Nicole Tausch

Drawing on research from the past 30 years, this systematic and narrative review introduces the Affect, Context, and Target (ACT) Framework and synthesizes findings on how emotions shape collective action across different cultural and political contexts. Specifically, it examines the cultures and regimes studied, the types of emotions involved, their emotional targets, and the forms of collective action analyzed. Our systematic review ( N = 156 articles) demonstrated that (1) more than 40 discrete emotions have been examined; (2) more negative and more activating emotions have received greater empirical attention; (3) emotions directed toward internal‐system‐relevant targets have been disproportionately represented in the literature, and (4) system‐challenging and normative forms of collective actions have been investigated more frequently in democratic than authoritarian regimes. The distribution of those studies was more equal in tight cultures and loose cultures. However, the ACT Framework highlights the importance of emotion targets and contextual factors.

Sharp disagreements about social issues have raised concerns about increasing societal polarization in democracies worldwide. While diversity of opinion is vital for democratic engagement and can promote innovative solutions, social science research shows that such disagreements can undermine social cohesion and erode social trust if they turn into identity-based conflicts. The present research examines the potential importance of social norms that promote equality-based respect, dialogue, and unity (inclusivity norms) in mitigating these negative outcomes. In a preregistered, large-scale survey of 12,041 individuals in 12 European countries, we find that perceived inclusivity norms are associated with increased tolerance, greater willingness to collaborate, and lower tendencies to avoid people who hold opposing opinions. In most countries studied, this pattern holds among respondents who strongly disapprove of the opposing viewpoint, endorse antipluralist opinions, hold anti-egalitarian preferences, and identify more strongly with their opinion-based group relative to society. These findings support the potential of inclusivity norms to preserve social trust and cohesion amid opinion diversity.

Evolutionary theory and historical evidence suggest humans possess distinct psychological tendencies for defensive and offensive violence, which have insufficiently been considered in research. In a large-scale preregistered study across 58 countries ( N = 18,128), we demonstrate that violent extremist intentions manifest along two distinct psychological phenomena: defensive extremism, motivated by protecting one’s group from (perceived) threats, and offensive extremism, driven by establishing group dominance. We show that these dimensions a) can be reliably differentiated across diverse cultural contexts, b) are distinctively associated with psychological dispositions, and c) systematically differentiate countries varying in macrolevel sociopolitical functioning and violence. Across nations, a two-factorial structure was observed that was invariant at the scalar level. Defensive extremist intentions were consistently higher than offensive extremism in 56 out of 58 countries, suggesting greater moral acceptance of protective violence. While psychopathy was positively related to both types of violent extremist intentions, those high in Machiavellianism and narcissism demonstrated particularly higher levels of defensive extremist intentions. By contrast, those scoring high on religious fundamentalism and social dominance orientation demonstrated particularly higher levels of offensive extremist intentions. Unexpectedly, liberal political group identification was associated with higher offensive but lower defensive extremist intentions. Crucially, offensive (but not defensive) intentions were associated with macrolevel societal dysfunction, including political terror and internal conflict. These findings establish that defensive and offensive violent extremist intentions represent two conceptually different forms of extremism across a large and diverse range of countries, with consequences for research and practice.

Evolutionary theory and historical evidence suggest humans possess distinct psychological tendencies for defensive and offensive violence, which have insufficiently been considered in research. In a large-scale pre-registered study across 58 countries (N = 18,128), we demonstrate that violent extremist intentions manifest along two distinct psychological phenomena: defensive extremism, motivated by protecting one’s group from (perceived) threats, and offensive extremism, driven by establishing group dominance. We show that these dimensions can (a) be reliably differentiated across diverse cultural contexts, (b) are distinctively associated with psychological dispositions, and (c) systematically differentiate countries varying in macro-level sociopolitical functioning and violence. Across nations, a two-factorial structure was observed that was invariant at the scalar level. Defensive extremist intentions were consistently higher than offensive extremism in 56 out of 58 countries, suggesting greater moral acceptance of protective violence. While psychopathy was positively related to both types of violent extremist intentions, those high in Machiavellianism and narcissism demonstrated particularly higher levels of defensive extremist intentions. By contrast, those scoring high on religious fundamentalism and social dominance orientation demonstrated particularly higher levels of offensive extremist intentions. Unexpectedly, liberal political group identification was associated with higher offensive but lower defensive extremist intentions. Crucially, offensive (but not defensive) intentions were associated with macro-level societal function, including political terror and internal conflict. These findings establish that defensive and offensive violent extremist intentions represent two conceptually different forms of extremism across a large and diverse range of countries, with consequences for research and practice.

