Bing-Chang Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Bing-Chang Wang has a total of 56 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Huanshui Zhang
College of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China
10 shared publications - Ji-Feng Zhang
Zhongyuan University of Technology
5 shared publications - Yong Liang
School of Information Science and Engineering, Shandong Normal University, Jinan, China
5 shared publications Huanshui Zhang
College of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266510, China
4 shared publications- Jianhui Huang
Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
4 shared publications - Tinghan Xie
Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, PR China
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
- Vol. 64 (4) , 2504-2538
Leader-Follower Mean Field LQG Games with Multiplicative Noise: The Direct Approach
This paper studies open-loop and feedback solutions to leader-follower mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian games with multiplicative noise by the direct approach. The leader-follower game involves a leader and many followers, where the state and control weight matrices in their costs are not limited to be positive definite. From variational analysis with mean field approximations, we obtain a set of open-loop controls in terms of solutions to mean field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. By applying the matrix maximum principle, a set of decentralized feedback strategies is constructed. Different from traditional works, a cross term has appeared in derivation due to the presence of mean field terms. For open-loop and feedback solutions, the corresponding optimal costs of all players are explicitly given in terms of the solutions to two Riccati equations, respectively.
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
- Vol. 64 (4) , 2504-2538
Leader-Follower Mean Field LQG Games with Multiplicative Noise: The Direct Approach
This paper studies open-loop and feedback solutions to leader-follower mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian games with multiplicative noise by the direct approach. The leader-follower game involves a leader and many followers, where the state and control weight matrices in their costs are not limited to be positive definite. From variational analysis with mean field approximations, we obtain a set of open-loop controls in terms of solutions to mean field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. By applying the matrix maximum principle, a set of decentralized feedback strategies is constructed. Different from traditional works, a cross term has appeared in derivation due to the presence of mean field terms. For open-loop and feedback solutions, the corresponding optimal costs of all players are explicitly given in terms of the solutions to two Riccati equations, respectively.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
- Vol. 24 (1) , 1-29
A Selective Survey of Recent Results on Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
- Vol. 24 (1) , 1-29
A Selective Survey of Recent Results on Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games
- Open Access
Leader-Follower Mean Field LQG Games with Multiplicative Noise
This paper studies open-loop and feedback solutions to leader-follower mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian games with multiplicative noise by the direct approach. The leader-follower game involves a leader and many followers, where the state and control weight matrices in their costs are not limited to be positive definite. From variational analysis with mean field approximations, we obtain a set of open-loop controls in terms of solutions to mean field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. By applying the matrix maximum principle, a set of decentralized feedback strategies is constructed. Distinct from traditional works, a cross term has appeared in derivation due to the presence of mean field terms. For open-loop and feedback solutions, the corresponding optimal costs of all players are explicitly given in terms of the solutions to two Riccati equations, respectively.
Open AccessLeader-Follower Mean Field LQG Games with Multiplicative Noise
This paper studies open-loop and feedback solutions to leader-follower mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian games with multiplicative noise by the direct approach. The leader-follower game involves a leader and many followers, where the state and control weight matrices in their costs are not limited to be positive definite. From variational analysis with mean field approximations, we obtain a set of open-loop controls in terms of solutions to mean field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. By applying the matrix maximum principle, a set of decentralized feedback strategies is constructed. Distinct from traditional works, a cross term has appeared in derivation due to the presence of mean field terms. For open-loop and feedback solutions, the corresponding optimal costs of all players are explicitly given in terms of the solutions to two Riccati equations, respectively.
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
- Vol. 13 (2) , 2175-2187
Social Optima and Mixed Nash Equilibria in Mean Field LQ Control of Major–Minor Systems
This article adopts a direct approach to systematically solve a class of linear quadratic social team and mixed game problems with one major agent and numerous minor agents in the presence of mean field interactions. For the team problem, the major and minor agents minimize a social cost which equals the sum of all agents’ costs. However, for the mixed game problem, there is a conflict of interest between the major agent and the other minor agents (the minor agents still work as a team). A direct approach is applied to solve these two problems, and the corresponding decentralized optimal controls are achieved by applying the maximum principle. This method can keep our analysis in a low-dimensional environment after directly decoupling a high-dimensional forward–backward stochastic differential equation in the team problem. The proofs of asymptotic social optimality and $\epsilon$ -Nash equilibrium are also provided, respectively. Finally, we summarize the differences between the team and mixed game problems, and a numerical simulation is presented.
