Abhishek Ray
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Abhishek Ray has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mario Ventresca
School of Industrial Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
3 shared publications Mario Ventresca
School of Industrial Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
2 shared publicationsBryan Chong
Amazon, Inc
1 shared publicationCesar Martinelli
Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
1 shared publication- César Martinelli
George Mason University, Fairfax, United States
1 shared publication Hong Wan
Purdue University, School of Industrial Engineering, West Lafayette, IN, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does AI-Augmented Content Win Readers? Accountability and Readership in News Media
News media's use of artificial intelligence (AI) has prompted regulatory activity (e.g., NY FAIR News Act), which typically recommends editorial oversight and transparency regarding AI use as accountability measures. But do these measures together help outlets win readers? Since journalists typically lack full agency over content despite driving revenue, we study this question using a principal-agent framework that links production (editor-journalist) and market (reader-outlet) models through content quality, with agents privately differing in AI-use intensity and principals enforcing accountability through oversight and transparency. We analyze the production and market models individually and jointly. Individually, we find that while costless oversight is always recommended, costly oversight can limit the oversight rents that heavy AI users extract. Further, transparency demand is not unconditional but depends on the content's alignment with readers' beliefs. Indeed, the so-called "transparency discount" is not guaranteed, and readership can increase with transparency when readers value news more than belief alignment. Yet, joint analysis reveals a transparency inversion paradox: an outlet can gain readership by disclosing AI use that degrades content, but lose readership by disclosing use that improves content. Thus, our study demonstrates regulatory weaknesses that can help advise recent legislative efforts on AI use in media.
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes AI-Augmented Content Win Readers? Accountability and Readership in News Media
News media's use of artificial intelligence (AI) has prompted regulatory activity (e.g., NY FAIR News Act), which typically recommends editorial oversight and transparency regarding AI use as accountability measures. But do these measures together help outlets win readers? Since journalists typically lack full agency over content despite driving revenue, we study this question using a principal-agent framework that links production (editor-journalist) and market (reader-outlet) models through content quality, with agents privately differing in AI-use intensity and principals enforcing accountability through oversight and transparency. We analyze the production and market models individually and jointly. Individually, we find that while costless oversight is always recommended, costly oversight can limit the oversight rents that heavy AI users extract. Further, transparency demand is not unconditional but depends on the content's alignment with readers' beliefs. Indeed, the so-called "transparency discount" is not guaranteed, and readership can increase with transparency when readers value news more than belief alignment. Yet, joint analysis reveals a transparency inversion paradox: an outlet can gain readership by disclosing AI use that degrades content, but lose readership by disclosing use that improves content. Thus, our study demonstrates regulatory weaknesses that can help advise recent legislative efforts on AI use in media.
- 6 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (10) , 8727-8754
An Economic Analysis of Online Ad Fraud Deterrence
Ad fraud is increasingly becoming a major concern in online advertising, with publishers being one of the key sources of fraudulent ad traffic. Although ad fraud deterrence is a critical problem from both technical and economic perspectives, past research has not considered their interplay. Our paper fills this critical gap by building a game-theoretic model wherein an ad network (an intermediary between publishers and advertisers) strategically leverages its technological tool (the configuration of a given fraud detection technology) and economic tool (the payment to publishers) to deter ad fraud and maximize profits effectively. Our analysis generates several interesting findings. For example, as the fraud detection technology and fraud generation techniques improve, we show that although the ad network needs to respond by making the technology configuration stricter to dampen fraud motives and admit less ad traffic, it may sometimes need to increase the payment. Furthermore, although many stakeholders advocate instituting strict legislation and policies to reduce malicious publishers, we show that this may sometimes fail to reduce fraud traffic and even hurt an ad network’s profit. In addition, our results provide other useful implications that present a new theoretical perspective on the incentive problems in ad fraud generation and detection. Our study also draws valuable insights for ad networks into implementing effective ad fraud deterrence policies and for advertisers to audit and monitor their ad campaign performance. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: S. Kumar thanks the Temple Center for International Business Education and Research for partially supporting this research. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02201 .