Britain's exit from the European Union has divided the public, making it crucial to understand its implications for wellbeing. In two survey studies ( N = 280, April 2020; N = 575, Nov 2020–July 2021) we examined how subjective wellbeing (mental wellbeing, MW; life satisfaction, LS) is predicted by Brexit attitudes and strained intergroup relations between UK Remainers and Leavers. We further tested whether positive intergroup contact is associated with wellbeing outcomes, via intergroup anxiety. Wellbeing was higher among Leavers than Remainers in Study 2. Negative intergroup emotions predicted lower MW for Remainers (Study 1). Perceived outgroup respect predicted higher MW for both groups, more so for Leavers (Study 2). Brexit identity negatively predicted wellbeing (Study 2), while contact quality positively predicted wellbeing (MW, Studies 1 and 2; LS, Study 2), via intergroup anxiety. Positive Brexit attitudes predicted greater wellbeing, especially for Leavers (Study 2). Greater wellbeing among Leavers may be attributed to the congruence between personal and perceived environmental values in the aftermath of Brexit. Strained intergroup relations were linked with lower wellbeing and positive contact was associated with higher wellbeing, via intergroup anxiety. Our research offers insights for interventions aimed at promoting wellbeing in polarized contexts by considering intergroup dynamics.

Sharp disagreements about social issues have raised concerns about increasing societal polarization in democracies worldwide. While diversity of opinion is vital for democratic engagement and can promote innovative solutions, social science research shows that such disagreements can undermine social cohesion and erode social trust if they turn into identity-based conflicts. The present research examines the potential importance of social norms that promote equality-based respect, dialogue, and unity (inclusivity norms) in mitigating these negative outcomes. In a pre-registered representative survey of 12,041 individuals in twelve European countries, we find that perceived inclusivity norms are associated with increased tolerance, greater willingness to collaborate, and lower tendencies to avoid people who hold opposing opinions. In most countries studied, this pattern holds among respondents who strongly disapprove of the opposing viewpoint, endorse anti-pluralist opinions, hold anti-egalitarian preferences, and identify more strongly with their opinion-based group relative to society. These findings support the potential of inclusivity norms to preserve social trust and cohesion amid opinion diversity.

We tested whether residents of Germany are more willing to help refugees from Ukraine compared to Syria and examined underlying psychological factors (perceptions of similarity, intergroup threat and the association with Islam). Across three experiments (total N = 3,119), a significant pro-Ukrainian preference emerged: Ukrainian refugees (vs. Syrian refugees) were perceived as less threatening (both realistically and symbolically), elicited less safety threat and were seen as more similar. Study 1 ( N = 991) showed that perceptions of threat and similarity mediated the impact of refugees' nationality on helping intentions. Study 2 ( N = 938) further demonstrated that perceptions of Syrian refugees as predominantly Muslim contributed to heightened perceptions of threat, which was associated with reduced helping intentions. In Study 3 ( N = 1,190), we employed vignettes to manipulate refugees’ nationality (Ukrainian/Syrian) and religion (Muslim/Christian). Participants perceived Ukrainian refugees portrayed as Christian (vs. Muslim) as more similar to themselves and less threatening and were more willing to help them. There was no effect of religion on helping behaviour, threat and similarity perceptions for Syrian refugees. The implications of these findings are discussed.

As climate and environmental activism has increased in recent years, so too has government repression of disruptive, non-violent protests. There have been mixed findings on the (dis)inhibiting impact of this repression on continued activism. We examine the impacts of repression on intentions to engage in normative (conforming to societal rules) and non-normative (violating these rules) collective actions, in a sample of Extinction Rebellion UK activists (N = 1,375). We assess both anticipated and experienced repression as predictors of action intentions, over and above past activism and core social-psychological motives (identification, grievance, and efficacy). We demonstrate that, while anticipated repression has no direct effect on either collective action type, lived experiences of repression positively predict non-normative action intentions. Analysing emotional responses to repression demonstrates positive indirect effects of anticipated repression through anger/outrage for both collective action types, and through contempt for non-normative action, as well as a negative indirect effect on non-normative action intentions via increased fear. Experienced repression also has a galvanizing indirect effect of non-normative action intentions via reduced fear. These findings disentangle differing indirect emotional effects of anticipated and experienced repression on both kinds of action intentions. Importantly, they also reveal a galvanizing effect of lived experiences of repression on disruptive action intentions.