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
- Vol. 13 (2) , 2175-2187
Social Optima and Mixed Nash Equilibria in Mean Field LQ Control of Major–Minor Systems
This article adopts a direct approach to systematically solve a class of linear quadratic social team and mixed game problems with one major agent and numerous minor agents in the presence of mean field interactions. For the team problem, the major and minor agents minimize a social cost which equals the sum of all agents’ costs. However, for the mixed game problem, there is a conflict of interest between the major agent and the other minor agents (the minor agents still work as a team). A direct approach is applied to solve these two problems, and the corresponding decentralized optimal controls are achieved by applying the maximum principle. This method can keep our analysis in a low-dimensional environment after directly decoupling a high-dimensional forward–backward stochastic differential equation in the team problem. The proofs of asymptotic social optimality and $\epsilon$ -Nash equilibrium are also provided, respectively. Finally, we summarize the differences between the team and mixed game problems, and a numerical simulation is presented.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 12 (4) , 2713-2725
Data-Driven Mean-Field Equilibrium Computation in Large-Population LQG Games
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 12 (4) , 2713-2725
Data-Driven Mean-Field Equilibrium Computation in Large-Population LQG Games
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control
- Vol. 36 (5) , 2590-2603
Model‐Free Approximate Dynamic Programming for Stochastic Zero‐Sum Games: Algorithm Design and Analysis
This paper studies the discrete‐time stochastic zero‐sum games by employing the approximate dynamic programming technique. We present on‐policy and off‐policy policy iteration algorithms to attain the saddle point without using the information of the system dynamics. A comparative analysis of model‐free algorithms and their equivalence relationships is examined. Numerical examples are given to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control
- Vol. 36 (5) , 2590-2603
Model‐Free Approximate Dynamic Programming for Stochastic Zero‐Sum Games: Algorithm Design and Analysis
This paper studies the discrete‐time stochastic zero‐sum games by employing the approximate dynamic programming technique. We present on‐policy and off‐policy policy iteration algorithms to attain the saddle point without using the information of the system dynamics. A comparative analysis of model‐free algorithms and their equivalence relationships is examined. Numerical examples are given to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
- 30 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Science China Information Sciences
- Vol. 68 (11) , 1-16
Stackelberg games for continuous-time stochastic linear quadratic systems via Q-learning
- 30 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Science China Information Sciences
- Vol. 68 (11) , 1-16
Stackelberg games for continuous-time stochastic linear quadratic systems via Q-learning
- 16 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control
- Vol. 36 (4) , 1876-1887
Stochastic Linear Quadratic Optimal Control for Continuous‐Time Systems via Reinforcement Learning
This paper aims at solving the infinite‐horizon stochastic linear quadratic (SLQ) optimal control problem online for continuous‐time systems with both additive and multiplicative noises. To eliminate the requirement for prior knowledge of system dynamics, a novel policy iteration approach is proposed, which leverages integral reinforcement learning (RL) techniques to iteratively solve the stochastic algebraic Riccati equation (SARE) using real‐time state and input data. The proposed approach is an off‐policy RL algorithm, where the learning process can be executed by using identical state and input data collected online over fixed time intervals, thereby enabling the optimal control law to be computed. The convergence of the proposed algorithm to the solution of the SARE is verified, and the effectiveness is validated through a numerical example.
- 16 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control
- Vol. 36 (4) , 1876-1887
Stochastic Linear Quadratic Optimal Control for Continuous‐Time Systems via Reinforcement Learning
This paper aims at solving the infinite‐horizon stochastic linear quadratic (SLQ) optimal control problem online for continuous‐time systems with both additive and multiplicative noises. To eliminate the requirement for prior knowledge of system dynamics, a novel policy iteration approach is proposed, which leverages integral reinforcement learning (RL) techniques to iteratively solve the stochastic algebraic Riccati equation (SARE) using real‐time state and input data. The proposed approach is an off‐policy RL algorithm, where the learning process can be executed by using identical state and input data collected online over fixed time intervals, thereby enabling the optimal control law to be computed. The convergence of the proposed algorithm to the solution of the SARE is verified, and the effectiveness is validated through a numerical example.
- 14 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Control Theory and Technology
- Vol. 24 (3) , 451-461
An online value iteration method for stochastic linear quadratic control with multiplicative noise
- 14 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Control Theory and Technology
- Vol. 24 (3) , 451-461
An online value iteration method for stochastic linear quadratic control with multiplicative noise
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
- Vol. 55 (11) , 5318-5331
Linear Quadratic Mean Field Stackelberg Games: Open-Loop and Feedback Solutions
This article investigates open-loop and feedback solutions to linear quadratic mean field (MF) games with a leader and many followers. The leader first gives its strategy and then all the followers cooperate to optimize the social cost as the sum of their costs. By variational analysis with MF approximations, we obtain a set of open-loop controls of players in terms of solutions to MF forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs), which is further shown be to an asymptotic Stackelberg-team equilibrium. By applying the matrix maximum principle, a set of decentralized feedback strategies is constructed for all the players. For open-loop and feedback solutions, the corresponding costs of all players are explicitly given by virtue of the solutions to two Riccati equations, respectively. The performances of two solutions are compared by the numerical simulation.
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
- Vol. 55 (11) , 5318-5331
Linear Quadratic Mean Field Stackelberg Games: Open-Loop and Feedback Solutions
This article investigates open-loop and feedback solutions to linear quadratic mean field (MF) games with a leader and many followers. The leader first gives its strategy and then all the followers cooperate to optimize the social cost as the sum of their costs. By variational analysis with MF approximations, we obtain a set of open-loop controls of players in terms of solutions to MF forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs), which is further shown be to an asymptotic Stackelberg-team equilibrium. By applying the matrix maximum principle, a set of decentralized feedback strategies is constructed for all the players. For open-loop and feedback solutions, the corresponding costs of all players are explicitly given by virtue of the solutions to two Riccati equations, respectively. The performances of two solutions are compared by the numerical simulation.