DHDaniel Holcomb

Daniel Holcomb

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Daniel Holcomb has a total of 77 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Security Aware Placement for Split Manufactured Integrated Circuit Design Flows

    by Arjun Suresh, Hari Narayana Burra, Wei-Huan Chen, Daniel Holcomb


  • Open Access

    Stealing Maggie's Secrets-On the Challenges of IP Theft Through FPGA Reverse Engineering

    by Simon Klix, Nils Albartus, Julian Speith, Paul Staat, Alice Verstege, Annika Wilde, Daniel Lammers, Jörn Langheinrich, Christian Kison, Sebastian Sester-Wehle, et al.

    Intellectual Property (IP) theft is a cause of major financial and reputational damage, reportedly in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars annually in the U.S. alone. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are particularly exposed to IP theft, because their configuration file contains the IP in a proprietary format that can be mapped to a gate-level netlist with moderate effort. Despite this threat, the scientific understanding of this issue lacks behind reality, thereby preventing an in-depth assessment of IP theft from FPGAs in academia. We address this discrepancy through a real-world case study on a Lattice iCE40 FPGA found inside iPhone 7. Apple refers to this FPGA as Maggie. By reverse engineering the proprietary signal-processing algorithm implemented on Maggie, we generate novel insights into the actual efforts required to commit FPGA IP theft and the challenges an attacker faces on the way. Informed by our case study, we then introduce generalized netlist reverse engineering techniques that drastically reduce the required manual effort and are applicable across a diverse spectrum of FPGA implementations and architectures. We evaluate these techniques on six benchmarks that are representative of different FPGA applications and have been synthesized for Xilinx and Lattice FPGAs, as well as in an end-to-end white-box case study. Finally, we provide a comprehensive open-source tool suite of netlist reverse engineering techniques to foster future research, enable the community to perform realistic threat assessments, and facilitate the evaluation of novel countermeasures.


  • Open Access

    Evaluating Vulnerability of Chiplet-Based Systems to Contactless Probing Techniques

    by Aleksa Deric, Kyle Mitard, Shahin Tajik, Daniel Holcomb

    Driven by a need for ever increasing chip performance and inclusion of innovative features, a growing number of semiconductor companies are opting for all-inclusive System-on-Chip (SoC) architectures. Although Moore's Law has been able to keep up with the demand for more complex logic, manufacturing large dies still poses a challenge. Increasingly the solution adopted to minimize the impact of silicon defects on manufacturing yield has been to split a design into multiple smaller dies called chiplets which are then brought together on a silicon interposer. Advanced 2.5D and 3D packaging techniques that enable this kind of integration also promise increased power efficiency and opportunities for heterogeneous integration. However, despite their advantages, chiplets are not without issues. Apart from manufacturing challenges that come with new packaging techniques, disaggregating a design into multiple logically and physically separate dies introduces new threats, including the possibility of tampering with and probing exposed data lines. In this paper we evaluate the exposure of chiplets to probing by applying laser contactless probing techniques to a chiplet-based AMD/Xilinx VU9P FPGA. First, we identify and map interposer wire drivers and show that probing them is easier compared to probing internal nodes. Lastly, we demonstrate that delay-based sensors, which can be used to protect against physical probes, are insufficient to protect against laser probing as the delay change due to laser probing is only 0.792ps even at 100\% laser power.


  • Open Access

    Resurrection Attack: Defeating Xilinx MPU's Memory Protection

    by Bharadwaj Madabhushi, Chandra Sekhar Mummidi, Sandip Kundu, Daniel Holcomb

    Memory protection units (MPUs) are hardware-assisted security features that are commonly used in embedded processors such as the ARM 940T, Infineon TC1775, and Xilinx Zynq. MPUs partition the memory statically, and set individual protection attributes for each partition. MPUs typically define two protection domains: user mode and supervisor mode. Normally, this is sufficient for protecting the kernel and applications. However, we have discovered a way to access a process memory due to a vulnerability in Xilinx MPU (XMPU) implementation that we call Resurrection Attack. We find that XMPU security policy protects user memory from unauthorized access when the user is active. However, when a user's session is terminated, the contents of the memory region of the terminated process are not cleared. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by gaining access to the memory region after it has been reassigned. The attacker can read the data from the previous user's memory region, thereby compromising the confidentiality. To prevent the Resurrection Attack, the memory region of a terminated process must be cleared. However, this is not the case in the XMPU implementation, which allows our attack to succeed. The Resurrection Attack is a serious security flaw that could be exploited to steal sensitive data or gain unauthorized access to a system. It is important for users of Xilinx FPGAs to be aware of this vulnerability until this flaw is addressed.

