Daan In 'T Veld
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Daan In 'T Veld has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cars Hommes
University of Amsterdam
2 shared publications - Alexandra Marques
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, The Hague, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Harry C. Wilting
Soest, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Iman van Lelyveld
De Nederlandsche Bank; VU University Amsterdam - Department of Finance and Financial Sector Management
1 shared publication - Jan Tuinstra
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School of Economics
1 shared publication Janneke van der Voort
University of Amsterdam
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industrial Ecology
- Vol. 30 (5) , 2505-2519
Unravelling biodiversity impacts of consumption: a production layer decomposition analysis for the Netherlands
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industrial Ecology
- Vol. 30 (5) , 2505-2519
Open AccessUnravelling biodiversity impacts of consumption: a production layer decomposition analysis for the Netherlands
- Open Access
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 119
The formation of a core-periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 119
Open AccessThe formation of a core-periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks
- 9 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 19 (3) , 389-411
State Aid and Competition: Application of a Social Welfare Criterion to State Aid
- 9 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 19 (3) , 389-411
State Aid and Competition: Application of a Social Welfare Criterion to State Aid
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 80, 101-124
Booms, busts and behavioural heterogeneity in stock prices
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 80, 101-124
Booms, busts and behavioural heterogeneity in stock prices
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 69, 45-67
Adverse effects of leverage and short-selling constraints in a financial market model with heterogeneous agents
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 69, 45-67
Adverse effects of leverage and short-selling constraints in a financial market model with heterogeneous agents
- 1 December 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 49, 27-40
Finding the core: Network structure in interbank markets
- 1 December 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 49, 27-40
Finding the core: Network structure in interbank markets
- 1 June 2014
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Man and the Economy
- Vol. 1 (1) , 79-92
How to Boost the Production of Free Services: In Search of the Holy Referee Grail
This paper argues that delivering free services is driven by a combination of motivations and explains how policy makers or other principals can exploit them to deal with underproduction of free services. We identify intrinsic motivation, respect and gratitude as main examples of underlying motivations. What is essential for free services is that there is considerable heterogeneity in how these motivations are valued across the population. We show how a menu of (monetary and non-monetary) rewards can easily outperform simple compensation approaches since it allows for self-selection and caters for the heterogeneity. As the leading example, we illustrate how a menu can improve the academic referee process. The menu idea can be used in a large set of settings and is potentially very fruitful.
- 1 June 2014
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Man and the Economy
- Vol. 1 (1) , 79-92
How to Boost the Production of Free Services: In Search of the Holy Referee Grail
This paper argues that delivering free services is driven by a combination of motivations and explains how policy makers or other principals can exploit them to deal with underproduction of free services. We identify intrinsic motivation, respect and gratitude as main examples of underlying motivations. What is essential for free services is that there is considerable heterogeneity in how these motivations are valued across the population. We show how a menu of (monetary and non-monetary) rewards can easily outperform simple compensation approaches since it allows for self-selection and caters for the heterogeneity. As the leading example, we illustrate how a menu can improve the academic referee process. The menu idea can be used in a large set of settings and is potentially very fruitful.
- 24 October 2013
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 14 (1) , 189-202
Market-Induced Rationalization and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels
We show that incomplete cartels in quantity-setting oligopolies may increase welfare, without any efficiencies or synergies being internalized by cartel formation. The main intuition is that the cartel has an incentive to contract output and that the firms outside the cartel react to this by expanding output. If the outsiders are more efficient than the cartel firms, average production costs go down. We model collusion in a market structure with imperfect substitute goods. Even for relatively moderate differences in efficiency, total welfare may increase due to this market-induced rationalization, whereas the cartel remains profitable. We discuss why the effect can be relevant for sectors where new, superior products are developed. Because anti-cartel enforcement is costly, it is important for competition authorities to realize that not all cartels lead to a welfare loss.
- 24 October 2013
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 14 (1) , 189-202
Market-Induced Rationalization and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels
We show that incomplete cartels in quantity-setting oligopolies may increase welfare, without any efficiencies or synergies being internalized by cartel formation. The main intuition is that the cartel has an incentive to contract output and that the firms outside the cartel react to this by expanding output. If the outsiders are more efficient than the cartel firms, average production costs go down. We model collusion in a market structure with imperfect substitute goods. Even for relatively moderate differences in efficiency, total welfare may increase due to this market-induced rationalization, whereas the cartel remains profitable. We discuss why the effect can be relevant for sectors where new, superior products are developed. Because anti-cartel enforcement is costly, it is important for competition authorities to realize that not all cartels lead to a welfare loss.