JWJan Woleński

Jan Woleński

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jan Woleński has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Between Wittgenstein and Freud: How Far Can Language-Games Go?

    by Jan Hertrich-Woleński

    If A and B are giants of thought (be it philosophical or other), it is very tempting to compare ideas proposed by both of them (even in cases where they do not have very much in common). Sigmund Freud and Ludwig Witt‑ genstein are examples of A and B satisfying the antecedent of the preceding conditional.

  • Pojęcie nauki

    by Jan Woleński

    DEFINICJA POJĘCIA: Nauka jest zjawiskiem wieloaspektowym, obejmującym naukowców, ich czynności i wytwory oraz formy organizacyjne. Pojęcie nauki najlepiej jest określone na zasadzie podobieństwa rodzinnego, tj. sieci krzyżujących się korelacji pomiędzy rozmaitymi aspektami tego, co jest uważane za naukę. ANALIZA HISTORYCZNA POJĘCIA: Nauka powstała we wszystkich kulturach, ale szczególne znaczenie miało jej powstanie w starożytnej Grecji. Zarys historii nauki przedstawiono wedle periodyzacji na cztery epoki. Ukazano kształtowanie się poszczególnych dyscyplin naukowych i ogólnych ram organizacyjnych funkcjonowania nauki, co pozwala lepiej uchwycić otwartość opisywanego pojęcia. UJĘCIE PROBLEMOWE POJĘCIA: Program badań nauki o nauce został sformułowany przez Marię i Stanisława Ossowskich (1935). Ossowscy przyjęli, że nauka jest wytworem kulturowym, i uznali, że nauka o nauce wymaga wzięcia pod uwagę czynności kreujących naukę jako wytwór poznawczy. Ogólnie mówiąc, naukę można badać z metodologicznego i socjologiczno-psychologicznego punktu widzenia. Najważniejsze analizy owego pojęcia mieszczą się w kontekście metodologicznym (filozofii nauki). Za K. Ajdukiewiczem można odróżnić metodologię apragmatyczną (metanaukę) i metodologię pragmatyczną. Podział ten jednak nie wystarcza do scharakteryzowania współczesnej filozofii nauki i wymaga wprowadzenia dodatkowych opozycji. REFLEKSJA SYSTEMATYCZNA Z WNIOSKAMI I ­REKOMENDACJAMI: Proponowane projekty nauki o nauce, szczególnie w filozofii nauki, formułują rozmaite kryteria wyznaczające treść i zakres pojęcia nauki. Podejmując rozważania od strony metodologicznej, konieczne jest uwzględnienie historii, socjologii i psychologii nauki, ale zachodzi również sprzężenie odwrotne.

  • Open Access

    STEFAN BALEY ON PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS METHOD

    by Jan Woleński

    The article examines the psychological views of S. Baley. It is emphasized that S. Baley’s interest in psychology arose under the influence of K. Twardowski, who combined philosophical and psychological research in his work, did not agree with the possibility of reducing mental phenomena to physiological ones, and emphasized that the method of introspection (self-analysis of internal experience) is an important psychological method. It is emphasized that K. Twardowski adopted the view of the importance of using the method of introspection as an analysis of acts of consciousness, which is always intended for something, in the process of psychological research from his teacher F. Brentano. It is stated that K. Twardowski’s students, and in particular S. Baley, under the influence of their teacher’s ideas, paid much attention to the philosophical foundations of psychological research, the significant connections existing between philosophy and psychology (in particular, with regard to general methodological issues) and the justification of the fact that introspection is a reliable scientific method of cognition. It is noted that Baley developed the ideas of psychology of education and development, influenced the formation of ideas of social psychology. In general, he worked within the framework of experimental psychology, going beyond the views on psychology held by F. Brentano, in particular regarding psychoanalysis. He devoted considerable attention to both specialized research and general methodological issues, the treatment of which determines how to understand the nature of mental phenomena and express it through language – in judgments about mental phenomena. The author of the article draws attention to the fact that Baley’s conclusion that perceptions are subjective is interesting from an epistemological point of view, which does not prevent them from being the intersubjective basis of empirical sciences. As a result, it must be stated that in the process of studying humanistic or social phenomena, it is not advisable to clearly separate the subjective and objective worlds. Keywords: introspection, mental phenomena, inner experience, intersubjective, psychology.