  • Open Access

    Memory Scraping Attack on Xilinx FPGAs: Private Data Extraction from Terminated Processes

    by Bharadwaj Madabhushi, Sandip Kundu, Daniel Holcomb

    FPGA-based hardware accelerators are becoming increasingly popular due to their versatility, customizability, energy efficiency, constant latency, and scalability. FPGAs can be tailored to specific algorithms, enabling efficient hardware implementations that effectively leverage algorithm parallelism. This can lead to significant performance improvements over CPUs and GPUs, particularly for highly parallel applications. For example, a recent study found that Stratix 10 FPGAs can achieve up to 90\% of the performance of a TitanX Pascal GPU while consuming less than 50\% of the power. This makes FPGAs an attractive choice for accelerating machine learning (ML) workloads. However, our research finds privacy and security vulnerabilities in existing Xilinx FPGA-based hardware acceleration solutions. These vulnerabilities arise from the lack of memory initialization and insufficient process isolation, which creates potential avenues for unauthorized access to private data used by processes. To illustrate this issue, we conducted experiments using a Xilinx ZCU104 board running the PetaLinux tool from Xilinx. We found that PetaLinux does not effectively clear memory locations associated with a terminated process, leaving them vulnerable to memory scraping attack (MSA). This paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution is an attack methodology of using the Xilinx debugger from a different user space. We find that we are able to access process IDs, virtual address spaces, and pagemaps of one user from a different user space because of lack of adequate process isolation. The second contribution is a methodology for characterizing terminated processes and accessing their private data. We illustrate this on Xilinx ML application library.

  • Countermeasures Against Voltage Attacks in Multi-tenant FPGAs

    by Shayan Moini, George Provelengios, Daniel Holcomb, Russell Tessier


  • Open Access

    Fault Recovery from Multi-Tenant FPGA Voltage Attacks

    by Shayan Moini, Dhruv Kansagara, Daniel Holcomb, Russell Tessier

    As multi-tenant FPGA applications continue to scale in size and complexity, their need for resilience against environmental effects and malicious actions continues to grow. To ensure continuously correct computation, faults in the compute fabric must be identified, isolated, and suppressed in the nanosecond to microsecond range. In this paper, we detail a circuit and system-level methodology to detect compute failure conditions due to on-FPGA voltage attacks. Our approach rapidly suppresses incorrect results and regenerates potentially-tainted results before they propagate, allowing time for an attacker to be suppressed. Instrumentation includes voltage sensors to detect error conditions induced by attackers. This analysis is paired with focused remediation approaches involving data buffering, fault suppression, results recalculation, and computation restart. Our approach has been demonstrated using an RSA encryption circuit implemented on a Stratix 10 FPGA. We show that a voltage attack using on-FPGA power wasters can be effectively detected and computation halted in 15 ns, preventing the injection of timing faults. Potentially tainted results are successfully regenerated, allowing for fault-free circuit operation. A full characterization of the latency and resource overheads of fault detection and recovery is provided.


  • Open Access

    Voltage Sensor Implementations for Remote Power Attacks on FPGAs

    by Shayan Moini, Aleksa Deric, Xiang Li, George Provelengios, Wayne Burleson, Russell Tessier, Daniel Holcomb

    This article presents a study of two types of on-chip FPGA voltage sensors based on ring oscillators (ROs) and time-to-digital converter (TDCs), respectively. It has previously been shown that these sensors are often used to extract side-channel information from FPGAs without physical access. The performance of the sensors is evaluated in the presence of circuits that deliberately waste power, resulting in localized voltage drops. The effects of FPGA power supply features and sensor sensitivity in detecting voltage drops in an FPGA power distribution network (PDN) are evaluated for Xilinx Artix-7, Zynq 7000, and Zynq UltraScale+ FPGAs. We show that both sensor types are able to detect supply voltage drops, and that their measurements are consistent with each other. Our findings show that TDC-based sensors are more sensitive and can detect voltage drops that are shorter in duration, while RO sensors are easier to implement because calibration is not required. Furthermore, we present a new time-interleaved TDC design that sweeps the sensor phase. The new sensor generates data that can reconstruct voltage transients on the order of tens of picoseconds.