Yeongjin Jang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yeongjin Jang has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Attila Altay Yavuz
University of South Florida, Tampa, USA
1 shared publication - Brent Byunghoon Kang
School of Computing Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) Daejeon Republic of Korea
1 shared publication - Byeongsu Woo
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology & CySecuLab, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication - Changwoo Min
Igalia
1 shared publication - Chihyun Song
KAIST, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication - Christopher Jelesnianski
Bradley Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, United States of America
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 283-300
Enforcing C/C++ Type and Scope at Runtime for Control-Flow and Data-Flow Integrity
Control-flow hijacking and data-oriented attacks are becoming more sophisticated. These attacks, especially data-oriented attacks, can result in critical security threats, such as leaking an SSL key. Data-oriented attacks are hard to defend against with acceptable performance due to the sheer amount of data pointers present. The root cause of such attacks is using pointers in unintended ways; fundamentally, these attacks rely on abusing pointers to violate the original scope they were used in or the original types that they were declared as. This paper proposes Scope Type Integrity (STI), a new defense policy that enforces all pointers (both code and data pointers) to conform to the original programmer's intent, as well as Runtime Scope Type Integrity (RSTI) mechanisms to enforce STI at runtime leveraging ARM Pointer Authentication. STI gathers information about the scope, type, and permissions of pointers. This information is then leveraged by RSTI to ensure pointers are legitimately utilized at runtime. We implemented three defense mechanisms of RSTI, with varying levels of security and performance tradeoffs to showcase the versatility of RSTI. We employ these three variants on a variety of benchmarks and real-world applications for a full security and performance evaluation of these mechanisms. Our results show that they have overheads of 5.29%, 2.97%, and 11.12%, respectively.
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 283-300
Open AccessEnforcing C/C++ Type and Scope at Runtime for Control-Flow and Data-Flow Integrity
Control-flow hijacking and data-oriented attacks are becoming more sophisticated. These attacks, especially data-oriented attacks, can result in critical security threats, such as leaking an SSL key. Data-oriented attacks are hard to defend against with acceptable performance due to the sheer amount of data pointers present. The root cause of such attacks is using pointers in unintended ways; fundamentally, these attacks rely on abusing pointers to violate the original scope they were used in or the original types that they were declared as. This paper proposes Scope Type Integrity (STI), a new defense policy that enforces all pointers (both code and data pointers) to conform to the original programmer's intent, as well as Runtime Scope Type Integrity (RSTI) mechanisms to enforce STI at runtime leveraging ARM Pointer Authentication. STI gathers information about the scope, type, and permissions of pointers. This information is then leveraged by RSTI to ensure pointers are legitimately utilized at runtime. We implemented three defense mechanisms of RSTI, with varying levels of security and performance tradeoffs to showcase the versatility of RSTI. We employ these three variants on a variety of benchmarks and real-world applications for a full security and performance evaluation of these mechanisms. Our results show that they have overheads of 5.29%, 2.97%, and 11.12%, respectively.
- Open Access
- 8 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1366-1375
GENESIS: A Generalizable, Efficient, and Secure Intra-kernel Privilege Separation
Maintaining the trustworthiness of OS kernels is imperative in upholding any form of security objective within a system. However, most commodity kernel designs are monolithic and subject to frequent changes that may contain or introduce new software bugs. The uniform privilege and single address space of monolithic kernels assist the adversary in turning any vulnerability into a single point of failure. Hence, various isolation designs have been proposed to enable privilege separation within the kernel. However, many of these solutions are architecture-dependent because of their reliance on specific features of their target architecture. We present Genesis, a novel architecture-agnostic intra-kernel privilege separation design. The main idea behind Genesis is to construct a self-protected execution environment while leveraging only de facto hardware security primitives in contemporary architectures. This design principle paves the way for a generalizable intra-kernel solution that is applicable to other architectures without significant redesign effort; specifically, our prototype leverages a general hardware feature, such as supervisor-mode access prevention (SMAP) on x86-64, over which we realize two essential techniques for intra-kernel isolation: kernel deprivileging and secure domain switching. While sustaining its generalizability, Genesis introduces moderate performance overhead in standard benchmarks and real-world applications, such as Nginx and Memcached.
