Jesper Ahlin Marceta
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Bristol University Press in Evidence & Policy
- Vol. 17 (3) , 525-534
The evidence-based policy movement and political idealism
The opposing views in the scholarly debate on evidence-based policy (EBP) have recently been labeled ‘rationalist’ and ‘constructivist’, where the former are positive to EBP and the latter are not. This framing of the debate is suboptimal, as it conflates critical positions that should be kept separate. This article suggests that the debate should be understood as one between idealists, realists, and counter-idealists about EBP. The realist position, that is, that EBP is difficult or impossible to achieve in practice, has already been treated at length in the debate. The conflict between idealism and counter-idealism, to the contrary, has been neglected. This article aims to stimulate the scholarly debate on EBP by initiating a principled discussion between idealism and counter-idealism about EBP, which should motivate proponents of EBP to formulate their ideal with substantial moral arguments. This places the debate on EBP in the context of normative political theory, where it rightfully belongs. Key messages The scholarly debate on evidence-based policy (EBP) has been framed as one between ‘rationalists’ and ‘constructivists’ It is better understood as one between idealists, realists, and counter-idealists The principled conflict between idealism and counter-idealism is treated at length The discussion should motivate proponents of EBP to formulate their ideal with substantial moral arguments
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Bristol University Press in Evidence & Policy
- Vol. 17 (3) , 525-534
The evidence-based policy movement and political idealism
The opposing views in the scholarly debate on evidence-based policy (EBP) have recently been labeled ‘rationalist’ and ‘constructivist’, where the former are positive to EBP and the latter are not. This framing of the debate is suboptimal, as it conflates critical positions that should be kept separate. This article suggests that the debate should be understood as one between idealists, realists, and counter-idealists about EBP. The realist position, that is, that EBP is difficult or impossible to achieve in practice, has already been treated at length in the debate. The conflict between idealism and counter-idealism, to the contrary, has been neglected. This article aims to stimulate the scholarly debate on EBP by initiating a principled discussion between idealism and counter-idealism about EBP, which should motivate proponents of EBP to formulate their ideal with substantial moral arguments. This places the debate on EBP in the context of normative political theory, where it rightfully belongs. Key messages The scholarly debate on evidence-based policy (EBP) has been framed as one between ‘rationalists’ and ‘constructivists’ It is better understood as one between idealists, realists, and counter-idealists The principled conflict between idealism and counter-idealism is treated at length The discussion should motivate proponents of EBP to formulate their ideal with substantial moral arguments
- 30 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 24 (4) , 543-546
Authenticity and physician-assisted suicide: a reply to Ahlzén
In a recent article in this journal, Rolf Ahlzén treats a moral problem related to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and the notion of authenticity. The problem is whether considerations of a patient’s “true self” should be included in judgments of PAS. In this short commentary, it is argued that Ahlzén (1) neglects to attend to central contributions to the philosophy of authenticity, (2) provides an internally inconsistent theory thereof, and (3) conflates crucial distinctions in the debate.
- 30 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 24 (4) , 543-546
Authenticity and physician-assisted suicide: a reply to Ahlzén
In a recent article in this journal, Rolf Ahlzén treats a moral problem related to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and the notion of authenticity. The problem is whether considerations of a patient’s “true self” should be included in judgments of PAS. In this short commentary, it is argued that Ahlzén (1) neglects to attend to central contributions to the philosophy of authenticity, (2) provides an internally inconsistent theory thereof, and (3) conflates crucial distinctions in the debate.
- Open Access
- 16 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 57 (1) , 41-58
An Individualist Theory of Meaning
- 16 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 57 (1) , 41-58
Open AccessAn Individualist Theory of Meaning
- 8 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 88 (3) , 951-964
Constructing the Abstract Individual
- 8 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 88 (3) , 951-964
Constructing the Abstract Individual
- Open Access
- 7 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-14
Resolved and unresolved bioethical authenticity problems
Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. It is sometimes argued that authenticity, i.e., being “real,” “genuine,” “true to oneself,” or similar, is crucial to a person’s autonomy. Patients sometimes make what appears to be inauthentic decisions, such as when (decision-competent) anorexia nervosa patients refuse treatment to avoid gaining weight, despite that the risk of harm is very high. If such decisions are inauthentic, and therefore non-autonomous, it may be the case they should be overridden for paternalist reasons. However, it is not clear what justifies the judgment that someone or something is inauthentic. This article discusses one recent theory of what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that the theory is seriously limited, as it only provides guidance in three out of nine identified cases. There are at least six authenticity-related problems to be solved, and autonomy theorists thus have reason to engage with the topic of authenticity in practical biomedicine.