- 6 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (10) , 8727-8754
An Economic Analysis of Online Ad Fraud Deterrence
Ad fraud is increasingly becoming a major concern in online advertising, with publishers being one of the key sources of fraudulent ad traffic. Although ad fraud deterrence is a critical problem from both technical and economic perspectives, past research has not considered their interplay. Our paper fills this critical gap by building a game-theoretic model wherein an ad network (an intermediary between publishers and advertisers) strategically leverages its technological tool (the configuration of a given fraud detection technology) and economic tool (the payment to publishers) to deter ad fraud and maximize profits effectively. Our analysis generates several interesting findings. For example, as the fraud detection technology and fraud generation techniques improve, we show that although the ad network needs to respond by making the technology configuration stricter to dampen fraud motives and admit less ad traffic, it may sometimes need to increase the payment. Furthermore, although many stakeholders advocate instituting strict legislation and policies to reduce malicious publishers, we show that this may sometimes fail to reduce fraud traffic and even hurt an ad network’s profit. In addition, our results provide other useful implications that present a new theoretical perspective on the incentive problems in ad fraud generation and detection. Our study also draws valuable insights for ad networks into implementing effective ad fraud deterrence policies and for advertisers to audit and monitor their ad campaign performance. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Funding: S. Kumar thanks the Temple Center for International Business Education and Research for partially supporting this research. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02201 .
- 2 April 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Management Information Systems
- Vol. 41 (2) , 367-393
Competition and Cognition in the Market for Online News
- 2 April 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Management Information Systems
- Vol. 41 (2) , 367-393
Competition and Cognition in the Market for Online News
- 3 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in IISE Transactions
- Vol. 56 (3) , 325-339
Optimal resource allocation to minimize errors when detecting human trafficking
Accurately detecting human trafficking is particularly challenging due to its covert nature, difficulty in distinguishing trafficking from non-trafficking exploitative conditions, and varying operational definitions. Typically, detecting human trafficking requires resource-intensive efforts from resource-constrained anti-trafficking stakeholders. Such measures may need personnel training or machine learning-based identification technologies that suffer from detection errors. Repeated usage of such measures risks biasing detection efforts and reducing detection effectiveness. Such problems raise the question: ‘how should imperfect detection resources be allocated to most effectively identify human trafficking?’ As an answer, we construct a class of resource allocation models that considers various optimal allocation scenarios. These scenarios range from optimal location selection for monitoring to optimal allocation of a finite set of imperfect resources, given error rates. We illustrate the applicability of these models across both human and technology-facilitated detection contexts at the India-Nepal border and in the global seafood industry. Insights from our models help inform operational strategies for allocating limited anti-human trafficking resources in a way that effectively preserves human rights and dignity.
- 3 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in IISE Transactions
- Vol. 56 (3) , 325-339
Optimal resource allocation to minimize errors when detecting human trafficking
Accurately detecting human trafficking is particularly challenging due to its covert nature, difficulty in distinguishing trafficking from non-trafficking exploitative conditions, and varying operational definitions. Typically, detecting human trafficking requires resource-intensive efforts from resource-constrained anti-trafficking stakeholders. Such measures may need personnel training or machine learning-based identification technologies that suffer from detection errors. Repeated usage of such measures risks biasing detection efforts and reducing detection effectiveness. Such problems raise the question: ‘how should imperfect detection resources be allocated to most effectively identify human trafficking?’ As an answer, we construct a class of resource allocation models that considers various optimal allocation scenarios. These scenarios range from optimal location selection for monitoring to optimal allocation of a finite set of imperfect resources, given error rates. We illustrate the applicability of these models across both human and technology-facilitated detection contexts at the India-Nepal border and in the global seafood industry. Insights from our models help inform operational strategies for allocating limited anti-human trafficking resources in a way that effectively preserves human rights and dignity.
