Xiao Ma
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Xiao Ma has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Susan H. Whiting
Univ Washington, Polit Sci, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
3 shared publications - Chengyuan Ji
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
1 shared publication Chuyu Liu
1 shared publicationFengming Lu
1 shared publicationNing Guo
Tsinghua University
1 shared publication- Tan Zhao
Department of Public Administration, School of Public Administration and Policy, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Urban Affairs Review
Developmentalism Without a Playbook: Grassroots Government and the Rise of E-Commerce in Peri-Urban China
This study examines how a grassroots government in peri-urban China facilitated the rise of e-commerce as a driver of local development. Drawing on a single-case study of L Town in X County, based on multi-year fieldwork and more than 100 interviews, we identify three stages through which the local state cultivated this nascent industry: understanding the market through surveys and experiential learning; assisting the market by promoting industrial clustering, strengthening human capital, and reducing costs; and planning market upgrades by cultivating regional brands and increasing product value. Our evidence further suggests that officials’ motivations extended beyond career advancement and fiscal incentives: concerns with social reputation and local visibility complemented material considerations. By tracing how a resource-poor township government promoted a frontier industry without an established governance playbook, this study extends the literature on local state entrepreneurialism and sheds light on state–market relations in China's rural e-commerce boom.
- 10 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Urban Affairs Review
Developmentalism Without a Playbook: Grassroots Government and the Rise of E-Commerce in Peri-Urban China
This study examines how a grassroots government in peri-urban China facilitated the rise of e-commerce as a driver of local development. Drawing on a single-case study of L Town in X County, based on multi-year fieldwork and more than 100 interviews, we identify three stages through which the local state cultivated this nascent industry: understanding the market through surveys and experiential learning; assisting the market by promoting industrial clustering, strengthening human capital, and reducing costs; and planning market upgrades by cultivating regional brands and increasing product value. Our evidence further suggests that officials’ motivations extended beyond career advancement and fiscal incentives: concerns with social reputation and local visibility complemented material considerations. By tracing how a resource-poor township government promoted a frontier industry without an established governance playbook, this study extends the literature on local state entrepreneurialism and sheds light on state–market relations in China's rural e-commerce boom.
- 17 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 265, 70-87
Leveraging Local Courts to Penalize Corruption in China: Trials at a Distance
How do Chinese courts punish corruption? This paper demonstrates how China strategically leverages its court system to signal anti-corruption resolve by transferring high-level corruption cases to local courts in distant jurisdictions. Assigning cases to distant courts insulates the judiciary from local political interference through geographic recusal and prevents the formation of a focal point for elite coordination by creating uncertainty about which court will be designated. Using an original dataset of high-ranking officials convicted of corruption since the 18th Party Congress, this paper finds that: 1) during the court designation stage, the more severe the case, the more distant the court, and the specific location of the court cannot be easily inferred from previous assignment records or case profiles; and 2) at the conviction stage, given the same case severity, courts that are farther away tend to impose longer sentences. These findings suggest that despite the prevalence of local judicial capture and protectionism, the local court system can still be strategically employed as an institutional tool for punishing corruption.
- 17 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 265, 70-87
Leveraging Local Courts to Penalize Corruption in China: Trials at a Distance
How do Chinese courts punish corruption? This paper demonstrates how China strategically leverages its court system to signal anti-corruption resolve by transferring high-level corruption cases to local courts in distant jurisdictions. Assigning cases to distant courts insulates the judiciary from local political interference through geographic recusal and prevents the formation of a focal point for elite coordination by creating uncertainty about which court will be designated. Using an original dataset of high-ranking officials convicted of corruption since the 18th Party Congress, this paper finds that: 1) during the court designation stage, the more severe the case, the more distant the court, and the specific location of the court cannot be easily inferred from previous assignment records or case profiles; and 2) at the conviction stage, given the same case severity, courts that are farther away tend to impose longer sentences. These findings suggest that despite the prevalence of local judicial capture and protectionism, the local court system can still be strategically employed as an institutional tool for punishing corruption.
- Open Access
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- p. 1-2
Validating Vignette Designs with Real-World Data: A Study of Legal Mobilization in Response to Land Grievances in Rural China – CORRIGENDUM
Validating Vignette Designs with Real-World Data: A Study of Legal Mobilization in Response to Land Grievances in Rural China – CORRIGENDUM
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- p. 1-2
Open AccessValidating Vignette Designs with Real-World Data: A Study of Legal Mobilization in Response to Land Grievances in Rural China – CORRIGENDUM
Validating Vignette Designs with Real-World Data: A Study of Legal Mobilization in Response to Land Grievances in Rural China – CORRIGENDUM
- 9 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 58 (6) , 1238-1272
Revolutionaries for Railways
This study explores the sources of regional favoritism in government-invested infrastructure projects. We built an original county-level dataset that matches the biographies of 1614 retired communist revolutionaries with information on the expansion of China’s state-directed high-speed railway program. Our findings indicate that a surviving revolutionary makes his birth county significantly more likely to receive the central government’s approval for railway investment. This pattern is robust after accounting for a wide range of alternative explanations and a natural experiment design that exploits variations in the timings of revolutionaries’ natural deaths. Additional evidence suggests that the empowering effect of the retired revolutionaries stems most likely from their assistance in their birth counties’ bottom-up lobbying of the central government. Their moral authority as the founders of the regime helps boost local requests for investment in the eyes of central policymakers. Our findings highlight a bottom-up intergovernmental dynamic that translates personal influence into policy benefits.
