Alexander Agadjanian
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Alexander Agadjanian has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dean Lacy
Dartmouth College
2 shared publications Alexander Hurt
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
1 shared publicationAlexander Wasdahl
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
1 shared publicationAlexandra Woodruff
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
1 shared publication- Annie Ma
Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA
1 shared publication - Brendan Nyhan
Department of Government, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 26 March 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review
- Vol. 53 (3) , 324-346
The Soviet Legacy and Cultural Memory: Conceptualization and the Armenian Experience
This paper first provides a conceptualization of the current state of research of the Soviet legacy as a complex, multi-level phenomenon that includes a set of ideas, symbolic traces, social structures and practices. It then defines how this complex legacy is reflected in the cultural memory landscape of the Republic of Armenia. The paper draws upon existing literature and the author’s empirical material that includes observations and interviews in museums and surveys. The paper concludes that the “Soviet” is de-ideologized, dissolved in a broader historical perspective, identified with the longer Armenian-Russian entanglement, and contains a contradictory image of both safety and restricted freedoms.
- 26 March 2026
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review
- Vol. 53 (3) , 324-346
The Soviet Legacy and Cultural Memory: Conceptualization and the Armenian Experience
This paper first provides a conceptualization of the current state of research of the Soviet legacy as a complex, multi-level phenomenon that includes a set of ideas, symbolic traces, social structures and practices. It then defines how this complex legacy is reflected in the cultural memory landscape of the Republic of Armenia. The paper draws upon existing literature and the author’s empirical material that includes observations and interviews in museums and surveys. The paper concludes that the “Soviet” is de-ideologized, dissolved in a broader historical perspective, identified with the longer Armenian-Russian entanglement, and contains a contradictory image of both safety and restricted freedoms.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Center of Culture and Civilization Studies in Analytical Bulletin of Armenian and Regional Studies (ABARS)
- Vol. 17 (17) , 78-85
“Freedom of Academia in and out: Social Sciences and Humanities in the Time of Geopolitical Crisis” A review of the conference held at Yerevan State University on October 19-21, 2023.
An overview of the international conference held at Yerevan State University in October 2003 and dedicated to the challenges to the academic freedom, particualrlty in post-Soviet area, due to geopoiltical crises.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Center of Culture and Civilization Studies in Analytical Bulletin of Armenian and Regional Studies (ABARS)
- Vol. 17 (17) , 78-85
Open Access“Freedom of Academia in and out: Social Sciences and Humanities in the Time of Geopolitical Crisis” A review of the conference held at Yerevan State University on October 19-21, 2023.
An overview of the international conference held at Yerevan State University in October 2003 and dedicated to the challenges to the academic freedom, particualrlty in post-Soviet area, due to geopoiltical crises.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World
- Vol. 8
How Many Americans Change Their Racial Identification over Time?
Despite long-standing assumptions about racial identity as a fixed characteristic, social scientists have increasingly recognized its fluidity and examined the origins of micro-level race change. However, knowledge regarding the prevalence of race change is limited. This data visualization fills this descriptive gap by providing a comprehensive account of recent levels of racial self-identification change among Americans. The author uses five high-quality panel surveys in which race is asked of the same nationally representative adult samples several years apart. Among all respondents, race change rates range from 5 percent to 12 percent across surveys, averaging 8 percent. Original white identifiers (4 percent on average) are much less prone to change than initial nonwhites collectively (20 percent). Blacks have as stable identities as whites, while mixed-race (52 percent) and “other”-race (73 percent) Americans undergo substantial identity shifts over time. Results further cement a perspective of race as flexible for some in the United States.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World
- Vol. 8
Open AccessHow Many Americans Change Their Racial Identification over Time?
Despite long-standing assumptions about racial identity as a fixed characteristic, social scientists have increasingly recognized its fluidity and examined the origins of micro-level race change. However, knowledge regarding the prevalence of race change is limited. This data visualization fills this descriptive gap by providing a comprehensive account of recent levels of racial self-identification change among Americans. The author uses five high-quality panel surveys in which race is asked of the same nationally representative adult samples several years apart. Among all respondents, race change rates range from 5 percent to 12 percent across surveys, averaging 8 percent. Original white identifiers (4 percent on average) are much less prone to change than initial nonwhites collectively (20 percent). Blacks have as stable identities as whites, while mixed-race (52 percent) and “other”-race (73 percent) Americans undergo substantial identity shifts over time. Results further cement a perspective of race as flexible for some in the United States.
