more qualitative research – for which our data can provide a helpful starting point.
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
Open AccessClimate agreement-making across negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: how states participate in the UN climate negotiations
Participation in multilateral negotiations such as those on climate change is key to understanding negotiation processes and outcomes. Despite its importance, participation – what negotiators actually do – remains understudied and ill understood. We address this gap by examining participation in UN climate negotiations. Specifically, we collect data across all 198 Parties and 58 negotiation sessions (subsidiary body meetings, SBs, and Conferences of the Parties, COPs) since 1995 on a total of six activities across both negotiation and non-negotiation spaces: oral interventions, written submissions, and services as chairs for negotiation activities; and press conferences, side events, and exhibits for non-negotiation spaces. Our analysis shows that participation spans different spaces, even if negotiations dominate. Nevertheless, non-negotiation spaces are growing in importance, with COP15 serving as a turning point. Non-negotiation spaces complement negotiations: Parties active in negotiations also tend to pursue non-negotiation spaces. Finally, Parties differ strongly in the extent to which they engage, with many Parties remaining relatively passive, sometimes despite a continuous presence at negotiation sessions. These observations already help to understand UN climate negotiations better, but invite further work, including more qualitative research – for which our data can provide a helpful starting point.
- Open Access
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 25 (1) , 105-126
What Drives International Cooperation? Evidence from WTO Negotiations
Why do some countries cooperate in international negotiations while others do not? This paper examines how regime type and trade relationships jointly shape cooperation among states. While prior research claims that democracies are inherently more cooperative and that trade fosters collaboration, we argue that neither factor alone sufficiently explains patterns of cooperation. Drawing on 1,567 documents submitted by World Trade Organization (WTO) members during the Doha Round negotiations (2000–2012), we analyse cooperation between country pairs (dyads) using hurdle models to assess both the likelihood and extent of cooperation. We find that democracies are not uniformly more cooperative but become so only when high levels of trade interdependence exist. Similarly, democracies also cooperate with authoritarian regimes when intensive trade relationships are present. These results challenge the assumption that democratic governance naturally generates cooperation, showing instead that economic incentives play a decisive role. The study advances understanding of international cooperation in complex multilateral negotiation settings.
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 25 (1) , 105-126
Open AccessWhat Drives International Cooperation? Evidence from WTO Negotiations
Why do some countries cooperate in international negotiations while others do not? This paper examines how regime type and trade relationships jointly shape cooperation among states. While prior research claims that democracies are inherently more cooperative and that trade fosters collaboration, we argue that neither factor alone sufficiently explains patterns of cooperation. Drawing on 1,567 documents submitted by World Trade Organization (WTO) members during the Doha Round negotiations (2000–2012), we analyse cooperation between country pairs (dyads) using hurdle models to assess both the likelihood and extent of cooperation. We find that democracies are not uniformly more cooperative but become so only when high levels of trade interdependence exist. Similarly, democracies also cooperate with authoritarian regimes when intensive trade relationships are present. These results challenge the assumption that democratic governance naturally generates cooperation, showing instead that economic incentives play a decisive role. The study advances understanding of international cooperation in complex multilateral negotiation settings.
- 6 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 37 (1) , 161-178
Executive power in European Union politics
- 6 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 37 (1) , 161-178
Executive power in European Union politics
- Open Access
- 4 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 28 (12) , 1950-1972
The power of expertise: gauging technocracy in EMU reform negotiations
Is the European Union a technocracy? Observers and practitioners of EU politics have debated this deceptively simple question for decades, without arriving at a clear answer. To a large extent, this is due to the elusive nature of technocracy itself, a phenomenon that is hard to define with precision, and even harder to measure empirically. To tackle this problem, the article presents a novel approach to technocracy in the EU based on the study of bargaining settings, in which political and technical actors interact horizontally and simultaneously—as opposed to sequentially—thus allowing for a better appraisal of the power of experts. Using data gathered by the ‘EMU Choices’ project, we apply this alternative framework to the analysis of negotiations on the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union over the period 2010–15, focusing on the role of two institutional actors: the European Central Bank and the European Commission. While we find some evidence for technocracy in EMU negotiations, this has been mostly at the hands of the hybrid Commission rather than the quintessentially technical ECB. This suggests both caution in dismissing the EU as hopelessly technocratic, and the need for further research on the nature of the Commission.