  • Trzy monografie Rudolfa Carnapa

    by Jan Woleński

    Artykuł przedstawia trzy książki Rudolfa Carnapa wydane w serii Biblioteka Współczesnych Filozofów, mianowicie (kolejność wedle wydania oryginału): Logiczna struktura świata (1928/2011), Logiczna składnia języka (1934/1995) i Logiczne podstawy prawdopodobieństwa (1950/2024). Krótko zreferowana jest ich treść, historyczny kontekst powstania i znaczenie dla rozwoju filozofii analitycznej.

  • Open Access

    What is Sport (Philosophically Speaking)?

    by Natan Berber, Jan Woleński

    This paper proposes an analysis of sport from an analytic-philosophical point-of-view. The authors argue that although a definition in the traditional sense ( per genus proximum and differentiam specificam ) – conceived as analytic, synthetic, or regulative – is rather impossible, a conceptual description, using some key intuitions, can be achieved. These intuitions are suggested by taking into account phenomena such as physical culture and its properties, Olympic games and their regulations, or the popularity of sport as perceived by direct spectators and indirect observers, particularly on television. Various examples suggest that sport is a complex phenomenon, generally consisting of the actions of people, subordinated to rules that govern how sport actors behave. Hence, a normative aspect of sport must be taken into account in any conceptual analysis of sport . If the traditional manner for defining a concept is considered unavailable, then Wittgenstein’s strategy of analysis, via the notion of family resemblance , is recommended. The authors show that this can also be applied to the concept of sport . After mentioning Renford Bambrough’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, the authors propose to treat the name sport as referring to a mereological collection of parts, unified by several factors and forming a family resemblance.

  • Open Access

    Tonk, Syntax, Semantics, Pragmatics

    by Jan Woleński

    In 1960, A. N. Prior proposed a binary sentential functor defined by inferential rule (introduction) A ⊢ A tonk B , and (elimination) A tonk B ⊢ A . Later, this idea was discussed by several authors, including in the context of the question of whether the ab ove rule defines this functor in a sufficient manner. This paper shows that if we assume the standard matrix (truth-tables) characterization of classical sentential functors, no valuation agrees with rules generating the sense of tonk. Moreover, these inferential prescriptions are at odds with the principle that if premises are true, the conclusion has to be such as well. A new solution is proposed. It consists in considering tonk-rules via so-called rejection consequence operation, that is, a dual with respect to the standard Cn . The general moral stemming from the proposed analysis says that inferentialism, the view that inference rules are purely syntactical, is dubious, because logic has its basis also in semantic presuppositions as well as in pragmatic ones.

  • Open Access

    Syntax, Semantics and Tarski’s Truth Definition

    by Jan Woleński

    Until Tarski’s semantic truth definition, the concept of truth was used informally in metalogic (metamathematics) or even proposed to be eliminated in favour of syntactic concepts, as in Rudolf Carnap’s early programme of philosophy via logical syntax. Tarski demonstrated that the concept of truth can be defined using precise mathematical devices. If L is a language for which the truth definition is given, it must be done in the metalanguage ML. According to this construction, semantics for L must be performed in ML. The most important example concerns the arithmetic of natural numbers. According to Tarski’s theorem of undefinability, the set of truths of this theory cannot be defined in it – such a definition can be formulated in the metatheory. This fact illuminates the relation between syntax and semantics. If Th is a rich theory and presented as a syntactic theory (a calculus), its semantics is not reducible to its syntax. According to Tarski’s view, related to his work in the simple theory of types, semantics for L can be always constructed in the morphology of ML, provided that L is of the finite order. Two problems arise: what does the word “morphology” mean and how to formulate these ideas, when the framework is based on the distinction between first‑order logic and higher‑order logic. As far as the issue concerns morphology, it is possible to consider it as an extended syntax, i.e. vocabulary which does not refer to semantic concepts or defines such notions by not‑semantic, e.g. set‑theoretical, categories. If the hierarchy of logical types is replaced by the distinction of logics of various orders, in particular between first‑order and higher‑order (it is sufficient to use second‑order), it is possible to show that semantics of first‑order rich theories cannot be defined inside them.