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 85 (3) , 737-752
Changing Votes, Changing Identities?
Although racial identity is usually assumed to be unchanging, recent research shows otherwise. The role of politics in racial identity change has received little attention. Using panel data with waves around two recent presidential elections, this article reveals survey evidence of racial fluidity and its strong relationship with vote switching patterns. Across several models and robust to various controls, switching from a non-Republican vote in 2012 to a 2016 Republican vote (i.e., non-Romney to Trump) significantly predicts nonwhite to white race change. Among nonwhites who did not vote Republican in 2012, switching to a Republican vote in 2016 increases the probability of adopting a white racial identity from a 0.03 baseline to 0.49, a 1,533 percent increase. Individuals originally identifying as Mixed and Hispanic drive this identity-voting link. A parallel dynamic on the Democratic side—new Democratic voters moving from white to nonwhite identities—does not occur. The systematic relationship between Trump switching and white identity adoption is unlikely to be spurious or due to measurement error, does not appear for the 2008–2012 election period, and makes theoretical sense in light of 2016 campaign rhetoric and trends in political-social identity alignment.
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 85 (3) , 737-752
Changing Votes, Changing Identities?
Although racial identity is usually assumed to be unchanging, recent research shows otherwise. The role of politics in racial identity change has received little attention. Using panel data with waves around two recent presidential elections, this article reveals survey evidence of racial fluidity and its strong relationship with vote switching patterns. Across several models and robust to various controls, switching from a non-Republican vote in 2012 to a 2016 Republican vote (i.e., non-Romney to Trump) significantly predicts nonwhite to white race change. Among nonwhites who did not vote Republican in 2012, switching to a Republican vote in 2016 increases the probability of adopting a white racial identity from a 0.03 baseline to 0.49, a 1,533 percent increase. Individuals originally identifying as Mixed and Hispanic drive this identity-voting link. A parallel dynamic on the Democratic side—new Democratic voters moving from white to nonwhite identities—does not occur. The systematic relationship between Trump switching and white identity adoption is unlikely to be spurious or due to measurement error, does not appear for the 2008–2012 election period, and makes theoretical sense in light of 2016 campaign rhetoric and trends in political-social identity alignment.
- Open Access
- 25 May 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Elite Cues and Popular Apolitical Issues: Evidence from Daylight Savings Time
Although much is known about the nature of elite influence on public opinion, its limits remain unclear. One area where elite cues might be less powerful is on popular apolitical issues that are part of everyday life. The current study investigates this question through a useful example: making daylight savings time (DST) permanent. This idea, where opinions likely already developed based on personal experiences outside politics, is broadly supported but non-politicized. In 2019, it received public support on Twitter by a prominent party leader -- then-president Donald Trump. Using his real endorsement tweet as a treatment, two survey experiments show Trump moves Republicans to favor and Democrats to oppose making DST permanent. But effects are weak in terms of size and significance -- especially when compared to party leader effects in other contexts -- perhaps revealing limits on elite influence in a popular apolitical realm. In this context, the study also provides suggestive evidence that expressive responding does not plague elite cue effects.
- 25 May 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessElite Cues and Popular Apolitical Issues: Evidence from Daylight Savings Time
Although much is known about the nature of elite influence on public opinion, its limits remain unclear. One area where elite cues might be less powerful is on popular apolitical issues that are part of everyday life. The current study investigates this question through a useful example: making daylight savings time (DST) permanent. This idea, where opinions likely already developed based on personal experiences outside politics, is broadly supported but non-politicized. In 2019, it received public support on Twitter by a prominent party leader -- then-president Donald Trump. Using his real endorsement tweet as a treatment, two survey experiments show Trump moves Republicans to favor and Democrats to oppose making DST permanent. But effects are weak in terms of size and significance -- especially when compared to party leader effects in other contexts -- perhaps revealing limits on elite influence in a popular apolitical realm. In this context, the study also provides suggestive evidence that expressive responding does not plague elite cue effects.
- 28 January 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Compass
- Vol. 68 (3) , 392-409
From urban landscape to national culture: Russia’s conspicuous religious simulacra and enduring, if fragile, secularity
This article considers the place religion holds in post-Soviet Russian society, and most importantly, the case of the dominant Russian Orthodoxy. It shows that the gap between low everyday religiosity and high public profile of religion is the key to a specific Russian version of secularity. How religion’s spectacular appropriation of physical and social space, up to the imaginative space of the national culture as such, does not cancel the strong counterweight of deeply ingrained secular cultural arrangements – either genetically linked to some European variations or specifically related to (post)communist experience.