- 4 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 28 (12) , 1950-1972
Open AccessThe power of expertise: gauging technocracy in EMU reform negotiations
Is the European Union a technocracy? Observers and practitioners of EU politics have debated this deceptively simple question for decades, without arriving at a clear answer. To a large extent, this is due to the elusive nature of technocracy itself, a phenomenon that is hard to define with precision, and even harder to measure empirically. To tackle this problem, the article presents a novel approach to technocracy in the EU based on the study of bargaining settings, in which political and technical actors interact horizontally and simultaneously—as opposed to sequentially—thus allowing for a better appraisal of the power of experts. Using data gathered by the ‘EMU Choices’ project, we apply this alternative framework to the analysis of negotiations on the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union over the period 2010–15, focusing on the role of two institutional actors: the European Central Bank and the European Commission. While we find some evidence for technocracy in EMU negotiations, this has been mostly at the hands of the hybrid Commission rather than the quintessentially technical ECB. This suggests both caution in dismissing the EU as hopelessly technocratic, and the need for further research on the nature of the Commission.
- 18 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 59 (2) , 371-387
Politics of Immobility: Global Knowledge Production and the Study of Europe in Asia
Europe and Asia find themselves increasingly connected. Why then do we find limited knowledge mobility in the study of Europe throughout Asia? What factors drive this immobility? This article takes account of the existing literature and complements it by offering a more global picture of European Studies in Asia. Throughout, we assume a decidedly political perspective. The study of Europe, we claim, is not only an academic affair, but subject to a politics of (im‐)mobility driven by state and non‐state funders and influenced by local as well as domestic diplomatic, trade‐related, and strategic factors. The article aims at contributing to our understanding of how Europe is studied in Asia and highlights the importance of non‐educational factors for future debates about knowledge mobility and the possibility of a global science.
- 18 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 59 (2) , 371-387
Politics of Immobility: Global Knowledge Production and the Study of Europe in Asia
Europe and Asia find themselves increasingly connected. Why then do we find limited knowledge mobility in the study of Europe throughout Asia? What factors drive this immobility? This article takes account of the existing literature and complements it by offering a more global picture of European Studies in Asia. Throughout, we assume a decidedly political perspective. The study of Europe, we claim, is not only an academic affair, but subject to a politics of (im‐)mobility driven by state and non‐state funders and influenced by local as well as domestic diplomatic, trade‐related, and strategic factors. The article aims at contributing to our understanding of how Europe is studied in Asia and highlights the importance of non‐educational factors for future debates about knowledge mobility and the possibility of a global science.
- 8 January 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 24-44
Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform
This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments’ preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries’ financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform.
- 8 January 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 24-44
Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform
This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments’ preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries’ financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform.
- 27 November 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 65-88
Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone
This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states’ power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success—particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.
- 27 November 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 20 (1) , 65-88
Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone
This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states’ power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success—particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.
- 5 July 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in East European Politics and Societies
- Vol. 33 (1) , 157-175
Low- and High-Skills Equilibria in Central and Eastern Europe: What Role for the Government?
What determines the incentives of governments and businesses to invest in skills needed for higher value-added activities? While many factors matter, this article focuses on the motivations and the role of political parties in government. A policy analysis in Poland and Romania between 1989 and 2015, shows how governments can determine a change in the supply of skills even in relatively new democracies. We tackle the variation in the supply of sophisticated skills in the two countries and find that, unlike governments dominated by national-conservative parties, governments dominated by liberal parties have strategically steered the supply of skills in the economy. They have simultaneously identified and incentivized three key actors to invest in higher added value activities: (1) They have steered their higher education institutions towards offering degrees conducive to research and development; (2) they have incentivized students through scholarships or through secure employment by fostering links with enterprises; and (3) they have bargained with multinational companies to attract sophisticated activities. The article suggests that political parties should figure more prominently in political economy scholarship focusing on CEE. Moreover, this work speaks to a broader debate about the role of political parties in skill formation and in institutional change more generally.
- 5 July 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in East European Politics and Societies
- Vol. 33 (1) , 157-175
Low- and High-Skills Equilibria in Central and Eastern Europe: What Role for the Government?
What determines the incentives of governments and businesses to invest in skills needed for higher value-added activities? While many factors matter, this article focuses on the motivations and the role of political parties in government. A policy analysis in Poland and Romania between 1989 and 2015, shows how governments can determine a change in the supply of skills even in relatively new democracies. We tackle the variation in the supply of sophisticated skills in the two countries and find that, unlike governments dominated by national-conservative parties, governments dominated by liberal parties have strategically steered the supply of skills in the economy. They have simultaneously identified and incentivized three key actors to invest in higher added value activities: (1) They have steered their higher education institutions towards offering degrees conducive to research and development; (2) they have incentivized students through scholarships or through secure employment by fostering links with enterprises; and (3) they have bargained with multinational companies to attract sophisticated activities. The article suggests that political parties should figure more prominently in political economy scholarship focusing on CEE. Moreover, this work speaks to a broader debate about the role of political parties in skill formation and in institutional change more generally.