- 7 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-7
Automated Mechanism Design for Complex Systems
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1099-1114
A Graph-Based Ant Algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions
Iterative combinatorial auctions are known to resolve bidder preference elicitation problems. However, winner determination is a known key bottleneck that has prevented widespread adoption of such auctions, and adding a time-bound to winner determination further complicates the mechanism. As a result, heuristic-based methods have enjoyed an increase in applicability. We add to the growing body of work in heuristic-based winner determination by proposing an ant colony metaheuristic–based anytime algorithm that produces optimal or near-optimal winner determination results within specified time. Our proposed algorithm resolves the speed versus accuracy problem and displays superior performance compared with 20 past state-of-the-art heuristics and two exact algorithms, for 94 open test auction instances that display a wide variety in bid-bundle composition. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature in two predominant ways: first, we represent the winner determination problem as one of finding the maximum weighted path on a directed cyclic graph; second, we improve upon existing ant colony heuristic–based exploration methods by implementing randomized pheromone updating and randomized graph pruning. Finally, to aid auction designers, we implement the anytime property of the algorithm, which allows auctioneers to stop the algorithm and return a valid solution to the winner determination problem even if it is interrupted before computation ends.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1099-1114
A Graph-Based Ant Algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions
Iterative combinatorial auctions are known to resolve bidder preference elicitation problems. However, winner determination is a known key bottleneck that has prevented widespread adoption of such auctions, and adding a time-bound to winner determination further complicates the mechanism. As a result, heuristic-based methods have enjoyed an increase in applicability. We add to the growing body of work in heuristic-based winner determination by proposing an ant colony metaheuristic–based anytime algorithm that produces optimal or near-optimal winner determination results within specified time. Our proposed algorithm resolves the speed versus accuracy problem and displays superior performance compared with 20 past state-of-the-art heuristics and two exact algorithms, for 94 open test auction instances that display a wide variety in bid-bundle composition. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature in two predominant ways: first, we represent the winner determination problem as one of finding the maximum weighted path on a directed cyclic graph; second, we improve upon existing ant colony heuristic–based exploration methods by implementing randomized pheromone updating and randomized graph pruning. Finally, to aid auction designers, we implement the anytime property of the algorithm, which allows auctioneers to stop the algorithm and return a valid solution to the winner determination problem even if it is interrupted before computation ends.
- 10 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 207-218
Agricultural Marketing Transformation Through Crowdsourcing System for Product Price Analysis
- 10 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 207-218
Agricultural Marketing Transformation Through Crowdsourcing System for Product Price Analysis
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1603-1608
A Mechanism Design Approach to Blockchain Protocols
Blockchain-based systems such as cryptocurrencies are achieving widespread usage, with a market capitalization of $150B (USD)as of September 2017. However, the most prominent platforms that account for over 70% of this market - Bitcoin & Ethereum - are exhibiting increasingly lower levels of decentralization. This poses the problem of concentrating levers of consensus to a select group of agents in the system. At the same time, attempts at higher levels of decentralization poses the problem of limiting scalability of such systems. In this paper, using mechanism design we propose a way of designing payoffs in order to disincentivize certain exhibited behaviors and incentivize desired behaviors of miners in such systems. Our approach indicates potential for research in this area for solving the much larger problem of centralization in decentralized systems such as blockchain.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1603-1608
A Mechanism Design Approach to Blockchain Protocols
Blockchain-based systems such as cryptocurrencies are achieving widespread usage, with a market capitalization of $150B (USD)as of September 2017. However, the most prominent platforms that account for over 70% of this market - Bitcoin & Ethereum - are exhibiting increasingly lower levels of decentralization. This poses the problem of concentrating levers of consensus to a select group of agents in the system. At the same time, attempts at higher levels of decentralization poses the problem of limiting scalability of such systems. In this paper, using mechanism design we propose a way of designing payoffs in order to disincentivize certain exhibited behaviors and incentivize desired behaviors of miners in such systems. Our approach indicates potential for research in this area for solving the much larger problem of centralization in decentralized systems such as blockchain.
- 3 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 174-188
An Ant Colony Approach for the Winner Determination Problem
- 3 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 174-188
An Ant Colony Approach for the Winner Determination Problem