- 28 January 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Compass
- Vol. 68 (3) , 392-409
From urban landscape to national culture: Russia’s conspicuous religious simulacra and enduring, if fragile, secularity
This article considers the place religion holds in post-Soviet Russian society, and most importantly, the case of the dominant Russian Orthodoxy. It shows that the gap between low everyday religiosity and high public profile of religion is the key to a specific Russian version of secularity. How religion’s spectacular appropriation of physical and social space, up to the imaginative space of the national culture as such, does not cancel the strong counterweight of deeply ingrained secular cultural arrangements – either genetically linked to some European variations or specifically related to (post)communist experience.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in State, Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide
- Vol. 39 (1) , 7-11
Pandemic and Religion: Interpretations and Practices. Introduction
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in State, Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide
- Vol. 39 (1) , 7-11
Open AccessPandemic and Religion: Interpretations and Practices. Introduction
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in State, Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide
- Vol. 39 (1) , 12-38
Resistance and Submission. Pandemic, Late Modern Epistemes, and Russian Orthodox Ethos
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in State, Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide
- Vol. 39 (1) , 12-38
Open AccessResistance and Submission. Pandemic, Late Modern Epistemes, and Russian Orthodox Ethos
- 30 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 38 (4) , 351-369
When Do Partisans Stop Following the Leader?
Evidence of public opinion blindly following political leader rhetoric has important implications for the scope of elite influence and normative democratic concerns. Past research, however, does not test the strength of real world leader cues amid signals that conflict with a leader’s policy message, and thus has not gauged the robustness of the “follow-the-leader” dynamic. The current study explores whether two different conflicting signals – 1) opposing intra-party Congressional elite cues and 2) negative policy information that gives compelling reasons to oppose a policy – attenuate leader influence in support of a realistic counter-stereotypical policy. A national survey experiment with two parallel partisan designs shows that individuals follow their leader to a substantial degree whether or not conflicting signals are present. Conflicting co-party elite cues do not attenuate leader influence among Republicans. For Democrats, although they weaken amid opposition, leader cues still shape mass opinion sizably. Providing substantially more information about the policy at hand does not make either partisan group much less likely to follow their leader, a finding that holds regardless of individuals’ preexisting ideology in the policy area. Results demonstrate the broad conditions under which “follow-the-leader” behavior holds and reveal a stronger nature of elite influence than previously understood. Party elites and information fail to effectively constrain the sway of prominent leaders, who have considerable latitude in positions they can take without losing mass support.
- 30 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 38 (4) , 351-369
When Do Partisans Stop Following the Leader?
Evidence of public opinion blindly following political leader rhetoric has important implications for the scope of elite influence and normative democratic concerns. Past research, however, does not test the strength of real world leader cues amid signals that conflict with a leader’s policy message, and thus has not gauged the robustness of the “follow-the-leader” dynamic. The current study explores whether two different conflicting signals – 1) opposing intra-party Congressional elite cues and 2) negative policy information that gives compelling reasons to oppose a policy – attenuate leader influence in support of a realistic counter-stereotypical policy. A national survey experiment with two parallel partisan designs shows that individuals follow their leader to a substantial degree whether or not conflicting signals are present. Conflicting co-party elite cues do not attenuate leader influence among Republicans. For Democrats, although they weaken amid opposition, leader cues still shape mass opinion sizably. Providing substantially more information about the policy at hand does not make either partisan group much less likely to follow their leader, a finding that holds regardless of individuals’ preexisting ideology in the policy area. Results demonstrate the broad conditions under which “follow-the-leader” behavior holds and reveal a stronger nature of elite influence than previously understood. Party elites and information fail to effectively constrain the sway of prominent leaders, who have considerable latitude in positions they can take without losing mass support.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in State, Religion and Church
- Vol. 6 (1)
Viktor Shnirel’man. 2017. “Koleno Danovo”. Eskhatologiia i antisemitizm v sovremennoi Rossii [“The Tribe of Dan.” Eschatology and Antisemitism in Modern Russia]. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo BBI (in Russian). — 631 p.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in State, Religion and Church
- Vol. 6 (1)
Viktor Shnirel’man. 2017. “Koleno Danovo”. Eskhatologiia i antisemitizm v sovremennoi Rossii [“The Tribe of Dan.” Eschatology and Antisemitism in Modern Russia]. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo BBI (in Russian). — 631 p.