Umberto Sagliaschi
Umberto Sagliaschi has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alex Almici
Università degli Studi di Brescia
2 shared publications - Renato Camodeca
Department of Economics and Management, Università degli Studi di Brescia, 25121 Brescia, Italy
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 14 February 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Intellectual Capital
- Vol. 20 (1) , 125-143
Strategic information disclosure, integrated reporting and the role of intellectual capital
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to use a theoretical and empirical model to investigate the adoption of the integrated reporting (IR) framework as a strategic choice to signal intellectual capital (IC) to equity investors, with specific reference to the pharmaceutical industry. Design/methodology/approach: The choice of drafting an integrated report is modelled as a means for managers to strategically disclose price-relevant information related to IC. The voluntary disclosure model developed by Verrecchia (1983) is used, also introducing the role of financial analysts to derive a directly reproducible empirical equation. Findings: Theoretically, as IR requires managers to exert an effort in reporting activity, this work shows that in equilibrium, only firms with sufficient IC have decided to adopt IR, resulting in rational investors’ willingness to pay more only for the forecasted earnings of integrated reporters. This theory is tested in the pharmaceutical sector, where the modelling choice is probably more valid, with mixed results. Research limitations/implications: When compliant with the International Integrated Reporting Council’s (IIRC) standards, IR provides the means to disclose IC in a perfectly verifiable way. Furthermore, since the IIRC has only recently been established, the conclusions have only been tested on a limited data set. Originality/value: This work connects the value relevance of IR to IC by adopting an equilibrium approach, which, in turn, provides specific indications of how to build a consistent empirical test of the theory.
- 14 February 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Intellectual Capital
- Vol. 20 (1) , 125-143
Strategic information disclosure, integrated reporting and the role of intellectual capital
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to use a theoretical and empirical model to investigate the adoption of the integrated reporting (IR) framework as a strategic choice to signal intellectual capital (IC) to equity investors, with specific reference to the pharmaceutical industry. Design/methodology/approach: The choice of drafting an integrated report is modelled as a means for managers to strategically disclose price-relevant information related to IC. The voluntary disclosure model developed by Verrecchia (1983) is used, also introducing the role of financial analysts to derive a directly reproducible empirical equation. Findings: Theoretically, as IR requires managers to exert an effort in reporting activity, this work shows that in equilibrium, only firms with sufficient IC have decided to adopt IR, resulting in rational investors’ willingness to pay more only for the forecasted earnings of integrated reporters. This theory is tested in the pharmaceutical sector, where the modelling choice is probably more valid, with mixed results. Research limitations/implications: When compliant with the International Integrated Reporting Council’s (IIRC) standards, IR provides the means to disclose IC in a perfectly verifiable way. Furthermore, since the IIRC has only recently been established, the conclusions have only been tested on a limited data set. Originality/value: This work connects the value relevance of IR to IC by adopting an equilibrium approach, which, in turn, provides specific indications of how to build a consistent empirical test of the theory.
- Open Access
- 24 November 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 10 (12) , 4393
Sustainability Disclosure in Integrated Reporting: Does It Matter to Investors? A Cheap Talk Approach
The purpose of this study is to investigate the value-relevance of corporate sustainability disclosure through integrated reporting. Sustainability disclosure is subject to managers’ discretion. Besides, it is often hardly verifiable. In this respect, integrated reporting could provide the means for a verifiable disclosure, otherwise, in the jargon of game theory, it could be considered as a cheap talk. This paper investigates which of these hypotheses is most likely to occur in reality. In order to do this, a simple theoretical framework is introduced, where sustainability of corporate performances is modelled as a tail-risk for shareholders. Costless signaling games (cheap talk) and persuasion games are reviewed within this context, in order to derive competing theories of sustainability disclosure’s value relevance through integrated reporting. These alternative theories are tested empirically consistent with the theoretical framework presented, in order to identify key-parameters. In this respect, a systematic textual analysis (artificial intelligence) of integrated reports was employed as to build a synthetic measure of sustainability disclosure. The application of this methodology on a sample of European listed companies showed that sustainability disclosure through integrated reporting has no effect on market-valuations, confirming the null hypothesis of integrated reporting resulting in a cheap talk’s babbling equilibrium.
- 24 November 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 10 (12) , 4393
Open AccessSustainability Disclosure in Integrated Reporting: Does It Matter to Investors? A Cheap Talk Approach
The purpose of this study is to investigate the value-relevance of corporate sustainability disclosure through integrated reporting. Sustainability disclosure is subject to managers’ discretion. Besides, it is often hardly verifiable. In this respect, integrated reporting could provide the means for a verifiable disclosure, otherwise, in the jargon of game theory, it could be considered as a cheap talk. This paper investigates which of these hypotheses is most likely to occur in reality. In order to do this, a simple theoretical framework is introduced, where sustainability of corporate performances is modelled as a tail-risk for shareholders. Costless signaling games (cheap talk) and persuasion games are reviewed within this context, in order to derive competing theories of sustainability disclosure’s value relevance through integrated reporting. These alternative theories are tested empirically consistent with the theoretical framework presented, in order to identify key-parameters. In this respect, a systematic textual analysis (artificial intelligence) of integrated reports was employed as to build a synthetic measure of sustainability disclosure. The application of this methodology on a sample of European listed companies showed that sustainability disclosure through integrated reporting has no effect on market-valuations, confirming the null hypothesis of integrated reporting resulting in a cheap talk’s babbling equilibrium.