- 8 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1366-1375
Open AccessGENESIS: A Generalizable, Efficient, and Secure Intra-kernel Privilege Separation
Maintaining the trustworthiness of OS kernels is imperative in upholding any form of security objective within a system. However, most commodity kernel designs are monolithic and subject to frequent changes that may contain or introduce new software bugs. The uniform privilege and single address space of monolithic kernels assist the adversary in turning any vulnerability into a single point of failure. Hence, various isolation designs have been proposed to enable privilege separation within the kernel. However, many of these solutions are architecture-dependent because of their reliance on specific features of their target architecture. We present Genesis, a novel architecture-agnostic intra-kernel privilege separation design. The main idea behind Genesis is to construct a self-protected execution environment while leveraging only de facto hardware security primitives in contemporary architectures. This design principle paves the way for a generalizable intra-kernel solution that is applicable to other architectures without significant redesign effort; specifically, our prototype leverages a general hardware feature, such as supervisor-mode access prevention (SMAP) on x86-64, over which we realize two essential techniques for intra-kernel isolation: kernel deprivileging and secure domain switching. While sustaining its generalizability, Genesis introduces moderate performance overhead in standard benchmarks and real-world applications, such as Nginx and Memcached.
- 4 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 185-203
A Survey on Sensor False Data Injection Attacks and Countermeasures in Cyber-Physical and Embedded Systems
- 4 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 185-203
A Survey on Sensor False Data Injection Attacks and Countermeasures in Cyber-Physical and Embedded Systems
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 19 (6) , 26-35
Enabling the Large-Scale Emulation of Internet of Things Firmware With Heuristic Workarounds
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 19 (6) , 26-35
Enabling the Large-Scale Emulation of Internet of Things Firmware With Heuristic Workarounds
- Open Access
- 24 December 2018
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2019 (1) , 172-191
Hardware-Supported ORAM in Effect: Practical Oblivious Search and Update on Very Large Dataset
The ability to query and update over encrypted data is an essential feature to enable breach-resilient cyber-infrastructures. Statistical attacks on searchable encryption (SE) have demonstrated the importance of sealing information leaks in access patterns. In response to such attacks, the community has proposed the Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM). However, due to the logarithmic communication overhead of ORAM, the composition of ORAM and SE is known to be costly in the conventional client-server model, which poses a critical barrier toward its practical adaptations. In this paper, we propose a novel hardware-supported privacy-enhancing platform called Practical Oblivious Search and Update Platform (POSUP), which enables oblivious keyword search and update operations on large datasets with high efficiency. We harness Intel SGX to realize efficient oblivious data structures for oblivious search/update purposes. We implemented POSUP and evaluated its performance on a Wikipedia dataset containing ≥229 keyword-file pairs. Our implementation is highly efficient, taking only 1 ms to access a 3 KB block with Circuit-ORAM. Our experiments have shown that POSUP offers up to 70× less end-to-end delay with 100× reduced network bandwidth consumption compared with the traditional ORAM-SE composition without secure hardware. POSUP is also at least 4.5× faster for up to 99.5% of keywords that can be searched compared with state-of-the-art Intel SGX-assisted search platforms.
- 24 December 2018
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2019 (1) , 172-191
Open AccessHardware-Supported ORAM in Effect: Practical Oblivious Search and Update on Very Large Dataset
The ability to query and update over encrypted data is an essential feature to enable breach-resilient cyber-infrastructures. Statistical attacks on searchable encryption (SE) have demonstrated the importance of sealing information leaks in access patterns. In response to such attacks, the community has proposed the Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM). However, due to the logarithmic communication overhead of ORAM, the composition of ORAM and SE is known to be costly in the conventional client-server model, which poses a critical barrier toward its practical adaptations. In this paper, we propose a novel hardware-supported privacy-enhancing platform called Practical Oblivious Search and Update Platform (POSUP), which enables oblivious keyword search and update operations on large datasets with high efficiency. We harness Intel SGX to realize efficient oblivious data structures for oblivious search/update purposes. We implemented POSUP and evaluated its performance on a Wikipedia dataset containing ≥229 keyword-file pairs. Our implementation is highly efficient, taking only 1 ms to access a 3 KB block with Circuit-ORAM. Our experiments have shown that POSUP offers up to 70× less end-to-end delay with 100× reduced network bandwidth consumption compared with the traditional ORAM-SE composition without secure hardware. POSUP is also at least 4.5× faster for up to 99.5% of keywords that can be searched compared with state-of-the-art Intel SGX-assisted search platforms.