- 9 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 58 (6) , 1238-1272
Revolutionaries for Railways
This study explores the sources of regional favoritism in government-invested infrastructure projects. We built an original county-level dataset that matches the biographies of 1614 retired communist revolutionaries with information on the expansion of China’s state-directed high-speed railway program. Our findings indicate that a surviving revolutionary makes his birth county significantly more likely to receive the central government’s approval for railway investment. This pattern is robust after accounting for a wide range of alternative explanations and a natural experiment design that exploits variations in the timings of revolutionaries’ natural deaths. Additional evidence suggests that the empowering effect of the retired revolutionaries stems most likely from their assistance in their birth counties’ bottom-up lobbying of the central government. Their moral authority as the founders of the regime helps boost local requests for investment in the eyes of central policymakers. Our findings highlight a bottom-up intergovernmental dynamic that translates personal influence into policy benefits.
- Open Access
- 2 January 2024
- Published by JSTOR
South Korean Migrants in China
Choose from multiple DOI resolution options
- 2 January 2024
- Published by JSTOR
Open AccessSouth Korean Migrants in China
Choose from multiple DOI resolution options
- Open Access
- 13 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Studies in Comparative International Development
- Vol. 57 (3) , 337-360
Vote Buying as Rent Seeking: Land Sales in China’s Village Elections
What explains why vote buying occurs in some elections but not others? The phenomenon of vote buying is under-studied in authoritarian, single-party-dominant regimes, especially in non-partisan elections in which competition is candidate-centered rather than party centered. Village elections in China provide a valuable window on the dynamics of vote buying in these conditions. Employing both an in-depth case study and an original, panel survey to provide new, systematic measures of rents and vote buying, we develop and test the following hypothesis: the availability of non-competitive rents accessible by winning candidates explains the variation in the incidence of vote buying in local elections. Our causal identification strategy exploits the timing of land takings and the exogenous nature of formal land takings authorized in state land-use plans at higher administrative levels to test the vote-buying-as-rent-seeking hypothesis. We find that the lure of rents, mainly from government takings of village land, is a key driver of vote buying by non-partisan candidates for the office of village leader. The evidence suggests that vote buying provides information to the authoritarian state about which local elites it should recruit into the rent-sharing coalition.
- 13 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Studies in Comparative International Development
- Vol. 57 (3) , 337-360
Open AccessVote Buying as Rent Seeking: Land Sales in China’s Village Elections
What explains why vote buying occurs in some elections but not others? The phenomenon of vote buying is under-studied in authoritarian, single-party-dominant regimes, especially in non-partisan elections in which competition is candidate-centered rather than party centered. Village elections in China provide a valuable window on the dynamics of vote buying in these conditions. Employing both an in-depth case study and an original, panel survey to provide new, systematic measures of rents and vote buying, we develop and test the following hypothesis: the availability of non-competitive rents accessible by winning candidates explains the variation in the incidence of vote buying in local elections. Our causal identification strategy exploits the timing of land takings and the exogenous nature of formal land takings authorized in state land-use plans at higher administrative levels to test the vote-buying-as-rent-seeking hypothesis. We find that the lure of rents, mainly from government takings of village land, is a key driver of vote buying by non-partisan candidates for the office of village leader. The evidence suggests that vote buying provides information to the authoritarian state about which local elites it should recruit into the rent-sharing coalition.
- 9 September 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Chinese Governance
- Vol. 7 (4) , 559-582
Riding on the power of the masses? How different modes of mass mobilization shape local elite bargaining in China
When local bureaucrats in China disagree with their superiors, official channels for achieving a policy revision are limited and generally ineffective. However, if the stakes involved are high, they may turn to the power of the masses and draw on public pressure to enhance their negotiating position. In such informal inter-bureaucratic bargaining, local officials might intentionally facilitate popular protest and lead to a situation we call ‘mobilized instability.’ More commonly, they borrow power from ‘consent instability,’ that is, they discreetly leak insider information and instruct their police forces to be exceptionally tolerant. In this article, we use the redistricting case in Changxing county, Zhejiang province as well as other incidents to show how local officials can strategically exploit public pressure, in the mode of ‘consent instability,’ to extract policy concessions. We introduce the concept of ‘mobilized instability’ through an examination of jurisdictional restructuring conflict in Daye county, Hubei province. This analysis suggests that reckless intermediaries might over-mobilize and radicalize the masses, thereby undermining intentions and leading to serious consequences for the public officials. The article concludes that the power of the masses may serve as a credible bargaining chip during informal elite bargaining, but it can also be risky for those who handle it poorly.