- 7 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-14
Open AccessResolved and unresolved bioethical authenticity problems
Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. It is sometimes argued that authenticity, i.e., being “real,” “genuine,” “true to oneself,” or similar, is crucial to a person’s autonomy. Patients sometimes make what appears to be inauthentic decisions, such as when (decision-competent) anorexia nervosa patients refuse treatment to avoid gaining weight, despite that the risk of harm is very high. If such decisions are inauthentic, and therefore non-autonomous, it may be the case they should be overridden for paternalist reasons. However, it is not clear what justifies the judgment that someone or something is inauthentic. This article discusses one recent theory of what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that the theory is seriously limited, as it only provides guidance in three out of nine identified cases. There are at least six authenticity-related problems to be solved, and autonomy theorists thus have reason to engage with the topic of authenticity in practical biomedicine.
- Open Access
- 11 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Academic Ethics
- Vol. 19 (2) , 175-185
Respect the Author: a Research Ethical Principle for Readers
Much of contemporary research ethics was developed in the latter half of the twentieth century as a response to the unethical treatment of human beings in biomedical research. Research ethical considerations have subsequently been extended to cover topics in the sciences and technology such as data handling, precautionary measures, engineering codes of conduct, and more. However, moral issues in the humanities have gained less attention from research ethicists. This article proposes an ethical principle for reading for research purposes: Respect the author.
- 11 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Academic Ethics
- Vol. 19 (2) , 175-185
Open AccessRespect the Author: a Research Ethical Principle for Readers
Much of contemporary research ethics was developed in the latter half of the twentieth century as a response to the unethical treatment of human beings in biomedical research. Research ethical considerations have subsequently been extended to cover topics in the sciences and technology such as data handling, precautionary measures, engineering codes of conduct, and more. However, moral issues in the humanities have gained less attention from research ethicists. This article proposes an ethical principle for reading for research purposes: Respect the author.
- 13 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (1) , 151-153
David C. Rose, Why Culture Matters Most
- 13 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (1) , 151-153
David C. Rose, Why Culture Matters Most
- Open Access
- 19 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 22 (3) , 387-395
A non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy
Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. The concept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under the non-ideal conceptualization proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, everyday choices of generally competent persons are autonomous to the extent that they are intentional and are made with understanding and without controlling influences. It is sometimes suggested that authenticity is important to personal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents otherwise autonomous persons from making autonomous decisions. Building from Beauchamp and Childress’s theory, this article develops a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy. Factors that indicate inauthentic decision-making are explicated, and the full concept is defended from three expected objections. The theory is then tested on a paradigm case which has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time, namely the possible inauthenticity of anorexia nervosa patients’ decision-making. It is concluded that the theory seems to be fruitful in analyses of the degree of autonomy of patients’ decision-making, and that it succeeds in providing reliable action-guidance in practical contexts.
- 19 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 22 (3) , 387-395
Open AccessA non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy
Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. The concept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under the non-ideal conceptualization proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, everyday choices of generally competent persons are autonomous to the extent that they are intentional and are made with understanding and without controlling influences. It is sometimes suggested that authenticity is important to personal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents otherwise autonomous persons from making autonomous decisions. Building from Beauchamp and Childress’s theory, this article develops a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy. Factors that indicate inauthentic decision-making are explicated, and the full concept is defended from three expected objections. The theory is then tested on a paradigm case which has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time, namely the possible inauthenticity of anorexia nervosa patients’ decision-making. It is concluded that the theory seems to be fruitful in analyses of the degree of autonomy of patients’ decision-making, and that it succeeds in providing reliable action-guidance in practical contexts.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in HEC Forum
- Vol. 30 (4) , 361-377
What Justifies Judgments of Inauthenticity?
The notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or “true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings.
- 3 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in HEC Forum
- Vol. 30 (4) , 361-377
Open AccessWhat Justifies Judgments of Inauthenticity?
The notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or “true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings.
- Open Access
- 8 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 43-50
The impossibility of reliably determining the authenticity of desires: implications for informed consent
It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making requires that the decision-maker’s desires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is argued that a method to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories of authenticity is introduced and applied to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach of treating them individually. The conclusion is drawn that, in practice, the authenticity of desires cannot be reliably determined. It is suggested that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent practices in healthcare.
- 8 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 43-50
Open AccessThe impossibility of reliably determining the authenticity of desires: implications for informed consent
It is sometimes argued that autonomous decision-making requires that the decision-maker’s desires are authentic, i.e., “genuine,” “truly her own,” “not out of character,” or similar. In this article, it is argued that a method to reliably determine the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of a desire cannot be developed. A taxonomy of characteristics displayed by different theories of authenticity is introduced and applied to evaluate such theories categorically, in contrast to the prior approach of treating them individually. The conclusion is drawn that, in practice, the authenticity of desires cannot be reliably determined. It is suggested that authenticity should therefore not be employed in informed consent practices in healthcare.