- 9 September 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Chinese Governance
- Vol. 7 (4) , 559-582
Riding on the power of the masses? How different modes of mass mobilization shape local elite bargaining in China
When local bureaucrats in China disagree with their superiors, official channels for achieving a policy revision are limited and generally ineffective. However, if the stakes involved are high, they may turn to the power of the masses and draw on public pressure to enhance their negotiating position. In such informal inter-bureaucratic bargaining, local officials might intentionally facilitate popular protest and lead to a situation we call ‘mobilized instability.’ More commonly, they borrow power from ‘consent instability,’ that is, they discreetly leak insider information and instruct their police forces to be exceptionally tolerant. In this article, we use the redistricting case in Changxing county, Zhejiang province as well as other incidents to show how local officials can strategically exploit public pressure, in the mode of ‘consent instability,’ to extract policy concessions. We introduce the concept of ‘mobilized instability’ through an examination of jurisdictional restructuring conflict in Daye county, Hubei province. This analysis suggests that reckless intermediaries might over-mobilize and radicalize the masses, thereby undermining intentions and leading to serious consequences for the public officials. The article concludes that the power of the masses may serve as a credible bargaining chip during informal elite bargaining, but it can also be risky for those who handle it poorly.
- 27 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 26 (4) , 771-773
Xiang Gao, Delegation and Development: Local Government in China’s Market Transition
- 27 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 26 (4) , 771-773
Xiang Gao, Delegation and Development: Local Government in China’s Market Transition
- 18 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 246, 586-601
Validating Vignette Designs with Real-world Data: A Study of Legal Mobilization in Response to Land Grievances in Rural China
How well do vignette designs capture actual behaviour in the real world? This study employs original survey data featuring both hypothetical vignettes and behavioural questions in order to assess the external validity of descriptive and causal inferences in survey experiments. The survey was conducted in a three-province, probability-proportional-to-size sample of 1,897 rural residents in China and focuses on the legal mobilization of citizens in response to grievances involving land rights. In terms of descriptive inference, we find that relative to the behavioural benchmark, hypothetical vignettes significantly over-estimate legal mobilization in response to a grievance, particularly for higher-cost actions like petitioning the government and litigating in court. We find that data from hypothetical vignettes affect causal inference as well, producing significantly different results regarding the effect of political connections and legal knowledge on legal mobilization. The study makes a contribution by identifying conditions under which hypothetical vignettes are less likely to produce valid inference. It engages a rich literature on disputing and legal mobilization in the field of Chinese politics and helps to resolve debates over the role of political connections and legal knowledge.
- 18 June 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 246, 586-601
Validating Vignette Designs with Real-world Data: A Study of Legal Mobilization in Response to Land Grievances in Rural China
How well do vignette designs capture actual behaviour in the real world? This study employs original survey data featuring both hypothetical vignettes and behavioural questions in order to assess the external validity of descriptive and causal inferences in survey experiments. The survey was conducted in a three-province, probability-proportional-to-size sample of 1,897 rural residents in China and focuses on the legal mobilization of citizens in response to grievances involving land rights. In terms of descriptive inference, we find that relative to the behavioural benchmark, hypothetical vignettes significantly over-estimate legal mobilization in response to a grievance, particularly for higher-cost actions like petitioning the government and litigating in court. We find that data from hypothetical vignettes affect causal inference as well, producing significantly different results regarding the effect of political connections and legal knowledge on legal mobilization. The study makes a contribution by identifying conditions under which hypothetical vignettes are less likely to produce valid inference. It engages a rich literature on disputing and legal mobilization in the field of Chinese politics and helps to resolve debates over the role of political connections and legal knowledge.
- 26 July 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- Vol. 29 (123) , 369-386
Partnering with the State: Historical Legacies, the Local State Sector, and Foreign Direct Investment in China
How does the size of local state-owned sector affect the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to that region? Using an original county-level dataset for China’s Yangtze Delta Region, this article finds that counties inheriting a larger state-owned sector from the planned-economy era have attracted more FDI since the outset of the market reform. The article argues that early foreign investors tended to invest in locales with a robust state sector to build joint ventures with local state-owned firms, as doing so helped them satisfy state regulations and reduce various political and market risks. The legacies of the planned economy also shaped local states’ preferences, leading to persistent variations in local economic structure. An instrumental variable analysis suggests that the association is likely causal.
- 26 July 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- Vol. 29 (123) , 369-386
Partnering with the State: Historical Legacies, the Local State Sector, and Foreign Direct Investment in China
How does the size of local state-owned sector affect the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to that region? Using an original county-level dataset for China’s Yangtze Delta Region, this article finds that counties inheriting a larger state-owned sector from the planned-economy era have attracted more FDI since the outset of the market reform. The article argues that early foreign investors tended to invest in locales with a robust state sector to build joint ventures with local state-owned firms, as doing so helped them satisfy state regulations and reduce various political and market risks. The legacies of the planned economy also shaped local states’ preferences, leading to persistent variations in local economic structure. An instrumental variable analysis suggests that the association is likely causal.